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Animation is popularly thought of as a sequence of still images or cartoons that 
produce an illusion of movement. However, a broader perspective of animation should 
encompass the diverse kinds of media artifacts imbued with the illusion of life. In many 
multimedia artifacts today, computational media algorithmically implement expanded 
illusions of life, which include images not only moving, but also showing reactions to 
stimuli (reactive animation), transforming according to their own internal rules 
(autonomous animation), evolving over a period of time (metamorphic animation), or 
even generating varying instances subject to user intervention or chance (contingent 
animation). 
Animation in the digital age consists of forms as varied as computer-generated 
imagery (CGI) in films, motion graphics on interactive multimedia websites, animated 
contents of video games, graphical interfaces of computer systems, and even digital 
signage in communal areas. With these forms, the new animation phenomena emerge 
from entertainment media, functional designs, and expressive works alike, all of which 
may engage viewers’ sensory perceptions, cognitive processes, as well as motor actions. 
Hence, the study and creation of animation now requires an interdisciplinary 
framework, including (1) insights from perceptual psychology and animation studies 
about animacy, (2) theories of conceptual blending from cognitive science applied to 
understanding images, (3) notions of embodiment and temporality in phenomenological 
approaches to human-computer interaction (HCI), and (4) new interpretations of liveness 
in performance studies accounts of computer-mediated performance. These emergent 
 xvi 
ideas jointly characterize the new role of animation in media, and produce new 












 This chapter provides general readers with a background understanding of the 
many ambiguous meanings of the term “animation” and introduces a new theoretical 
perspective on the subject. It also states the dissertation’s central thesis question, and 
introduces the motivating beliefs, aims, and intended outcomes of it. 
Animation as a Medium 
 Animation, to many people, is regarded as a synonym for cartoons, a subcategory 
of movies or television programs, which primarily target children. Innumerable animated 
cartoons have been produced over the past hundred years, including many classics from 
Walt Disney Studios and comparable contenders in North America like Fleischer Studios, 
Warner Bros. Animation, and others. They gave birth to many cartoon characters, such as 
Mickey Mouse, Betty Boop, Popeye, Daffy Duck, and somewhat more lately Buzz 
Lightyear, who constituted the childhood memories of many. The 24-hour rotation of 
both classic and contemporary animated TV shows on cable television further shows that 
animation is definitely a major entertainment medium to most Americans (Wells, 2002, 
pp. 3-6). On the other hand, the viewership of Japanese animation, commonly known as 
anime, is an antithesis to the North American norm because its target audience is not 
primarily composed of children, and its themes can be as varied as those of live-action 
cinema (Napier, 2005, pp. 15-19). Anime, manga (Japanese comics), and video games 
have garnered so much media time and space in Japan that they have spun off many other 
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subcultures, like the cosplay (costume play) and otaku1 scenes (Lamarre, 2009, p. 144). 
Many anime fans consider animation as an indispensable part of their lives. In this regard, 
animation is not just an entertainment form, but also a socio-cultural representation that 
entails the making of both everyday and extraordinary cultural meanings (Fore, 2007). 
Animation as a Technology of Illusion 
 On the consumer side, animation is a medium. On the producer side, the story is 
different. To many filmmakers and media producers, animation is the technique of 
creating an illusion of movement by means of showing successive images at a flickering 
speed. The technique has been widely applied in film productions for many years to 
create special effects, such as using the stop-motion technique to make the larger-than-
life gorilla in King Kong (1933) appear to climb up the Empire State Building. Similarly, 
by means of the cel-animation technique, the cartoon character Bugs Bunny appears to 
play basketball with Michael Jordon in Space Jam (1996). Lately, with the advances in 
computer graphics technology, the illusion of life has become more photorealistic. The 
audiences’ eyes are cheated to believe that extinct species of dinosaurs are reborn in 
Jurassic Park (1993), or that Manhattan is destructed by an immense tsunami in The Day 
After Tomorrow (2004). However, in the eyes of media historians or theorists, no matter 
how realistic the visual effect on the screen is, it is still composed of a sequence of still 
images. The essential technique is no different from a set of nineteenth-century bourgeois 
toys, including the thaumatrope, the phenakistoscope, the zoetrope, and the praxinoscope. 
All these apparatuses, collectively called animation toys, existed well before film and are 
believed to have inspired the inventions leading to the cinematic apparatus. Hence, some 
                                                 
 
 
1 According to Lamarre (2009:xvii), the term otaku generally refers to “cult fans,” who are “totally into 
manga, anime, video games, and a range of related merchandise and events.” 
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theorists (Cholodenko, 1991b, pp. 9-10; Manovich, 2001, p. 302) see animation as the 
ancestor of the cinema, rather than a part of it, in technological terms. 
Animation as an Art Form 
 Regarding animation as just a set of technologies induces annoyance in many 
artists who have been fascinated by, or obsessed with, the specific medium for quite some 
time. Instead of just a way to create illusion, many of them see animation as a singular art 
form enabling them to convey messages in unprecedented and expressive ways as they 
navigate through a continuum between mimesis and abstraction (Furniss, 1998, pp. 5-6). 
The unique medium benefits from live-action film the poetics of narratives, and shares 
the aesthetics of ambiguity with the visual arts. Hence, it has always been one of major 
playgrounds of the formal avant-garde. From Walter Ruttmann’s Opus 1 (1921) and Hans 
Richter’s Rhythmus 21 (1921), to the later works of Oskar Fischinger (e.g., Composition 
in Blue, 1935), Len Lye (e.g., A Color Box, 1935), Norman McLaren (e.g., Hen Hop, 
1942), experimental abstract films from that era involved animated components 
substantially enough that they can even be classified as animation films. Parallel to these 
radical attempts, some others have explored the nuances of narrative mode and the 
physicality of the medium. Chuck Jones (e.g., Duck Amuck, 1951), Osamu Tezuka (e.g., 
Broken Down Film, 1985), and lately Daniel Greaves (e.g., Manipulation, 1991) tell 
stories in their exemplars without forgetting to remind the audience of the specificity and 
materiality of the medium, such as the camera frame, film celluloid, paper, ink, and paint. 
Meanwhile, there are numerous canonical works that depict poignant, evocative, and 
metaphorical stories, including Jiri Trnka’s The Hand (1965), Caroline Leaf’s The Street 
(1976), Yuriy Norshteyn’s Tale of Tales (1979), Frédéric Back’s The Man who Planted 
the Trees (1987), and Michael Dudok de Wit’s Father and Daughter (2000). As today’s 
computers and software applications have become accessible, independent animators can 
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create works that are totally self-driven. Now animation is an art form accessible to the 
independent auteur like painting and sculpture. 
 In summary, animation is many things. It can be a kind of entertainment. It can 
also be a form of representation carrying socio-cultural meanings. On the one hand, it 
refers to a set of technologies creating the illusion of movement. On the other hand, it is 
an art form negotiating the tension between reality and imagination. Animation might 
refer to different concepts for different people within different contexts. Some might also 
say that a piece of animation art can simultaneously apply certain animation techniques to 
create illusion, be socially critical, and be entertaining. In other words, all these different 
interpretations of animation in the meantime overlap in some areas. As I have pointed out 
at the beginning of this chapter, the term “animation” is ambiguous. 
Animation in the Digital Age 
 Just like other media or art forms, animation has undergone a digital revolution 
over the past decades. First, we have witnessed animation proliferating in a wide array of 
entertainment media, from animated cartoons, motion titles, music videos, video game 
contents, to interactive multimedia websites, outdoor electronic displays or projections. 
Second, major production technologies have advanced from the traditional hand drawings 
on cels, articulated three-dimensional puppets or two-dimensional cutout silhouettes, or 
deployment of animatronic figures, to computer-generated characters and computer-
simulated visual effects. Third, more and more works of art or performance incorporate 
animation into their video or projection content. Most revolutionary of all, many 
interfaces of personal computers or hand-held devices have incorporated animated 
graphical elements. Although these insertions are seemingly for the sake of adornment, 
they are believed to enhance agency of the systems and constitute continuity of the 
human-computer dialogues (Suchman, 2007, pp. 210-214). In short, animation is 
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becoming perceptually pervasive today. We can see animation everywhere in the digitally 
mediated environments we inhabit.  
 In light of this current animation landscape, my overall questions are: during the 
current digital revolution, do these convoluted animation phenomena suggest new 
approaches to the analysis and design of new digital artifacts? Can established theories 
and practices in one area, such as research in user-interface design, give new insights to 
another, such as the study of animation media, and vice versa? I believe that the creation 
and study of the emergent cross-domain animation phenomena in digital media would 
require an interdisciplinary approach. 
Animation as a Phenomenon of Liveliness 
 According to the origin of the term, the literal meaning of “animation” in Latin is 
“instilling with life.” “To animate” is to give life to something. Since what or who gives 
life is always unknown, the act of endowing with life inevitably leads to a spiritual end, 
such as for alchemists in medieval Europe or the Taoist’s in ancient China. To manifest 
the idea of life, some writers use the word figuratively to describe something that “looks” 
lively but is not necessarily alive, for example, “animation of the machine” (Turkle, 
1984, p. 27). In this sense, life is a kind of everyday experience and animation is an 
illusion of that experience. In the traditional view of animation, the illusion is mainly 
projected by means of movement. I argue to expand the meaning of  “illusion of life.” 
This illusion hinges not solely on movement, but on the perceptual phenomenon of 
liveliness, which is reminiscent of our embodied everyday experiences with life, such as 
reaction, metamorphosis, growth, and so on. It is my belief that this interpretation gives 
us a useful theoretical lens to juxtapose and analyze animation phenomena of different 
domains in comparable vocabularies. When an animated cartoon cat walks like an elegant 
lady, when two squares in an abstract film spin like a pair of dancers, when computer 
interfaces present windows moving playfully and responding to user clicks by twisting 
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and minimizing, when game characters bounce, squash, and stretch while heroically 
exploring their worlds, the phenomenon of liveliness is the soul of all animations. 
 This phenomenon-oriented approach to animation tends to include everything 
around us in the world. A counter-question is: is it theoretically fruitful to have an all-
embracing concept of animation? My aim is not to invent an all-encompassing theory of 
animation, but rather to mobilize the interlinking, or to destabilize the borders, between 
different areas of knowledge pertaining to animation. It is not my intention to establish 
overarching knowledge of such areas as human-computer interaction, artificial life, 
artificial intelligence, digital art, or digital performance. I only believe that each of these 
areas that manifest the illusion of life would help delineate the essence of animation in 
the digital age. My ultimate focus is still on how images, with the aid of computers, can 
project an expanded illusion of life.  
 Hence, this dissertation is intended to 
• theoretically establish a new perspective of animation in today’s digital age as a 
perceptual phenomenon (Chapter 2); 
• extend theories of perception, cognition, and bodily interaction for analysis based 
in this new perspective on animation (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4); 
• examine a corpus of animated artifacts exemplifying the new animation paradigm, 
and identify a set of key variables defining the primary concerns for designers and 
developers (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6);  
• suggest a novel framework for designing more embodied, evocative, and affective 
forms of generative and interactive animation (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8); 
• investigate potential contributions to new principles of interface design, and new 






 This chapter starts with characterizing the emerging animation phenomena I have 
observed from today’s digital media and have introduced in the previous chapter, 
followed by questions I raise to challenge the inadequacies of existing approaches to the 
study and creation of animation. I then propose a “movement” away from analytically 
focusing on any single medium to studying a more embodied experience of the illusion of 
life with lessons informed from several peculiar mechanical artifacts, which give rise to 
the idea of generative and interactive animation. 
New Animation Phenomena in the Digital Age 
 As mentioned in the last chapter, with recent advances in multimedia 
technologies, animation has become increasingly pervasive. Apart from the cinema and 
television, today we can see animation in many digitally mediated environments, such as 
the graphical user interface (GUI) of many operating systems, interactive multimedia 
websites on the Internet, entertainment or lifestyle applications on hand-held mobile 
devices, and many electronic displays or projections in outdoor communal areas. These 
multimedia artifacts consist of “animated” (in the sense of “bringing to life”) images, 
which are not only “moving,” but also presenting an expanded illusion of life, such as 
showing reactions to stimuli (reactivity), transforming according to their internal rules 
(autonomy), evolving over a period of time (generativity or metamorphosis), or even 
producing divergent outcomes subject to chance or intervention (contingency). Examples 
of reactivity include a graphic icon in Macintosh OS X bouncing restlessly in response to 
a user click, and a mouse pointer shedding glitter like fairy dust trailing Disney’s version 
of Tinker Bell. Autonomous animation can be seen when a cartoon dog runs on a 
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computer screen during a file transfer, or when a little green man walks faster and faster 
in a traffic light on counting down to the red signal (Figure 2.1). A virtual tree growing 
on a website based on user-submitted content demonstrates both metamorphosis and 
contingency. Despite the ubiquity, however, such animation phenomena are typically not 
considered in the study of animation, but instead are regarded as visual effects in user-
interface design, computer game development, and related fields. I believe that the idea 
of animation should be expanded to encompass this wide array of phenomena of 
liveliness enabled by emerging technologies of digital media, because they altogether 
project a more pervasive impression of life than traditional filmic animation. 
 
Figure 2.1 An animated “running” green man on a traffic light in Taipei 
Theorizing the New Animation Phenomena 
 Considering the new animation phenomena in digital media based on existing 
animation theories, which primarily centralize traditional filmic animation, inevitably 
brings about challenging theoretical inquiries. Viewing experience of the new animation 
phenomena differs from that of filmic animation in that a viewer of the former is not just 
a passive audience but also a participant. Initially, the viewer perceives movements in 
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digital media the same way as in animation films and interprets the images subject to her 
or his past movie or television viewing experience. Yet, the viewing context in digital 
media may differ considerably. In addition to perceiving the images on a screen, the 
viewer is invited or required to “fiddle” with the artifacts, such as configuring a GUI on a 
mobile phone, controlling a game character, or interactively operating a multimedia 
authoring software application. In short, when the viewer sees the animation, she or he 
also interacts with the artifact. This scenario triggers us rethinking many traditional 
perspectives on animation. For instance, the genie effect of Macintosh OS X is perceived 
differently from the genie in Aladdin (1992) (Figure 2.2). The little green man walking 
and running on traffic lights does not work the same way as the incredible Hulk in both 
functional and perceptual terms. Textual analysis2 in terms of semiotics, genre, or 
narrative that formerly applied to animation films or television shows might not be 
directly relevant to the new animation phenomena. Regarding the functionality of these 
artifacts, their goals and objectives might as well be completely unrelated to conventional 
animations. Before looking into these issues, we need to start with an overview of some 
existing approaches to animation, from both the humanities and computing disciplines. 
                                                 
 
 
2 The meaning of the term “text” here follows Roland Barthes, who sees visual media such as photography, 
film, television, or painting based on codes, like verbal languages. 
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Figure 2.2 Two genies, one in a cartoon animation, another in Macintosh OS X 
Existing Approaches to Animation 
 In this section, I present a brief survey of approaches to studying animation from 
film-based and computer graphics-based perspectives. I then point out the inadequacies 
of these approaches by highlighting their over-reliance on considering the medium-
specific images in animation as the central object in their analyses. These medium-centric 
approaches inevitably fail to cope with the new paradigm of digital animation driven by 
emerging technologies across multiple media. 
Film-Based Approaches 
 In humanities disciplines, animation is generally seen as a marginal type of film, 
often referred to as an “animation film.” Scholars have predominantly drawn on two 
approaches to animation research, namely contextual and textual analysis (Furniss, 1998, 
pp. 7-12). The former looks at production contexts, including the historical, industrial, 
technological, and economic situations in which individual works can be understood. 
Some studies in this approach also review the national or cultural aspects of some 
animation films within a film genre. For example, anime is lately an emerging genre, 
which can be studied as a national cinema of Japan with respect to its post-WWII history 
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of economy, just happening to be in the animation category. Susan Napier’s research in 
anime belongs to this type of studies, uncovering vital links in both global and local 
contexts (Napier, 2005). The latter approach, usually more theoretical and ahistorical than 
the former, draws attention to the canonical texts of the specific medium. It entails 
conducting close readings of works and applying theoretical models to perform analyses 
of the aesthetics, semiotics, or narratives. For instance, Osamu Tezuka’s Broken Down 
Film (1985) can be contrasted with Chuck Jones’ Duck Amuck (1953) and Daniel 
Greaves’ Manipulation (1991) in terms of the self-reflexivity of cel animation embedded 
in the narratives. Paul Wells’s comprehensive typology of narrative strategies employed 
in a set of canonical animation films demonstrates how this method is applied to 
analyzing the distinctive medium, suggesting a wealth of possibilities for animators and 
filmmakers to create their new works (Wells, 1998, pp. 68-126). While this cursory 
overview of animation studies does not encompass the entirety of film-based approaches 
to animation, it captures at least a sketch of the prevalent and conventional approaches 
within the field.  
 Although research in film-based animation has contributed an immense and 
powerful corpus for the analysis of works creating the illusion of life with sequential 
images, these approaches mainly concentrate on the perception and meaning of visual 
images without addressing the embodied engagement with many multimedia artifacts that 
are also imbued with phenomena of liveliness. The prevalent view of animation as only a 
type of film is too medium-centric in that it falls short of explaining the new animation 
phenomena that have clearly emerged in various media. When computer interfaces 
contain icons that jump restlessly in response to user clicks, and when game characters 
squash and stretch in the game worlds according to players’ control, designers and 
developers working in cross-media fields today require new insights and principles to 
design and produce digital media artifacts of this new genre. We need to import new 
areas of knowledge beyond the film medium.  
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Computer Graphics-Based Approaches 
 On the other hand, in computing disciplines the research agenda of animation has 
primarily been about the digital synthesis of a sequence of images. Early research areas 
included hierarchical modeling and animation in primitive graphic forms, and 
development of efficient standards and encoding for multimedia content. These concerns 
have been expanded by later studies to develop works including computer representation 
of physical objects and materials, photorealistic rendering (and more recently stylized 
rendering, such as cel-shading) techniques, simulation of physical phenomena like 
particle systems and spring dynamics, developing algorithmic approaches to generate 
organic motion such as flocking (e.g., Craig Reynolds’s Boids) or other self-evolving 
patterns like cellular automata (e.g., John Conway’s Game of Life), implementing 
artificial intelligence (AI) programs to create animated behaviors3, and much more. Initial 
application domains were primarily technical, scientific, medical, architectural, and 
recently cinematic, yet the marvelous illusions generated by computers have spread to 
other communal and personal entertainment platforms, including television, digital signs 
and billboards, notebook computers, and hand-held devices. 
 Mainstream computing disciplines see animation as a part of computer graphics. 
The term computer animation is narrowly understood as only computer-generated 
imagery (CGI), which is also a kind of medium-specific images. The promising 
capability of generative algorithms supporting interactive construction of polymorphic 
instances of animation has been downplayed. However, the animation phenomena in 
GUIs and other digital environments remind us that a new paradigm of animation is 
                                                 
 
 
3 Though work in this vein such as in Bates (1993, 1994) often focuses on creating digital characters with a 
sense of believable “aliveness,” which often highlights creating seemingly intelligent and emotional 
human-like responses more than the type of perceived dynamic phenomena that is the focus of my concern 
with “liveliness,” see Chapter 7 for more discussion. 
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emerging on the computer platform. This generative and interactive form of animation 
has not been addressed directly by current research in human-computer interaction (HCI), 
because its concerns are mainly usability- or productivity-oriented. Although a few other 
researchers like Joseph Bates (1993, 1994), Michael Mateas (2004), and Ken Perlin have 
developed works that do consider computer expressiveness as part of their concerns, they 
have not explicitly pointed out the role of animation in computational media. We need an 
interdisciplinary approach that brings consideration of expressiveness and entertainment 
value of animation to the design and creation of computer artifacts. 
 The above approaches to animation are not only medium-centric, but are also 
discipline-centric. On the humanities side, major studies of animation emphasize the 
aesthetic, expressive, affective, and social- or even political-critical values of the 
artifacts. Scholars in these areas are interested in how animation makes meaning. On the 
computing side, researchers focus on the practical, informational, or entertainment 
potentials of the related technologies. They incline to explore how people and society can 
benefit from a state of the art. The two disciplines contrast dramatically in their mind-
sets. 
Definitions of Animation 
 Aside from being colonized by either Film Studies or Computer Science, 
animation has also been isolated as a separate area of inquiry as some animation theorists 
are interested in marking a new territory. At the outset, the majority of these theorists 
define animation by its creation processes and industrial practices. This majority 
unanimously arrives at a definition that hinges on the frame-by-frame manipulation of 
images (Ward, 2000). On the other hand, some define animation in terms of styles. 
Maureen Furniss outlines a continuum of animation in relation to live-action imagery. 
She uses “abstraction” and “mimesis” to represent the extremes of the continuum, which 
aims to encompass all different film styles and approaches (Furniss, 1998, pp. 5-6). 
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Similarly, Paul Wells proposes a relational array between “experimental” and 
“orthodox,” with a remark that animation should challenge the regime of live-action films 
(Wells, 1998, p. 28). 
 In contrast, the Canadian animator Norman McLaren (1950) came up with what 
has proved to be the most influential definition of animation, which is more about 
essence than the process: “animation is not the art of drawings that move but the art of 
movement that are drawn” (Furniss, 1998, p. 5). His emphasis on movement rather than 
drawings echoes Gilles Deleuze’s view: “animation is not the transformation of images 
into one another, but the images being formed and dissolving through movement” 
(Schaffer, 2007). That is to say, animation is not formed by images before movement but 
rather after it. That means movement precedes images in animation, for there are no 
animated images without movement. Both McLaren’s and Deleuze’s views seem to 
imply that movement constitutes animated images. In other words, movement is the 
essence of animation. Their ideas, prioritizing movement over images or drawings, mark 
a major step toward the illusion of life. However, they still position animation in a 
particular medium. Considering only the cinematic medium is inadequate in addressing 
the emerging phenomena pertaining to animation across multiple media. As I have 
mentioned in the last chapter, we need a broader perspective of animation to investigate 
the new cross-media and cross-discipline animation phenomena. 
Beyond Single Medium 
 Hence, I call for a “movement” away from centralizing any single medium to a 
phenomenon-oriented approach to the study of animation. This movement brings into 
consideration human perception, cognition, and bodily interaction when dealing with 
animated artifacts, addressing the aforementioned discipline- and medium-centric 
problems. On the one hand, the new perspective mobilizes interplay of knowledge 
between different areas, including perceptual psychology, animation studies, visual 
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studies, cognitive science, HCI, and even performance studies. It echoes with, and 
actually extends, Paul Ward’s suggestion for a discursive study of multiple areas of 
knowledge about animation (Ward, 2003). On the other hand, the movement shifts our 
focus from medium-specific images to diverse kinds of media artifacts imbued with an 
illusion of life, spanning a range from the nineteenth-century bourgeois toys to computers 
in the late twentieth century. The close relationship between animation and many early 
experimental artifacts creating moving images has been respectively marked by Alan 
Cholodenko (Cholodenko, 1991a, 2007), Lev Manovich (Manovich, 2001), and others. 
To me, Cholodenko’s latest view is exceptional in that he draws attention to the animatic 
apparatus in addition to the animated image (Cholodenko, 2007). Cholodenko thinks that 
the “animatic apparatus,” which he refers to the mechanical apparatus that generates 
moving pictures, such as the phenakistoscope or the zoetrope, manifests a double 
definition of animation: simultaneously meaning “endowing with life” and “endowing 
with movement.” One could interpret that it animistically gives life to inanimate images 
through mechanical movements like spinning, flipping, and illuminating. In this regard, I 
would add that animation should not only refer to visual imagery and the animatic 
apparatus that generates it, it also includes the operation of the apparatus, which performs 
the embodied and material realization of animation. Early animatic apparatuses seem on 
the surface level to involve only visual perception. Yet in practice, a certain degree of 
motor action on the viewer’s part is required, from the simplest action of peeping in, to 
more engaging physical operation to “generate” and “maintain” the moving images. 
Hence, it should be recognized that sensorimotor interaction is essential to the operation 
and reception of animation. 
 Cholodenko calls his readers’ attentions to the animatic apparatus, including 
accounts of animation toys. These artifacts are generally regarded as ancestors of 
animation in Euro-American study of the arts. In fact, many mechanical artifacts from 
other parts of the world also manifest the human pursuits for creating an illusion of life 
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and movement. Most importantly, they all mobilize a connection between motor action 
and sensory feedback on the viewer’s side. They include shadow puppets, humanoid 
automata, karakuri (a kind of Japanese mechanical robot developed in the Edo period), 
pacing-horse lamps (a kind of traditional Chinese lanterns), and Chinese handscroll 
paintings.  
 Shadow puppets are brought to life under the motor control of puppeteers. While 
moving a rod hooked up the limb of a shadow puppet, a puppeteer is simultaneously a 
performer as well as an audience of her or his own show, because the puppeteer also 
gazes at the animated images on the screen, just from the other side of it compared with 
the theatrical audience. The puppeteer’s visual and motor systems are wired in the 
movements of the puppet (Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3 Puppeteers being simultaneously performers and audiences of their own show 
 Automata are “programmed” by humans through mechanical means to 
“demonstrate” self-movement, creating an illusion of autonomy. Their control is largely 
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limited to the basic on-and-off operation. Yet, some of the humanoid automata, such as 
the Japanese tea-serving karakuri (Figure 2.4), can demonstrate an embodied and situated 
interaction with the audience. When the audience takes the cup of tea from the karakuri’s 
hands, it stops pacing and waits patiently. Once the teacup is returned, it bows 
courteously and turns back. The action and reaction loop is embedded in the ritual of 
Japanese tea ceremony. Although puppets and automata are peripheral to human actors in 
theatrical performance, they manifest the human pursuit for creating the illusion of life.  
 
Figure 2.4 A tea-serving karakuri 
 Meanwhile, the Chinese pacing-horse lamp (Figure 2.5) functions more like a 
peculiar mix of mechanized zoetrope and shadow play. The turning of the drum inside 
the lantern is driven by thermodynamics. Although the mechanical process is different 
from that in automata, the human operation is similar. The viewer is always able to adjust 
the turning speed for an optimal viewing experience. 
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Figure 2.5 Figures on a pacing-horse lamp spinning automatically 
 Besides, many Chinese handscroll paintings entail even more viewer-driven 
interaction. The handscroll, a distinguished format in Chinese painting, is an exceedingly 
long horizontal scroll. When not in use, it is rolled up. On viewing, the beholder unrolls 
part of it, approximately an arm-length at a time. This length roughly defines the size of 
the viewing frame, which slides over the whole scroll, like a horizontal pan of 
background in cel animation. This paper panning is coordinated by both hands of the 
viewer and loops back to her or his eyes. When the viewer’s field of sight approaches the 
edge of the frame, the viewer would gently unroll that side of the scroll and roll up the 
other end. The motor action of the hands and the visual perception jointly produce an 
apparent sense of controlling a horizontal camera pan. Although the picture is 
undoubtedly static, the peculiar artifact does give the beholder an experience of moving 
camera view in a landscape or even a narrative world (Figure 2.6).  
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Figure 2.6 A beholder’s hands and eyes coordinating the panning of a hand-scroll 
painting (Wu, 1996, p. 58) 
 The causal relationship is intricate between the illusion of life created and the 
motor-sensory connection embedded in these artifacts. Apparently, the illusion is 
triggered and maintained by motor control, and then perceived by the user. Conversely, 
the created illusion amazes the audience and incites further bodily engagement with the 
artifacts. This engaging feedback loop characterizes an embodied experience of an 
expanded illusion of life that involves not only sensory perception but also motor action.  
 It is this feedback loop that is a major characteristic of animation on computers 
today in which algorithms support interactive multiple generation of the expanded 
illusion of life. Similar interplay between illusion and engagement in the above 
mechanical artifacts is also active in many digital media artifacts. We are presented with 
digital puppets (e.g., avatars in computer games or virtual worlds), computational 
automata (e.g., screensavers of computer operating systems), and interactively scrollable 
pictures (e.g., Apple Quicktime VR technology). These terms are not metaphorical, but 
rather are ontological, because computers actually display reactive, autonomous, 
evolving, and contingent images, just like percepts that shadow puppets, karakuri, 
pacing-horse lamps, and the like, convey to their audiences. When we walk across the 
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road “with” the little green man on a walk signal, when we call in a genie-like application 
on a computer, when we move the mouse pointer with trailing fairy dust like a magic 
wand, when we tilt a hand-held gadget to pour water “out of” the screen, animation 
alongside the computer provide us with a more embodied experience of an expanded 
illusion of life than the traditional film form of animation.  
 I have been calling this the “new animation paradigm,” “generative and 
interactive animation,” or most simply, interactive generative animation. This type of 
animation is generative, because works of this kind are able to present different versions 
rendered possible by computational generation. As Philip Galanter puts it, generative art 
is a method in which an artist off-loads “moment-to-moment intuitive decisions to an 
external autonomous system” (Galanter, 2006, my italics). By autonomous system, he 
meant a system generating time-sensitive instances. Hence, the multiple instances of the 
new animation works are dynamically generated by systems. Meanwhile, works of this 
new paradigm are also interactive, because they are often open to user input and 
intervention. Simon Penny asserts that interactive art should involve machine systems to 
produce reactive instances based on sensory input (Penny, 1996). In other words, systems 
generate different versions of output in response to different user input on different 
occasions. It follows that new animation works are made interactive with the support of 
systems too.  
 Both Galanter’s generative art and Penny’s interactive art include systems and 
instances, which give rise to major phenomena of liveliness I have reiterated, namely the 
autonomous and the reactive. Moreover, as I shall show in later chapters, other 
phenomena like contingency would also emerge as a result. All in all, generativity and 
interactivity are intricately conjoined in the new animation paradigm, creating an 
expanded illusion of life in computational systems. In the next chapter, I shall underscore 
several established areas of knowledge that are useful for us to investigate the 
characteristics of this new type of animation from multiple perspectives. 
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The text and figures of this chapter, in part, contain material that is a reprint of, or has 
been submitted for publication in (Chow & Harrell, 2009a, 2009b). The dissertation 






 In digital media, the new animation paradigm gives audiences an embodied 
experience of an expanded illusion of life, which includes not only movement, but also 
various other phenomena of liveliness, such as reactions to stimuli, rule-based 
autonomous behaviors, or even enduring and contingent transformations like 
metamorphosis or growth. These emerging animation phenomena are becoming more 
pervasive, but also increasingly convoluted, in our digitally mediated everyday life. What 
surround us are apparently embellishments, but I believe they are in fact representing an 
enduring human concern: to create an illusion of life. We require a more robust 
framework to uncover the underpinnings for notion of the new paradigm of animation. To 
start analyzing the new animation phenomena, I delineate the necessary conditions as 
follows: 
• There must be a creator who designs, plans, or programs an illusion of life. 
• There must be an observer who perceives the illusion. 
• There must be material manifestation including imagery of which people make 
meaning. 
• There must be bodily engagement with the material artifact. 
• In digital environments, the creator, the observer, and the artifact co-enact a new 
form of live performance. 
 These conditions mark the human perception, cognition, and bodily interaction in 
relation to animated artifacts in general. Based on these components, I propose four areas 
of knowledge as the points of departure: 
 First, I look at the new animation phenomena from the observer’s perspective 
(The Observer). I review thoughts from animation studies and perceptual psychology 
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regarding how we “perceive” certain dynamic phenomena that are reminiscent of our 
everyday experiences with life. In short, I invoke insights about the observer’s, as well as 
the creator’s, perceptions of animacy. References include (Arnheim, 1974; Cholodenko, 
1991a, 2007; Dennett, 1987; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). 
 Second, I examine the interpretation of an image (The Image). I draw upon 
theories from cognitive semantics and recent findings from neuroscience to discuss how 
we “read” and “sense” animated images and how these images activate our imaginations. 
References include (Fauconnier, 2001; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Glenberg, 1997; 
Hiraga, 2005; Hutchins, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Turner, 
1996). 
 Third, meaning emerges from the new animation phenomena not just through 
image viewing but also by taking bodily action (The Body). Starting with introduction of 
feedback mechanisms from cybernetics and phenomenological approaches to human-
computer interaction, I look into how our bodies engage or even “interact” with these 
animated artifacts. During interactive engagement, meaning is embodied in our bodily 
action. References include (Dourish, 2001; Gibson, 1986; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Moran, 
2000; Shneiderman & Maes, 1997; Wiener, 1961) 
 Fourth, the new animation phenomena can be regarded as a mediated form of 
performance (The Performer). Based on arguments in performance studies about the 
impact of media technologies, I investigate how real-time control and rendering 
technologies entangle the notions of performance and animation, and influence the 
relationship between the performer and the observer, bringing contingencies of life to 
animation. References include (Auslander, 1999; Dixon, 2007; Kleist, 1810; Lewis, 
2000; Reiniger, 1970; Tillis, 2001).  
 Finally, each of these four areas gives rise to new theoretical ideas about 
animation articulated in the next chapter. 
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The Observer: Perception of Animacy 
 This section addresses the general question: what dynamic phenomena make 
things “look lively” to an observer. These phenomena of liveliness are reminiscent of our 
everyday experiences with life and make us aware of life and living things in our 
mundane world. Yet, this awareness of life and living things should not be directly 
equated to aliveness, because the former is only a perception, which alone cannot confirm 
if something is alive. There is subtle difference between “looking lively” and “looking 
alive” since the latter also hinges on our common knowledge (e.g., someone might be 
unconscious, but still alive). In other words, I am not aiming to inquire about the 
metaphysic of life, but instead to characterize the illusion of life. Toward this end, I first 
differentiate the nuances between the concepts of aliveness and liveliness. I draw upon 
perceptual psychology and animation studies to delineate phenomena of liveliness of 
different kinds, namely prominent behaviors and emergent patterns. The former 
concentrates observers’ attentions on particular progressive actions and behaviors, while 
the latter dilute observers’ attentions over a collective transforming whole. In order to 
better illustrate the idea for readers of different backgrounds, I provide the following 
chart of vocabularies in relation to movement, action, visual components, happening, 
animation, and film at large as examples, with the concentrated attention on the left 
whereas the diluted on the right: 
Moving in space Transforming in shape 
Chasing Wandering 
Boxing Dancing 
A tug of war A flock of birds 
Dropping a knife Raining in the environment 
Animated figures Evolving background 
Primary animation Secondary animation 
 25 
Character animation Natural phenomena animation 
Narrative film Abstract (nonrepresentational) film 
  
 Meanwhile, this new perspective on liveliness also attempts to destabilize or 
problematize the dichotomy of the animistic and mechanistic views applying to 
animation, which corresponds to the two conventional animation styles, namely organic 
versus mechanical motion. At the end of this section, I bring up a message that the new 
typology of liveliness would lead us to better motion design than the old classification 
into organic and mechanical movements. 
The Animistic View of Life 
 The connection between the perception of dynamic phenomena and the belief in 
life and soul is a historical thought in many cultures, such as the alchemists targeting 
immortality in the West, the notion of Tao in China, and Shinto in Japan. The idea can be 
collectively called the animistic view of life, in accordance with Alan Cholodenko’s 
essays on the illusion of life (Cholodenko, 1991a, p. 16, 2007, p. 487), as well as Paul 
Wells’s book (Wells, 1998, p. 32). People with this belief might attribute life and soul to 
many dynamic phenomena, not only humans talking and animals walking, but also plants 
growing and even natural phenomena, such as leaves waving in the breeze, water running 
down the river, lightning striking a tree, and the like. They believe in the spiritual 
connection between life and movement. This view has been denigrated as unscientific 
and “primitive,” often grossly mischaracterized by anthropological texts – that is not the 
type of argument being made here. In this chapter, the term “animistic” specifically refers 
to a kind of subjective association of dynamic phenomena with living things. As Mark 
Turner puts it, we tend to compare an actor moving a physical object to the movement of 
our body, believing that there is a soul responsible for the bodily movement (Turner, 
1996, p. 21). Likewise, one might on a preconscious level believe that falling leaves and 
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floating clouds all have their own internal impulses and souls. This perspective, as 
applied to performing art or animation, partly explains the psychological effect when we 
view a marionette walking on the theatrical stage, a tea-serving karakuri (a mechanical 
robot) nodding its head, or a computer-generated desktop lamp jumping on the cinema 
screen. We are inclined to “suspend our disbelief” and see them as alive. In other words, 
when we see things moving, no matter for a hand drawing, a puppet, or an everyday 
object, we tend to suppose they are animated (i.e., brought to life), resulting in what we 
call “animation.” 
Piaget on Aliveness 
 The animistic view also has an empirical grounding. Since 1920s, the Swiss 
philosopher Jean Piaget started to study children’s perspective of life and soul by 
conducting interviews. He later concluded in his theory of child development that 
children are having different criteria of aliveness in the course of their growth. At the 
very first stage, they consider nearly everything as alive. At the second stage, movement 
differentiates the animate from the inanimate. At the third stage, they think something 
that generates its own movement is alive, while something moved by others is not 
(Arnheim, 1974, p. 400; Turkle, 1984, p. 30). His findings explain why an infant child is 
engaged with the mobile above the crib, and why kids love the anthropomorphic sun and 
moon. This theory about child psychology at different ages seems largely compatible 
with the animistic view that movement instills life. However, one should not hastily think 
that this view only applies to infants or children, just as some people see animation as 
cartoons only for kids. In fact, this psychological view at earlier ages is still traceable in 
our immediate perception after growing up. 
Arnheim on Liveliness 
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 The perceptual psychologist Rudolf Arnheim has carefully articulated the nuances 
between aliveness and liveliness. For Arnheim, the former is a psychological belief, 
while the latter is a perceptual quality. On the basis of perception and observation alone, 
we may find something very lively but may not think it is alive at second thought. 
Arnheim asserts that what counts as liveliness is not whether there is really a mind or 
soul, but rather the level of complexity of the observed behavior. He delineates different 
degrees of liveliness according to different levels of complexity, from simple movement 
to complex behavior (Arnheim, 1974, p. 401), as shown in the following list: 
1. Something that moves is livelier than those do not.  
2. Movement involving internal change (i.e., change in shape) is at a higher level of 
complexity than rigid object displacement.  
3. The thing moving by its own force (i.e., self-initiated movement) is higher in 
degree of liveliness than that physically moved by others.  
4. Those self-movements initiated by internal impulses are livelier than those driven 
by external forces.  
 The first three levels cover many natural phenomena and everyday physical 
interactions between actors and objects, such as a leaf falling, a balloon deflating, or 
hitting a tennis ball, whereas the last level corresponds to numerous other organic 
behaviors like chasing, escaping, searching, avoiding, hesitating, and so on. In Arnheim’s 
sense, an observer sees a movement with a higher degree of liveliness, and so more 
“animate,” if the visible “interplay between force and counterforce,” in terms of changes 
in course, dominance, or others, is becoming more complex (Arnheim, 1974, pp. 402-
403).  
From Interaction to Intention 
 Many other researchers in perceptual psychology have also closely investigated 
how motion influences the perception of animacy (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Fritz 
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Heider and Marianne Simmel are among the first of those creating short films of 
geometric figures in motion (Figure 3.1) and asking observers for their immediate 
feedback. They found that observers saw those figures with personalities and emotions 
just because of temporal contiguity and spatial proximity in the films. Their findings have 
called attention to how audiences respond to various qualities of motion, like speed, 
timing, direction, trajectory, and so on. For example, Winand Dittrich and Stephen Lea 
presented observers with a set of randomly moving letters among which there is an 
exceptional one supposed to be intentionally chasing other, like a predator or an attentive 
follower. They found that for one to be detected as particularly animate, apart from 
visible interaction in terms of movement, the impression of intentionality produced by 
the movement is also equally important. While the perception of interaction depends on 
what Arnheim calls the visible interplay between the chaser and the chased, the 
perception of intentionality hinges on only the trajectory of the chaser. A chaser that 
moves prominently to its goal is more easily detected as animate. Steward also conducted 
similar experiments by presenting a set of motion that seemingly violates Newtonian 
laws, that means, showing not interaction between forces, but rather unexpected motion. 
The upshot is that an object abruptly changing direction to avoid an obstacle or suddenly 
accelerating toward a goal is perceived to be more animate (Dittrich & Lea, 1994). 
Lately, Patrice Tremoulet and Jacob Feldman demonstrated that just change in direction 
and change in speed, even without any goal or obstacle, can produce an impression of 




Figure 3.1 Sequential “snapshots” of animation demonstrating perceptual animacy by 
Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) 
Dennett on Intentional Behaviors 
 Results from psychological experiments seem to be in line with Daniel C. 
Dennett’s theory of the intentional stance, which differentiates organic behaviors from 
physical phenomena. The theory describes three levels of abstraction an observer adopts 
when viewing the behavior of an object. At the most concrete level (the physical stance), 
an observer uses his knowledge of the laws of physics to predict the outcome of a 
behavior, for example, a flying ball going to break a window. At the next level (the 
design stance), an observer assumes an engineered or biological system governing the 
outcome and ignores the mechanics within the system. For instance, one can predict an 
alarm clock is about to ring when the set time comes. At the most abstract level (the 
intentional stance), an observer treats an object having intention toward a goal (Dennett, 
1987, pp. 16-17). When we see several ponies fleeing the forest, we guess they are 
escaping from a danger. The intentional stance not only applies to plants or artifacts 
(Dennett, 1987, pp. 16-22), but also reflects in our viewing of animation. When we watch 
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a pendulum, we take the physical stance to predict the swing. In case the pendulum 
suddenly swings past the highest point and spins around, we would feel that it gains 
“celestial” internal energy that acts against the natural force, which supposes to keep it on 
the right track. The unanticipated movement would incite us speculating the intent behind 
the dynamic and switching to the intentional stance, by which we are not asking whether 
the pendulum has an inner soul, but rather predicting what the next action is.  
 To some researchers exploring expressive potential of computation such as 
George Lewis, Fox Harrell, and Jichen Zhu, this subjective attribution of intention to 
unanticipated and independent behaviors is even a key to designing seemingly intelligent 
systems (Harrell & Zhu, 2009; Zhu & Harrell, 2009). Harrell and Zhu think that the sense 
of intentionality in these systems not only depends on computational complexity, but also 
results from the interplay of user agency (affecting the system according to its 
affordances) and system agency (the user’s interpretation of the system’s behavior as 
self-motivated, responsive, and intentional) in social and cultural situations. I add that 
temporal context is also crucial, because Dennett’s the intentional stance is time-
dependent. Dennett believes that humans would “choose” different levels of stance when 
viewing the behavior of an object. This act of choosing may not be a conscious mental 
activity, but rather takes place at the preconscious cognitive level (Dennett, 1987, p. 22), 
especially when the behavior happens in a time-sensitive situation. For instance, upon 
seeing an animated character fleeing, we have no time to analyze rationally whether there 
is a soul – we just automatically and inevitably think about its goal in relation to the 
situation. In other words, the intentional stance taken by the observer is largely an 
immediate and preconscious response to the liveliness of an animated object. 
Interactional and Intentional Liveliness 
 Hence, the idea of liveliness should at least encompass interactional and 
intentional aspects. For interactional liveliness the more complex the interplay of forces, 
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the livelier the behavior is. It follows that a ghost in the arcade game Pac-Man is quite 
lively, because it runs away from Pac-Man who has eaten a power pellet and then turns 
back to attack him again after the power has gone. The situation also applies to many 
recurrent chasing sequences in animated films like The Coyote and The Road Runner. For 
intentional liveliness, the movement need not be complex and forces may not be 
obviously visible. In fact, it is more about surprising the audience by breaking the 
expected action-reaction pattern. For instance, at the very beginning of the computer 
animation film Luxo Jr. (1986), a plastic ball rolls in and stops next to a desktop lamp, 
which suddenly “wakes up,” looks closely and pushes back the ball. This act surprises 
audiences and invokes the intentional stance. Next, the ball bounces back and again, an 
audience might consider if the ball also has its intention, especially when the ball seems 
like rolling out of the frame by itself. One does not switch back to the physical stance 
toward the ball until the lamp looks back into someone in the dark. This first 30-second 
happening in the film shows us how intentional liveliness meticulously effects based on 
simple, but unexpected, motion. 
Emergent Liveliness 
 Meanwhile, Arnheim also touched upon other kinds of complex behavior, such as 
dancing and acting. He sees dance performance as the “dynamics conveyed to the 
audience visually” (Arnheim, 1974, p. 408). Any movement of body parts must be 
generated by a “narrow local impulse,” which spreads over all the body and visibly 
brings about the posture. I believe, to observers, these dynamics are so intricate that the 
interaction among various impulses can only be perceived collectively. The final image 
projected to observers is still full of energy, but it is definitely not a simple interactional 
or intentional behavior. It gives us the third type of liveliness: emergent pattern. This 
dynamic phenomenon is like the emergent motion of bird or fish flocking, in which each 
animate being is steering toward local flock-mates and away from overcrowding 
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simultaneously. Observers cannot tell from where the impulses emerge, because every 
point of motion is leading, and also being led, now and then, here and there, just like 
every joint and tendon of a dancer in action. What one can tell is that the overall 
performance is very lively. Therefore, Dennett’s theory may not apply here, because an 
audience in a dance performance or a beholder of a kaleidoscope seems not to take any of 
the three stances. One just gazes at the presentation and enjoys the transformation 
emerging. In fact, this specific kind of liveliness does not concentrate our attentions on 
the behaviors of particular figures or objects, but rather distribute, or even dilute, our 
focus over a collective transforming whole. I call this emergent liveliness. 
Concentrated versus Diluted Attentions 
 Emergent liveliness stands quite a different position from interactional and 
intentional liveliness. Not only does it divert observers from Dennett’s three stances, but 
also it expands our notion of animacy. The animists would argue for this wider horizon, 
because they attribute life to even falling leaves and waving water. Based on Arnheim’s 
continuum, these natural phenomena are only of low-degree liveliness because they show 
little or no obvious impulse. Yet, when anime fans are fascinated by the spectacular 
landscape where grass straws sway in the breeze while the hero just stands still (Figure 
3.2), when water ripples spread from the mouse over a button on the computer screen 
(Figure 3.3), I assert that analysis of only the degrees of liveliness of these phenomena 
does not truly reveal their vitality. What we need to emphasize here is not the difference 
in degree, but the difference in kind. There is another kind of liveliness beside those 
prominent interactional and intentional behaviors. Instead of highlighting tension 
between forces or surprising acts, this type of liveliness shows a continuous and 
persistent change in state, which project a life-like ambience to the observers. If 
prominent liveliness, including the interactional and the intentional, concentrates 
audiences’ attentions on the high-pass momentum, the alternative kind, emergent 
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liveliness, distributes their attentions to low-pass kinetics. In animation films, the former 
corresponds to primary motion, like the eye movement of Donald Duck, stretch and 
squash of a bouncing ball, whereas the latter secondary motion, such as Superman’s cape 
waving in the air and follow-through motion of a ponytail (Figure 3.4). This “secondary” 
liveliness usually shows rhythmic patterns, such as waving, orbiting, and cycling. 
Occasionally, it involves stochastic components, like irregularity, chaos, and noise, just 
as an integral part of real life. In animation practices, these motions are called 
“secondary” because they are derived from the primary one, but the succession does not 
mean the order of importance. To the contrary, these ambient patterns are indispensable 
for a lifelike illusion of life. 
 
Figure 3.2 Genies standing still with their jiggling heads in Princess Mononoke (1997) 
 
  




Figure 3.4 Follow-through motion of a tie under the influence of the body movement 
The Mechanistic Approach to Motion 
 The liveliness of movement patterns has been an enduring human concern. Since 
the Enlightenment, some people have been interested in the means of implementing 
patterns of movement. Following Cholodenko again (Cholodenko, 1991a, p. 16, 2007, p. 
487), here I call them the mechanists. They invented mechanical clocks and various kinds 
of lifelike automata, such as the mechanical duck apparently able to digest and humanoid 
robots seemingly able to play flute and to write (Terpak, 2001). All these artifacts exhibit 
programmed phenomena in patterns. These rhythmic patterns are repeatable because they 
are outputs of pre-calculated geometric ratios of gears and scales of bars. In short, they 
are regarded as mechanical motion. Ironically, the primary focus of these automata was 
to simulate organic behaviors. Similar attempts of highlighting patterns can be found in 
some non-narrative animation films, like John Whitney’s abstract computer animation, in 
which mathematical algorithms generate visual rhythms, and Oskar Fischinger’s 
Composition in Blue (1935), in which movements were programmed according to the 
soundtrack of the piece. Apart from rhythmic patterns, stochastic phenomena can also be 
under the spotlight of the show. In fact, chance and randomness have always been greatly 
appreciated in art practices because they mean less regular, less predictable, and so often 
more humanlike. This is the reason why the jiggling of frames in many independent 
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hand-drawn animations is praised as a noted complement to the smooth continuity of 
commercial animated cartoons. The idea can be best illustrated by the canonical works of 
Len Lye and Norman McLaren. Lately, with the advent of computer graphics technology, 
chaos can also be simulated by pseudorandom algorithms. For example, the famous 
Perlin noise function has been widely used to model many sorts of chaotic patterns in 
nature, from leaf veins, fire particles, to water waves. The function can even be applied to 
simulate human-scale jitters in film, such as camera shake, jump cuts, and stop-motion 
discontinuity.  
 
Figure 3.5 A screenshot of Composition in Blue (1935) 
Summary: Charting Liveliness 
 In this section, I have described liveliness of three kinds, which result in two 
different sorts of attentions. Interactional and intentional liveliness refer to those 
phenomena concentrate observers’ attentions, whereas emergent liveliness corresponds to 
diluted attention. 
• Interactional liveliness is shown in interplay of force and counter-force. The more 
complex the action-reaction sequence is, the livelier it is. Observers usually 
switch between the physical and the design stances. 
 36 
• Intentional liveliness arises from prominent and progressive movement surprising 
audiences, provoking them into taking the intentional stance. It presents no 
obvious dynamic tension.  
• Emergent liveliness can be found in phenomena that dilute our attention across a 
collective transforming whole. Usually the force pattern is so complex that it 
becomes rhythmic and stochastic, and it is hard to focus on a particular impulse. 
The phenomena are emergent in that no apparent consequence can be noticed very 
often, but they complement the other two types of liveliness to form a complete 
life-like experience. 
 In the section “The Observer” of next chapter, I shall show how these various 
kinds of liveliness are manifested in digital environments, forming a new notion that 
destabilizes the dichotomies between organism versus machine, and animator versus 
program. 
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The Image: Understanding Images 
 This section examines process of interpreting an image. It starts with describing a 
trajectory of thought about images, from the literal meaning of the term in the pictorial or 
visual form, to the metaphorical meaning of the term as a form of mental representation. I 
then review major structuralist semiotics approaches to images, which tend to separate 
material images from their meanings, followed by a survey of other ideas that contend 
that closer connection exists between the material and the mental. Drawing upon insights 
from cognitive semantics together with recent neuroscience findings both from the field 
of cognitive science, I argue that animated visual images, which we understand using 
both our perceptual and motor apparatuses, tie together both material and mental notions 
of images, constituting an embodied kind of cognitive processes. 
 “Image” has many meanings. It literally refers to visual images that exist in 
material forms, like sketches, photographs, or lithographic prints. It also refers to what 
we see, but do not consider to be fundamentally material, such as shadows or film 
projections. But the term has also been extended to mean those images that occur in our 
minds when we think of something, perhaps recalling something seen in the past. 
Sometimes, the term image can even refer to an imaginative construct shared by a group 
of people that may be more about emotional impressions and associations, like the 
general image of a corporation or a rock band. Hence, the term spans both the material 
and the mental. 
Problems in Signification 
 When we perceive an image, how do we interpret it? Do we “read” an image just 
as a word or a sentence? How do we make meaning of an image? This kind of question 
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poses a challenge to many thinkers and researchers in the field of semiotics4. Semiotics, 
also formerly called semiology, is the general science of signs (Barthes, 1973a, p. 9; 
Gombrich, 2002, Preface), emphasizing the process of signification, which means 
something “stands for” something else (Eco, 1976, p. 8). The idea developed from 
concepts from linguistics, in which Ferdinand de Saussure pointed out that for any 
linguistic unit, there is a link between its concept and its sound pattern. To Saussure, this 
sound pattern was not physical sound, so not material, but rather a hearer’s sensory 
impression of the sound (Saussure, 1983, p. 66), or an “acoustic image” as Barthes later 
called it (Barthes, 1973a, p. 38). Hence, Saussure’s notion of signification refers to a link 
between conception and perception. Moreover, Saussure asserted that this link is largely 
arbitrary, which means unmotivated and without any intrinsic natural relation, before 
being established by the language using community (Saussure, 1983, pp. 67-68). For 
example, “kot” in Russian and “cat” in English both refer to the same species of 
quadrupeds – the different sound images are not naturally related to the concept of that 
species but just “imposed” and “anchored” in the corresponding communities. Once 
established, these arbitrary links become stable and resistant to change. Although some 
linguistic signs, like onomatopoeic words, are arguably less arbitrarily motivated at the 
very beginning, Saussure contended that most of these words have been subjected to 
substantive phonetic evolution and already lost their originality (Saussure, 1983, p. 69).  
 Roland Barthes reviewed and extended Saussure’s idea of linguistic signs to apply 
to many of our everyday objects, such as fashion items and images in popular media 
(Barthes, 1973b). Yet he distinguished the character of general signs from that of 
linguistic signs, a distinction that has vital implications for image interpretation.  
                                                 
 
 
4 Here I consider semiotics to be a field of studies, not a discipline, see (Eco, 1976, pp. 7-8). 
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 First, the image, as a sign, rather than purely a psychological entity, has both 
material and mental components. In Elements of Semiology, Barthes pointed out that the 
signifier of a general sign has certain material substance because it acts as a “mediator” 
for the reader to access the meaning/concept of the sign (Barthes, 1973a, p. 47). Since the 
signifier belongs to the “plane of expression,” the substance of expression can be a 
material image, for example, a graphic icon, a picture, or a written word. The signified, 
on the other side of a sign, is a mental image, which corresponds to the “plane of content” 
and refers to the concept in our minds.  
 Second, Barthes’s analyses of images problematize the inevitable oppositions of 
arbitrary and motivated, cultural and natural. For Barthes, an image sign can have both 
conventional symbolic meanings (connotation) and non-coded perceptual messages 
(denotation). For example, an image in a spaghetti advertisement is able to show the 
“Italianicity” of the product, as well as its naturalness and freshness (Barthes, 1977c). In 
this case, the relationship between image and meaning is both arbitrary and motivated 
because it has more than one signification, in which the connotation is cultural whereas 
the denotation is natural. Hence, for Barthes an arbitrary relation is institutionalized, and 
a motivated one hinges on analogy and similarity between the signifier and the signified.  
 In fact, Barthes has brought us other questions even more pertinent to the image 
sign: how can the motivated, and so analogical, nature of images be compatible with the 
discontinuous signification process? (Barthes, 1973a, p. 52) A photographic image is 
analogical. It resembles something. The tomato-like object in the advertising image 
seems like a fresh tomato. This message is not coded, and no one needs any training to 
recognize it. Bathes calls this kind of phenomena an “awareness of have-been-there” 
(Barthes, 1977c).  This perceptual message can be presented in innumerable pictures of 
all nuances. How can this type of analogical many-to-one relations be structurally 
specified by means of signification? 
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 This riddle has been the central question engaging many other thinkers. Nelson 
Goodman addressed the issue of understanding symbols from a formal approach 
(Goodman, 1976). He subsumed both visual representation and verbal description under 
the idea of denotation, or more precisely, classification of samples by means of labels.  A 
label becomes the meaning imposed on a specific group of samples. Why a portrait 
represents a celebrity, or why a certain style of painting expresses a “blue” feeling, is 
dependent on the classification system, which is founded on conventions and practices. 
Ironically, this extremely formal approach brings us back to the culture-nature 
dichotomy, suggesting that an image is just conventionally linked to its meaning. This 
view further distances the material image from the mental image by dissolving any 
intrinsic relationship between the two.  
 However, not all semioticians agree upon the resolution of the arbitrary-motivated 
conflict in image signs by the slanted claim of conventionality. Charles Sanders Peirce 
classified all signs into three categories, namely icon, index, and symbol, which 
respectively correspond to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness in his ontology of triadic 
relations. To Peirce, intrinsic quality is a first, actual fact a second, habit or law a third. It 
follows that icons resemble something intrinsically, indices relate to something causally, 
and symbols represent something conventionally (Hiraga, 2005, pp. 29-31) (see also 
Stanford Encyclopedia). This triad is generally well received, particularly in visual 
studies and graphic design, because it seemingly applies well to images. However, there 
are still ambiguities. For example, a photographic image can be said to be an index rather 
than an icon as the image is a consequence of chemical reaction to light. Sometimes, it is 
hard to tell whether a graphic icon of female in a dress is based on resemblance or 
convention. 
 Umberto Eco has attempted to develop a general theory of semiotics accounting 
for all meaning-making phenomena, including the iconic sign. After rigorous and 
comprehensive analyses, he finally concluded that understanding an image could not be 
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explained by semiotics alone (Eco, 1976, p. 216). The compromised campaign of 
semiotics, moving the discipline toward image interpretation rather than a logic or 
science of images, seems to confirm a central vagueness in the concept of the image – 
especially when referring to mental images. 
Material versus Mental Images: Wittgenstein and Mitchell on Images 
 Fortunately, there are other thinkers who dismiss the myth of mental images as 
strictly separate from the material. Ludwig Wittgenstein remarkably pointed out that 
images inside our brains (mental images) are no more abstract than images outside 
(material images) because we always think in terms of what we have already perceived, 
or even what we are pointing at, regardless of whether they are verbal symbols or visual 
images (Mitchell, 1986, pp. 15,19). To further illustrate the point, W. J. T. Mitchell raised 
the example of a decoy: when a duck responds to a decoy, it is seeing another duck 
(Mitchell, 1986, p. 17). To the fooled duck, the material image and the mental image are 
equivalent (Mitchell, 1986, p. 90). To the hunter, the material image looks “enough” like 
an imaginative mental image of a duck to fool a duck. In contrast to the verso-recto 
structure of signs (Barthes, 1973a, p. 30) that has the signifier and the signified on two 
sides, Mitchell’s argument tends to position material and mental images on the same side 
with respect to the mind. Both of them are dependent on consciousness. Without a 
conscious viewer, neither of the two images can exist. 
 This subjective view of images recentralizes the beholder in the meaning-making 
process and sheds us new light on image interpretation. An image is no longer an object 
preceding its viewer, but rather a mental construct based on perception5. Images differ 
from signs in that the structuralist assumption of a pre-existing system plus individual 
                                                 
 
 
5 This idea echoes Saussure’s perspective of signs, but later structuralist programs have deviated from his 
original insight. 
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actualization does not apply. Every image interpretation depends on every perception by 
every viewer. When we perceive a photographic image, we may “see” a person “having 
been there.” On seeing a graphic icon on a street sign, we may “construct” a scenario of a 
car on a slippery road. While we are audience of a puppet theater, we may “imagine” that 
the puppets grow up to human scale (Gombrich, 2002, p. xvii). These phenomena suggest 
that understanding images is grounded in perception and cognition. This view on images 
parallels insights from distributed, embodied, and situated perspectives on cognition, 
which are in direct opposition to perspectives based in classical Cartesian mind-body 
dualism (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Below, I describe major representatives of these 
relatively recent trends of thoughts, together with their constructs that will be central to 
my approach: including material anchors, image schemas, conceptual blends, meshes, 
and iconic mappings. Each provides an acute contribution to understanding the 
relationship between images and thought.  
Physicality of Images: Hutchins’s Material Anchors 
 Being one of the major proponents of the idea of distributed cognition, Edwin 
Hutchins meticulously describes many of our everyday practices and instruments, such as 
queuing and analog timepieces, in which physical structures of images represent elements 
for conceptual processes. He asserts that material structures and patterns, like marks or 
diagrams, can provide us with stable images for complex mental operations, such as 
calculation done on paper or navigation with a compass. He calls these images material 
anchors, which “hold” information in place or incorporate constraints for mental 
manipulation (Hutchins, 2005). It follows that a material image, for example, marks on 
paper or a compass rose and needle, can act as a direct input to the cognitive process, in 
which the world is used as its own representation. In Wittgenstein’s words, we compute 
by manipulating the marks or diagrams in our minds. While Hutchins’s analyses cover 
mostly goal-specific, instrument-oriented tasks, the material image of each artifact or 
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instrument is equivalent to the mental image for manipulation. The major advantage of 
anchors to cognitive processes is that one can reduce memory and processing loads by 
building the constraints of the task into the physical structure of the artifact. 
Spatiality of Images: Image Schemas 
 While material anchors represent the distribution of concepts onto physical 
structures of images, image schemas reciprocally suggest that many concepts are built 
upon our experiences with spatial structures of perceptual images. Based on numerous 
examples in our everyday use of language, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson shows that 
metaphors not only allow us to communicate abstract concepts by projection of 
similarities but actually structure largely our ways of thinking through entrenchment 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 6). Many of these metaphors are based on our bodily and 
perceptual experiences in space. For instance, when we say “time flows,” it 
metaphorically seems that time is a fluid substance flowing by us and we are observers 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 158). These metaphors are so conventional and entrenched 
that they often just gone unnoticed, and the corresponding mental images are so 
embedded in our minds that they exist as extremely skeletal and schematic images, what 
cognitive semantics calls “image schemas” (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 97). Lakoff and 
Mark Turner differentiated image schemas from image metaphors in that the former are 
not mental images but instead very general spatial structures (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 
99). In other words, only structural patterns are preserved in the schemas for spatial 
reasoning.  
Integration of Images with Concepts: Conceptual Blends 
 Gilles Fauconnier and Turner have elaborated the insights of conceptual 
metaphors and mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985) to introduce conceptual blending theory 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The theory describes a basic mental operation that 
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generates new meaning by integration of concepts. The operation constructs a partial 
match between multiple input conceptual spaces and selectively projects from those input 
spaces into a novel “blended” conceptual space. Conceptual metaphors are a kind of 
asymmetric blends in which the “source” input provides the topology for the 
understanding of the “target” input that is completely project into the blended space 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 127). Blending is a dynamic process, and successive 
blends give rise to an emergent integration network, which is pervasive in everyday life, 
as well as other creative feats like rhetoric, reasoning, gameplay, and even interface 
design (Fauconnier, 2001, p. 279). Fauconnier and Turner’s analyses also are sympathetic 
with Hutchins’s distributed cognition analyses as they examine everyday objects like 
watches and money to illustrate how our minds interact with the world. Their discussion 
even extends to cover written, spoken, and sign languages (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, 
pp. 210-216). To this, Hutchins’s response is not without doubt. He contends that the 
arbitrary relations in most linguistic signs make them a very weak type of material 
anchor, because not much analogical information is held in the material form of these 
signs. Each of them just provides a distinctive perceptual identity from one another 
(Hutchins, 2005). To Fauconnier and Turner, a material anchor can just be a structural 
constant for a concept, like money notes. In contrast, Hutchins demands more 
information loaded onto material anchors. He thinks the compass rose, with all of its 
marks, is more important than just the needle, which he believes Fauconnier and Turner 
did not emphasize (Hutchins, 2005). 
Matching of Images with Bodily Experience: Glenberg’s Meshes 
 Although there are nuances between Fauconnier and Turner’s interpretation and 
Hutchins’s view, material anchors for conceptual blends mark an indispensable link by 
which part of human memories can be projected onto world objects. In fact, Arthur M. 
Glenberg has also investigated the connection between memory and the world based on 
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Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis of embodied mind (Glenberg, 1997). His article repositions 
memory as cognitive apparatus to combine, or in his words “mesh,” perceptual patterns 
projected from the environment with patterns of interaction from bodily experiences. The 
two patterns are compatible because they are both “encoded” in terms of one’s body. One 
can recognize a walking path as the “path home” using a match of patterns between the 
perceived environment and embodied motor knowledge in one’s body memory. If 
material anchors suggest a “download” of structural information from memory to 
artifacts by perceptual processes, Glenberg’s notion of mesh recalls an “upload” of 
spatial and functional meaning from the environment to memory through embodied 
interaction. The two ideas highlight different portions of a mind-matter continuum, but 
they definitely do not draw any boundary. Instead, they mobilize interplay between mind 
and matter through the body.  
Mapping between Images and Metaphors: Hiraga’s Iconicity 
 For image schemas, material anchors, and meshes, images, no matter material, 
perceptual, or mental, all play an important role in providing topological or structural 
patterns. However, there are still other qualities of images that cannot be overlooked. 
Masako K. Hiraga’s approach to iconicity in poetry considers a wider spectrum of iconic 
representation based on Peirce’s well-known icon-index-symbol trichotomy of signs. 
Hiraga particularly looks into Peirce’s further division of icons into images, diagrams, 
and metaphors, which are delineated with increasing abstractness from concrete 
resemblance to structural and relational analogy (Hiraga, 2005, pp. 30-34). While 
diagrams and metaphors are mostly addressed by other aforementioned theories, Hiraga’s 
analyses also cover the most immediate and intrinsic relations, such as the shape of a 
poetic text resembling a swan (Hiraga, 2005, p. 101). 
 To Hiraga, iconicity is the mapping between form and meaning, in which 
meaning can be a mental image whereas form can refer to either imagic or diagrammatic 
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quality of a text. Hence, an imagic mapping relates objects by immediate resemblance 
and a diagrammatic mapping by structural analogy. These mappings, like metaphorical 
projection, are subsumed in conceptual integration networks to explain how a reader 
generates multiple mental images, or in Hiraga’s terms “iconic moments,” from a text. 
The value of Hiraga’s iconicity to image interpretation is bringing the most intrinsic 
qualities of images back to the nexus between perception and cognition. 
Summary: Image Interpretation 
 After a survey of all these major thoughts from a vantage point of image 
interpretation, I arrive at the following points: 
• Immediate-Arbitrary Relations of Images: Images differ from verbal signs in that 
intrinsic, immediate, and analogical relations co-exist with arbitrary and 
conventional relations. 
• Relating Material and Mental Images: Material images and mental images should 
be seen as in relation rather than in opposition. Both of them should not be 
analyzed without the beholder because they both are mental constructs. In some 
cases, the two can even be equivalent. 
• Connecting Image Perception, Cognition, and Bodily Interaction: Images, along 
with their material structures and perceptual patterns, can take part in cognitive 
processes like matching. Moreover, the mind is capable of matching patterns 
projected from perceptual images or resulted from bodily experiences. 
• Mapping Form and Meaning of Images: The mind can recognize various degree 
of iconicity of images, which maps form and meaning along a continuum from 
intrinsic to abstract qualities. 
 However, none of the above theories explicitly address animated images. When 
images are moving, would we understand or even “sense” them in a more immediate 
way? Would animated visual images be closer to mental images? How would animated 
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images be matched with other cognitive patterns in conceptual networks? How would 
animated images be cognitively connected to bodily interaction? 
Animated Images as Embodied Images 
 Hutchins’s arguments for material anchors mainly focus on human-performed 
instrumental and operational tasks, so his material images have to be stable and faithful 
representations of the elements to be manipulated in the cognitive process. However, this 
faithfulness does not necessarily apply to cases in which the outcome is not a priori clear 
and task specific, such as process-driven imagination-laden creative activities. For 
example in filmmaking, a storyboard is not strictly a faithful representation of the mental 
image inside the director’s mind, but is also a device used for contingent reflection on a 
creative work-in-progress, projecting evocative sensation onto the work that goes beyond 
the physically represented information, and allowing that work to trigger generation of 
subsequent imaginative images. W. J. T. Mitchell, based on other influential thinkers, has 
pointed out that words can be so vivid that provoking imaginative images, in his words 
“verbal image,” even livelier than the original sight (Mitchell, 1986, pp. 23-24). I believe 
that animated visual images transgress the boundary between the original and the 
imaginative even more vigorously, mobilizing viewers’ motor-sensory connections and 
constituting embodied understandings of sensations.  
 Consider that the storyboard of a film in progress projects the director’s 
approximation of the intended outcome. At some point, the director will need an 
animated visual image, technically called a “rehearsal,” an “animatic,” or a “rough cut,” 
especially when one wants to elicit visceral sensations such as disgust, sorrow, 
nervousness, and others. There are many nuances to these “gut feelings” that static 
images may not be able to convey. Instead, they have to be performed as actions in 
animated images. For example, a viewer is able to distinguish an animated character’s 
giggling from trembling, because the viewer perceives and understands it as exhibiting 
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lifelike qualities previously experienced in her or his everyday life. This is quite different 
than the use of culturally specific symbolic conventions (such as trembling lines) without 
which a still image could not convey these distinctions. 
 While being careful not to overstate these claims, results regarding the activation 
of brain structures known as mirror neurons have been posited as suggesting that, when 
perceiving a performed action in a moving image, the viewer’s interpretation relies upon 
evocation of the corresponding sensorimotor knowledge from a repertoire of her or his 
own embodied experiences (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008, pp. 94-98,124-125). The 
coupling of perception and action enables the viewer to “recall” the associated sensation. 
When we see someone jumping restlessly, we understand one’s excitement, not by 
“reading,” but rather “sensing.” In short, animated images constitute an embodied 
cognitive process. By the same token, a movie director can “feel” whether an actor’s 
performance is matching his mental image, or an animator can “detect” if her or his 
character is moving right. This kind of visceral understanding largely takes place at the 
immediate, or even preconscious, level – requiring minimal cognitive effort. 
 Cognitive semantics research also provides us with accounts of understanding 
sensation through perception. When discussing animacy, Mark Turner states that we 
cannot perceive others’ sensations, so we can only infer their sensations by comparing 
their actions to our own reactions in similar situations (Turner, 1996, p. 21). He refers 
this analogical inference to a type of parabolic projection, or metaphor, in which partial 
structure of a source story of the perceiver, including action and emotion in particular, is 
projected to a target story of the perceived.  
 It follows that the director or animator can infer the sensation by cognitively 
projecting her or his own experience to the perceived action. This act of “inference” 
seems to be suggesting that the projection takes place at a higher cognitive level, 
demanding conscious mental operation. In fact, some mental projections can be 
cognitively effortless. This point can be illustrated in the terms of conceptual blending 
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theory. The matches between two input mental spaces, what Fauconnier and Turner call 
“vital relations” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 92), of some blends can be so tightly 
compressed that they become automatic and unnoticed. Fauconnier has cited the 
computer interface phenomenon as an example of this kind of immediate blends 
(Fauconnier, 2001, pp. 264-265). In this regard, I would like to add that, for the director 
or animator, there is also a blend of a past experience and a perceived action yielding an 
inferred sensation. The compression can be so tight that the animated image is 
immediately associated with the sensation. The image becomes an immediate and 
embodied input to the integration network.  
 As mentioned earlier, Hutchins coined the term “material anchor” to mean those 
material objects or images with stable patterns and structures “locking down” specific 
information in input concepts. I believe that animated visual images, as embodied 
images, not only “hold” information but also “embody” sensation or meaning, which 
trigger imaginative elaboration in blending. Instead of concentrating on goal-specific 
computation, I shall explore material-based open-ended imagination through cases of 
fluid and flexible representations in the form of animated visual images in the section 
“The Image” of next chapter. 
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The Body: Embodied Meaning of Action 
 In this section, I look into how observers engage with animated artifacts. 
Regarding the traditional film form of animation, audiences are mainly engaged through 
perception, except for some subtle body movements like shifting between reclining or 
upright positions. In digital media, the engagement involves not just sensory perception, 
but also motor-based bodily interaction. An observer absorbed in audio-visual content, 
for example in a multimedia website, is also driven to take timely action or to react 
promptly, because the animated artifact invites participation meanwhile continuing its 
transformation. The body of the observer is engaged continuously, in terms of attention – 
like being captivated in a theater, and also alternately, in terms of action – like 
participating in a tennis game. Most important of all, the observer makes meaning 
through this engagement of sensory and motor apparatuses with the system, echoing the 
central embodied cognition perspective that meaning-making processes involve both 
perception and motor action. On the sensory side, animated visual images constitute 
embodied understanding of sensation, as I have argued in the previous section. On the 
motor side, as I shall discuss in this section, bodily motor action embodies intention. The 
two sides conjoin a motor-sensory feedback loop between the system and the user. I 
believe animated systems entailing this motor-sensory connection are able to give users 
an embodied experience of an expanded illusion of life. 
 To illustrate this new notion bridging animation and motor action in animated 
systems, I first review major underpinnings related to motor-sensory feedback in physical 
or machine-mediated environments, followed by insights from phenomenological 
thoughts of how users make meaning of bodily interaction with these environments. 
Then, drawing upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s perspective on bodily action, which 
suggests that our bodies are able to turn movement into meaning in the form of motor 
habits, I propose considering motion-based user input, in which meaning is embodied in 
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the qualities of motion, as a preferred alternative to the conventional point-and-click 
method of user input for animated systems. In such systems, as multimedia websites or 
entertainment applications, the motion components persisting in both motor input and 
animated feedback enable a tighter motor-sensory connection and give rise to more 
embodied and evocative meaning reminiscent of our everyday motion. 
Meaning in Environments: Feedback and Affordance 
 Various motor-sensory circuits persist in interaction between human users and 
engineered systems in different scenarios. When riding a bike, typing on a keyboard, 
playing computer games with a gamepad, and using other motion-sensing input devices, a 
user has to engage part or all of the body in “controlling” the machine and “sensing” the 
feedback. The interaction mechanisms are not unlike how an animate interacts with its 
physical environment, for example, a bird subtly adjusting its feathers to round about 
approaching obstacles in the middle of its flight. Quite a few scholars have paid attention 
to the similarities in interaction mechanisms between engineered systems and physical 
environments. Norbert Wiener is credited with introducing the term “cybernetics,” which 
from the Greek means “steersman,” to call the study of control and communication 
theories in animals and machines (Wiener, 1961, p. 19). To Wiener, the steering engine 
of ships is one of the earliest and best-developed forms of feedback mechanism. 
Although his interpretation of “feedback,” like steering, is inclined to regulating output 
by adjusting input (Wiener, 1961, p. 13), which is slightly different from my emphases on 
lively reaction from systems, his awareness of the value of animal reaction to nature 
reminds us that observations of the natural environment and its inhabitants is informative 
to designing interactive systems because of the forgotten commonalities between two sets 
of environments. Recall the first time we attentively used the mouse to drag a file to the 
trash bin in a GUI environment. We kept moving the mouse while focusing on the 
moving file icon until it reached the trash bin. This sensorimotor phenomenon is 
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evocative of our physical experiences of throwing away items in the office. We need to 
“see” something being “put” in the bin. In the GUI environment, after being so attentive 
at the first trial, we have gone unnoticed of the details in repeating the action. Today we 
are fairly used to operating a wide array of input devices and interpreting sensory 
feedback from various systems, just like how our bodies get used to the physical 
environment. Hence, digitally mediated environments absorb the body no less than the 
physical environment.  
 In addition, J. J. Gibson’s theory of affordances also marks the vital link between 
bodies and environments. Gibson coined the term “affordance” to mean those 
environmental features that support what animals can do. Gibson believes that these 
properties in an environment, whether it is the natural or the artificial (in fact Gibson 
dismisses this dichotomy in environments, see (Gibson, 1986, p. 130)), are usually 
directly perceivable, without requiring much learning (Gibson, 1986, p. 143). This idea 
inspired Donald Norman’s asserting that in designing interfaces affordances should be 
made perceivable to users (Norman, 1988, pp. 22-23). Norman’s proposal then has given 
rise to the prevalent user-centered design paradigm, which aims to make interfaces easy 
to use and to learn. In his well-known book The Psychology of Everyday Things, Norman 
emphasizes visible, natural, and perceivable clues laid out in the environments. To make 
interfaces user-friendly, one has to make those clues easy to notice. How? Here Gibson 
again sheds us some light. As Gibson puts it, “affordances are properties taken with 
reference to the observer” (Gibson, 1986, p. 143). A property that is “commensurate with 
the body of the observer” is “more easily picked up.” Therefore, Gibson’s idea also 
reminds us that the relationship between bodies and environments should be recentralized 
in interaction and interface design. 
Embodied Meaning in Tools: Dourish’s Embodied Interaction  
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 With an awareness of the role of the body in designing interactive systems, Paul 
Dourish advocates an approach to interaction design grounded in the idea of embodiment. 
Dourish draws upon notions from phenomenology, particularly Martin Heidegger’s 
“Being-in-the-world,” to interpret embodiment as people’s engagement in the world in 
order to make meaning of it (Dourish, 2001, p. 126). In other words, meaning is 
embodied in engagement. For Dourish, engagement includes both physical and social 
interactions. Therefore, to create embodied interactive systems he suggests making use of 
our “familiarity” with the mundane everyday world, including practical experiences with 
physical objects and communication skills in social communities. His book delineates 
several high-level principles to achieve this goal. 
 By embodiment Dourish seems to mean largely the embodiment of tools in the 
working environment. This bias toward production may have originated from Heidegger. 
As in his well-known hammer analogy describing that a carpenter would only see a 
hammer available for his tasks (what he calls “ready-to-hand”), Heidegger presupposed a 
“work-world” in his pronounced dictum (Moran, 2000, p. 233). It follows that Dourish’s 
proposal also emphasizes the practical and functional meaning of everyday world objects 
and tools. Although this meaning of “everyday experience” with objects is in line with 
the major notion of phenomenological embodiment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 36), 
Dourish tends to concentrate on objects and practices, but sometimes overlooks the body 
that uses those objects. His approach focuses on the ways that objects, artifacts, or 
equipment, are put into use, but seldom elaborates on how our body acts upon and reacts 
in these situations. In fact, Heidegger’s “Being” is more about things like equipment 
rather than human beings (Moran, 2000, p. 412). 
Embodied Meaning in Body: Merleau-Ponty on Bodily Action 
 Heidegger believes that meaning is embodied in practice and in action (Dourish, 
2001, p. 184), but he largely ignored the role of the body in the process. In contrast, 
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that “our body is our general medium for having a world” 
through habit (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 146). By “habit,” Merleau-Ponty means 
specifically motor habit. Based on Gelb and Goldstein’s empirical studies of brain-
damaged patients, Merleau-Ponty describes two types of bodily movement, namely 
“Greifen,” meaning “to seize,” and “Zeigen,” as “to show” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 
123). The former refers to the kind of concrete movements toward some existing objects, 
while the latter the kind of abstract movements not relevant to any actual situation and 
dependent upon one’s imagination. For example, an impaired patient may be able to 
touch his nose because of a mosquito sting, but not able to point to it without preparatory 
movement. A typical subject can perform a salute, but the patient cannot without placing 
himself in an actual situation. It seems that the patient cannot enter into an imaginary 
situation. In fact, unimpaired people have turned most abstract movements, like pointing 
or other gestures, into motor habits. Merleau-Ponty believes that it is our body that 
actually absorbs meaning, in the form of bodily experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 
146-147). In Dreyfus’s words, our body gets involved through practices and acquires 
bodily skills (Dreyfus, Wrathall, & ebrary Inc., 2006). 
General Motor Input: Direct Manipulation versus Gestural Input 
 The two types of bodily action mentioned by Merleau-Ponty aid in articulating a 
general divide between mechanisms of motor input in HCI, where the two sides are direct 
manipulation and gestural input. The former corresponds to “grasping” whereas the latter 
“showing.” (While this separation is at the mechanism level, another contention exists at 
the design level, which is between direct manipulation and intelligent agent, and is 
covered in Chapter 7.) 
 Ben Shneiderman is credited with summarizing the central ideas of direct 
manipulation, which include spatial representation of objects, physical action, and visible 
feedback. In other words, they are common phenomena prevalent in the graphical user 
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interface of today. As Shneiderman puts it, the primary goal is to bring human-computer 
activity back to the level of early stages of Jean Piaget’s theory of child development, in 
which children comprehend largely through physical actions. Interfaces based on this 
principle would be easier for children and adults to use (Shneiderman, 2003 [1983]). That 
is to say, direct manipulation requires not much learning and just demands users of the 
innate capabilities of concrete movements. 
 However, the use of gestures in HCI supposes that users perform abstract 
movements with their empty hand such as pointing, alongside other modes of input like 
speech. One of the first experimental interfaces incorporating these is Put That There 
(Bolt, 1980), in which a user is able to move objects on the graphical interface by a 
combination of pointing and ordering. The act of pointing in this work differs from using 
conventional pointing devices like the mouse. The former is not an example of direct 
manipulation, because it does not involve the act of dragging (Bolt, 1980). Instead, 
general pointing is a gesture, although a very primitive one that has gone unnoticed. Alan 
Wexelblat quotes Adam Kendon, a leading expert in gesture study, that a gesture must 
have features, motion or shape, that make it identifiable (Wexelblat, 1994). It follows that 
a click-and-drag action with a mouse is not a gesture, neither pressing a key on a 
keyboard, because the corresponding hand movement and shape have nothing related to 
the meaning and consequence of the action. The speed or path of dragging the mouse or 
pressing the key has no significant effect on the result. In fact, Wexelblat and other 
researchers like Francis Quek are more interested in empty-handed natural gestures and 
how these can augment multimodal input. That means they look for interfaces other than 
conventional input devices. However, I find that their rigorous reviews of gesture 
taxonomy are still informative for analysis of gestural input enabled by emerging input 
technologies including touch-based input and motion-sensing hand-held devices.  
From Gesture-Based to Motion-Based Input 
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 Wexelblat surveys and summarizes gesture types in an array of symbolic (by 
convention, e.g., thumbs-up-for-good), pantomimic (miming the use of objects and 
making similar motions), iconic (hand-acting), deictic (pointing or directional), and 
rhythmic (Wexelblat, 1994). In the context of human-computer interaction, to select by 
conventional pointing devices like the mouse can be seen as a mediated type of deictic 
gestures. In addition, many touch-based input devices like the touchpad on many laptop 
computers facilitate a more natural type of pointing without the intermediate. The 
touchpad and touch screens open up possibilities of applying more gestures as motor 
input, such as to select a group of objects by circling on the touchpad, to turn a slide by 
swiping, or to rotate a picture by a pinch-and-turn action. All these belong to the 
overlapping area between symbolic and pantomimic gestures. Meanwhile, motion-
sensing input devices enabled by accelerometers or other motion-tracking technologies 
also make possible input between pantomimic and iconic gestures. For instance, a user 
can grip the controller of a video game console just like swinging a tennis racket, or he 
can shake the cell phone to undo a step and tilt it to steer a vehicle in a racing computer 
game. It seems that pantomimic gestures are particularly promising in these emerging 
modes of input, which are more natural, situated, and embodied to users because 
pantomimes always rely on pose and more importantly motion to show the use of some 
“phantom” objects, that is, embodied meaning. According to Gordon Kurtenbach and 
Eric A. Hulteen, the motion of a gesture must be significant to its meaning (Kurtenbach 
& Hulteen, 1990, p. 310). Hence, bodily action and motion are crucial to convey meaning 
in gesture-based interaction.  
Embodied Meaning in Motion-Based Input 
 Merleau-Ponty posits that what is damaged in the patient is the “power of laying 
out a past in order to move toward(s) a future.” He calls this the “intentional arc,” which 
is our consciousness toward something (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 135-136). The 
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intentional arc works beneath the levels of conscious conceptualization and perception, 
through which we acquire bodily skills and build motor habits. Our bodies “absorb” 
motor knowledge and take care of our everyday motion (Dreyfus, et al., 2006). Therefore, 
a typical subject can perform seemingly imaginary abstract movements as easily as 
concrete movements without a thought. Merleau-Ponty believes that motility reveals our 
consciousness as “not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’” move toward something 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 137). In other words, bodily motion represents intention and 
meaning. This idea applies to not only gestures, but also motor action at large. Hence, I 
argue against any clear distinction between the two general types of bodily movement, 
“to seize” and “to show”, and so the two types of motor input in human-computer 
interaction, for practices would enrich our intentional arc (Dreyfus, et al., 2006), turning 
any possible movements to motor habits. For example, double-clicking a mouse button is 
a gesture at first, but repeated exercising turns it into a habitual action embodying a user’s 
intention to confirm. Hence, stringently separating gestural input from direct 
manipulation might not lead us toward tighter motor-sensory connection and more 
embodied meaning in animated systems. Instead, distinctions should be drawn based on 
whether a motor input contains meaningful components to our body, that is, situated, 
embodied, and evocative motion. Consider the jog dial of a video tape recorder (VTR). 
When a user spins the dial, the motion, including speed and direction, convey his various 
intentions of going forward or backward at variable speed. This kind of motion has 
already been borrowed as a gesture of hurry in live performance, in which the spinning 
speed roughly reflects the hurriedness! (See Figure 3.6) Similar motion-based signals can 
be applied to computer interaction as well, such as on the touchpad. Therefore, I call for a 
specific kind of motor input, which is motion-based input, in which motion embodies the 
intentional arc with meaning and information. In short, bodily motion is a spatiotemporal 
embodiment of meaning, because it manifests the intentional arc enveloping past and 
future, here and there. When one performs a bodily action, the body part, such as hands 
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or fingers, moves in space from time to time, carrying and conveying one’s intention. I 
believe interactive systems taking motion components into consideration result in tighter 
motor-sensory links and entail more embodied meanings. 
 
Figure 3.6 Use of the jog dial of a VTR 
Summary: Embodied Meaning of Bodily Interaction 
 Based on the above review of motor action in the context of digital interactive 
media, I come up with the following points about the embodied meaning of bodily 
interaction: 
• Body Adapting the Digital: Based on Wiener’s notion of feedback and Gibson’s 
concept of affordance, I deduce that bodily interaction of an animate being in the 
physical environment draws a parallel to that in digitally mediated environments, 
and our body gets used to digital environments just like we adapt to the physical 
world. 
• Action Embodying Meaning: Reviewing Dourish’s embodied interaction 
approach, I argue that meaning is embodied not just in the ways we use objects 
but also in how our body acts upon artifacts. 
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• Motion Revealing Intention: According to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, our body 
can turn any movements into motor habits, which reveal our intentions toward 
something. 
• Spatiotemporal Embodiment: Meaning is best embodied in bodily movements 
taking place in both space and time. 
 Therefore, in order for users to make embodied meaning in interacting with 
digitally animated artifacts, interfaces should incorporate more motion-based motor 
input. On the one hand, this kind of input, as I shall discuss in the section “The Image” of 
next chapter, couples with animated feedback in a motor-sensory loop embedded in 
digital interactive media, usually resulting in adaptive, evocative, and imaginative 
meaning. On the other hand, in the section “The Body” of the next chapter, I shall 
elaborate on the idea of spatiotemporal embodiment, and show that motion-based input, 
together with interactive generative animation, would lead us to digital environments 
entailing such kind of embodiment. 
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The Performer: Live Performance of Animation 
 In digital environments, generative and interactive animation, rather than like 
film-based movies, have more in common with puppet performance or automaton 
demonstration. Instead of just viewing direct playback of recorded moving images on the 
screen, audiences in front of a computer screen or a performance stage both see 
presentation images that can show possibly different versions on every viewing, as well 
as immediate variations in response to their occasional actions. This section delineates 
the ontological and phenomenological similarities between puppet performance and the 
new animation paradigm that I have been arguing for. It starts with a brief comparison of 
animation and puppetry by way of the overlap in physical shadow puppets. I then 
describe how computing technology enables performance animation in virtual space. 
Finally, I show that with advances in real-time control and rendering technologies 
animation phenomena in the digital age are now rendering live performance a new 
meaning. 
Animation versus Puppetry 
 Animation and puppetry are commonly viewed as coming from different lineages 
of arts. The former is a subcategory of film, a visual art. The latter is a marginal type of 
theater, a performing art. Puppetry has very historical and even legendary origin in 
several ancient cultures, such as China and Java. In contrast, the birth of animation is 
always attributed to those nineteenth-century European bourgeois entertainment toys like 
the zoetrope and the phenakistoscope. Apart from their contrasting origins, the two arts 
also have obvious differences in terms of media materials, technologies, and practices. 
One is traditionally based on animators’ frame-by-frame manipulation of drawings, 
pictures, or images, while the other relies on puppeteers’ direct manipulation of tangible 
objects or doll-like figures. 
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 However, there is ambiguity in certain niche areas. The noted silhouette 
filmmaker Lotte Reiniger has a book called Shadow Theatres and Shadow Films, 
juxtaposing the two arts with a focus on her life-long favorite medium: the shadow 
puppet (Reiniger, 1970). A glimpse of the illustrations in the book reveals a remarkable 
connection between puppetry and animation. The articulated figures used in two domains 
are basically the same. Since shadow-figures are usually flat, an animator can take one 
from the shadow theater without the rods, lay it flat on a glass plate, and shoot it with an 
overhead camera, just like an ordinary filming setting for cel animation (Reiniger, 1970, 
p. 85). As Reiniger calls animation as “an entirely new kind of puppeteering” (Reiniger, 
1970, p. 82), to the puppeteer the two arts have ontological similarities. Moreover, the 
projection of silhouette films, for example, the Reiniger’s classic The Adventures of 
Prince Achmed (1926), in the cinema looks very much like a performance in the shadow 
theater (although the former is rear projection while the latter front projection). From the 
audience’s viewpoint, the two media also have phenomenological intersection where both 
give life to some tangible inanimate objects. Hence, the ontological and 
phenomenological likeness brings us an ambiguous term, puppet animation, which can 
refer to films created with stop-motion filming techniques on tangible figures, or those 
directly recorded from live performance of tangible figures.  
Performance Animation: Tillis’s Double Meanings of “Real Time” 
 The advent of so-called “computer animation” seems to further blur the 
distinction between animation and puppetry. With latest advances in various real-time 
control and rendering technologies, computer-generated characters become comparable 
to puppets, and the term digital puppet is used not just as a simple metaphor. For 
instance, by means of motion capture, a computer animator can enact a computer-
generated version of Mickey Mouse in virtual space just like a puppeteer wearing a 
physical all-encompassing bodysuit (performers in all-encompassing bodysuits are 
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theoretically regarded as puppeteers, see (Kaplin, 2001)). In his attempt to reposition 
puppetry in the digital age, the performance studies scholar Steve Tillis has explicitly 
drawn the correspondence between motion-capture techniques and all-encompassing 
bodysuits, as well as the analogy between inverse kinematics in computer graphics, 
which allows an animator to use a handle to move the end of an articulated chain so that 
each joint will rotate accordingly, and the strings or rods in puppetry (Tillis, 2001). Since 
data from inverse kinematics or motion capture can be processed and rendered as 
computer graphics characters in real time, today’s animators can see the resultant 
movement according to their control instantaneously, making the operation of a digital 
puppet strikingly similar to that of a physical puppet. This synchronicity of operation 
makes computer characters resemble their physical counterparts in the way that stop-
motion puppets are unable to match. Although digital puppets and physical puppets 
inhabit different spaces, computer rendering on the screen provides a visual experience 
comparable to what we see in the theater. Hence real-time control and rendering 
technologies fulfill what Tillis considers the double meanings of “real time” (Tillis, 
2001). On the puppeteer or animator side, it refers to a synchronicity between control and 
resultant movement. On the audience side, it in addition includes real-time reception as 
well. Both sides together suggest animation and puppetry can be put in the same 
category. 
 Other intriguing examples showing digital puppets include the online application 
kit Sodaconstructor (www.sodaplay.co.uk) for constructing animated models and the 
program Animata (animata.kibu.hu) designed to create interactive animations for the 
theater. Sodaconstructor allows users to make digital creatures composed of point masses 
and articulated by elastic skeletons. A user can drag a point mass and the whole creature 
body will move along, like a puppeteer moving a rod attached to a shadow puppet. 
Meanwhile, Animata supports the performance of a reverse shadow play, in which a 
player standing in front of a clear background uses the whole body to control a computer-
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generated Indonesian shadow puppet projected facing him. The puppet is like a full-sized 
avatar of the player. Both cases demonstrate a kind of “performance animation” enabled 
by digital interactive technology.  
 
Figure 3.7 A screenshot of Sodaconstructor 
 
 
Figure 3.8 A digital shadow theater using Animata 
 For Tillis, the term “performance animation” applies to any computer-generated 
figures operated by animators and received by audiences in real time (Tillis, 2001). While 
Tillis primarily focus on anthropomorphic figures like puppets, I add that the term should 
apply to any computer animation as long as there is a synchronicity of operation and 
reception. For instance, the Apple iPhone entertainment application Spawn generates 
real-time particles moving like swarms, meanwhile a user can lead the movement with a 
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finger moving on the touch screen, trigger firework explosion by a tap, and others. 
Although the digital “puppet” here is non-representational and totally abstract in form, it 
does “perform” according to the user’s finger action and is received by the user’s eyes 
simultaneously.   
  
Figure 3.9 Snapshots of the iPhone application Spawn 
Observer and Performer: A Mutual Sense of Liveliness 
 In above cases, computer systems invite user participation by means of real-time 
control and rendering technologies. Users are responsible for part of the happenings just 
like performers. Yet, some might argue that participating users are audiences and are by 
no means performers. Although a performer and an audience might see a similar visual 
content (e.g., in the shadow puppet show, the audience views in front of the screen while 
the puppeteer watches behind it, and what they see are mirror images), what they really 
perceive may be drastically different. It is because they have different selective attention. 
As I have shown in the section “The Observer” about perception of animacy, the observer 
perceives a holistic illusion of life, including prominent behaviors and emergent patterns. 
In contrast, the performer has to pay most of the attention on the nuances in control and 
feedback, which result in a slightly different composition in the liveliness perceived. The 
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performer usually more attends to patterns than behaviors. In his famous essay about the 
art of marionettes (Kleist, 1810), Heinrich von Kleist describes a fictive dancer who 
admires the unconscious and natural movement of puppets, which always follows gravity 
faithfully. Kleist thinks that humans’ self-consciousness is upsetting the “natural grace” 
of movement. To the performer, the liveliest movement hinges on not just internal 
impulse but also natural resonance, that is, body rhythm and coordination. Paul Wells 
also makes a similar argument, for Wells many works of abstract animation are very 
animistic because the pure movement depicted is a reflection of the automatic and 
preconscious coordination of the eye and the hand of the animator (Wells, 1998, p. 32). 
In fact, this preconscious motor-sensory loop is the ground of many animation 
productions. Generally, both performers and animators favor what I call diluted attention. 
Therefore, animators and audiences basically take different perspectives on liveliness. 
 However, today’s real-time technologies bring about a mutual sense of liveliness 
between the performer and the observer, making animators and audiences alike in digital 
media. For example, many authoring environments provide animators with real-time 
animation previews, which inadvertently turn an animator into the audience of her or his 
own work in seconds, like a puppeteer in shadow play. Indeed, instantaneous reactive 
features of many multimedia systems allow viewers to feel the preconscious loop of 
motor action and sensory feedback in a similar way as what animators have always 
experienced. As soon as one is engaged in the transient and continuing interaction with 
the system, one has to make timely response, and attention will be fully occupied by the 
motor-sensory coordination. The participants, including the animator and the audience, of 
a work of interactive generative animation, are becoming both the performer and the 
observer. They would understand and share each other’s perspectives of liveliness 




 Real-time systems transcend the new animation phenomena as performance 
animation. This is a new notion blending the traditional concepts of puppetry and 
animation. I call it “puppeteerly animation,” as opposed to the traditional film-based 
“viewerly animation.” This neologism follows similarly the rhetoric of Roland Barthes’s 
“writerly text,” in which the reader produces, instead of consumes, meaning of the text 
like the writer. By the same token, in puppeteerly animation, the viewer creates, instead 
of receives, animation phenomena like the puppeteer in a live performance. Yet, some 
people might think that this kind of performance animation should not be regarded as 
live, because the leading creator is always absent from the show. For them, a theatrical 
puppet show is live but a videotaped puppet show or a stop-motion puppet animation is 
not, because the puppeteer is absent during audience reception. Within this view, it 
follows that puppeteerly animation cannot be live since system designers, programmers, 
and animators are all absent during user interaction. I argue, in contrast, that automaton 
demonstration, like the mechanical duck or flute player invented in eighteenth-century 
Europe, or the tea-serving karakuri created during the Edo period of Japan, is 
contrastingly regarded as live performance, although the designers or inventors are also 
commonly absent from the show. It shows that spatiotemporal co-presence of the creator 
and the observer is part of the ritual in the traditional stream of the performing art only. It 
is not a necessary condition of liveness.  
 Regarding the issue of presence in performance within today’s mediatized 
context, Steve Dixon asserts that the essence of presence is no longer about physical 
presence, but rather audience interest and attention (Dixon, 2007, p. 132). This view is 
best demonstrated in digital media, in which time fragmentation (e.g., video-on-demand 
service on interactive television or web-based television, online weblogs, instant 
messaging service, etc.) and telepresence (e.g., online chat-room service, tele-
videoconferencing, social networking websites, virtual worlds like SecondLife, etc.) are 
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commonplace. Immediacy and proximity are no longer defining characteristics of 
liveness in the digital age. In other words, computer-mediated performance animation 
engaging its audiences, both their mind and body, in both operation and reception, should 
also be seen as live, with the participants “being there.”  
Summary: Performance Animation 
In summary, animation and puppetry have intricate convolution as shown in the 
following: 
• Ontological-Phenomenological Similarities: Stop-motion shadow-puppet 
animation shares with theatrical shadow-puppet shows the physicality of puppets 
and projection of images; 
• Operation-Reception Synchronicity: Real-time performance animation in digital 
media differs from physical puppet shows in materiality, but both have 
synchronicity of producer operation and audience reception. 
• Puppeteerly versus Viewerly: Real-time systems turn viewers into puppeteers, 
animators into audiences, animation into live performance, which I call 
“puppeteerly animation” as opposed to the traditional film-based “viewerly 
animation.” 
 Puppeteerly animation suggests a new notion of live performance in which 
spatiotemporal co-presence of performers and audience is not required. This new 
meaning of “live” also characterizes generative and interactive animation. In the section 
“The Performer” of the next chapter, I will define liveness of interactive generative 
animation. 
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The text of the section “The Image” of this chapter, in part, contains material that is a 
reprint of, or has been submitted for publication in (Chow & Harrell, 2009a, 2009b). The 
dissertation author was a co-author of this paper. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NEW PRINCIPLES OF INTERACTIVE GENERATIVE 
ANIMATION 
 
 Generative and interactive animation, which I argue requires a new paradigm for 
analysis and design, gives viewers or users an embodied experience of an expanded 
illusion of life. Today’s multimedia artifacts are reactive, autonomous, evolving, and 
contingent. The previous chapter delineated the four areas of knowledge to provide 
theoretical underpinnings. That framework corresponds to the four constitutive parts of 
the emerging phenomenon, namely the observer, the image, the body, and the performer. 
An animated artifact must be manifested materially in the form of an image and 
perceived by an observer. The artifact engages the observer in sensorimotor 
spatiotemporal experience through her or his body. The observer interacts with the 




Figure 4.1 The diagrammatic relationship of four constitutive parts of the new animation 
paradigm 
 Each of these four integral areas brings about new principles of the new animation 
paradigm. These principles envelop the characteristics of generative and interactive 
animation in the digital age: 
• The observer perceives a holistic illusion of life. 
• The image invokes material-based imagination. 
• The body is engaged in enduring interaction. 
• The performer, including the observer and the artifact, participates in a computer-
mediated co-performance. 
 These principles underscore human perception, cognition, and bodily interaction 
in connection with animated artifacts. Readers sensitive to animation might notice that 
the first two principles also apply to traditional filmic forms of animation. They can be 
regarded as additional tools for rethinking and analyzing animation film. Meanwhile, the 
latter two principles focus on viewers’ bodily engagement and participation, which are 
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more specific to digital media artifacts. In other words, the sum of these principles 
characterizes generative and interactive animation, however they are also able to shed 
new light on traditional principles of animation.  
 This chapter describes each principle accordingly, with emphasis on how 
generative and interactive animation exhibits all these exceptional qualities. In order to 
cautiously observe, identify, and compare the qualities of an artifact with one another, I 
devise qualitative variables to articulate each of these attributes. At the end of each 
section, brief sample analyses are included to illustrate the meaning of the corresponding 
variable, together with its possible values. (Detailed analyses will be covered in Chapter 
6). These variables jointly describe a new taxonomy of generative and interactive 
animation, as well as animated and multimedia artifacts at large. This taxonomy, instead 
of being a formal classification, suggests an analysis and design paradigm and 
perspective for the creator who is to design, contrive, and develop multimedia artifacts of 
this emergent kind. (Chapter 5 will talk more about this taxonomy and Chapter 7 will 
describe the new design perspective). 
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The Observer: Holistic Illusion of Life 
 In the section “The Observer” of the preceding chapter about perception of 
animacy, I have argued that rather than focusing only on degrees of liveliness, we should 
pay more attention to the nuances in different kinds of liveliness, like those between 
prominent behaviors and emergent patterns. This section further shows that how different 
types of liveliness are simultaneously exhibited in generative and interactive animation, 
which thus manifests a holistic sense of liveliness. Meanwhile, this holistic illusion of life 
also cast doubt on the long-standing notion of organism versus machine, and then the 
conventional animator-centric and program-driven paradigms of animation production. 
This provocative view characterizes an indispensable part of the new animation 
paradigm. 
Organism versus Machine 
 In the section about perception of animacy, I briefly described the subtle 
connection between the animistic and mechanist views of life. This intriguing 
relationship lies in the essence of the notion of animation. As Cholodenko puts it, the 
double meanings of animation, endowing with life and endowing with movement, 
destabilize the opposition of animism and mechanism. He points out that the animatic 
apparatus animistically gives life to inanimate images by means of mechanical movement 
driven by viewers’ hands (Cholodenko, 2007, pp. 495-497). The coupling between the 
apparatus and mechanical movement parallels that between the computer and procedures. 
However, Cholodenko only touches upon the impact of computing technology on 
animated film images in terms of visual effects. I would add that generative and 
interactive animation casts even more disturbances on the dichotomy of organism and 
machine. 
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 As I have mentioned earlier in the section about perception of animacy, the 
animistic view of life hinges on certain spiritual and preconscious connection between 
life and dynamic phenomena. Anything that shows dynamics is seen as having life and 
soul. In contrast, the mechanistic view, arguably emerging since the Enlightenment in 
Euro-American thought traditions, aims to dismiss the spiritual connection. People 
supporting this view are interested in implementation of life-like phenomena by 
mechanical means so as to demystify life and soul. Yet, at the outset they were only able 
to implement simple rhythmic and repeatable phenomena, like orbiting, up and down, 
swinging, waving, and so on, in artifacts like mechanical clocks and automata based on 
geometry of gears and bars. This “movement” has brought about a contending 
relationship between organic phenomena and mechanical motion, with the presumption 
that the latter seems unnatural and uncanny relative to the former. In other words, the 
inherent type of motion generated by machines is regular and boring. 
Natural and Organic Phenomena 
 With the advent of the computer, more complex dynamic motion, such as an 
automobile drifting or projectiles being thrown, can be computed and rendered in 
programs according to physical models. The use of machines to implement motion has 
been extended to cover physical phenomena. However, it was not until the application of 
pseudorandomness, such as the Perlin noise function, in computational media that 
machines could really step out of regularity. Natural phenomena, such as raining, 
snowing, lightning, leaves falling, splashing water, and the like, were considered so 
stochastic that could not be easily approximated yesterday, but now they can be realized 
by various heuristic algorithms incorporating an appropriate component of noise, as seen 
in many multimedia websites or CGI movies. Organic motion that is pervasive in natural 
environments also has replicates in the digital domain. For example, Craig Reynold’s 
computational model Boids (1986) simulates the complex and emergent behaviors like 
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flocking of birds or schooling of fish. The model takes into account three different 
steering mechanisms, namely to avoid crowding local flock-mates (separation), to align 
with the average heading of local flock-mates (alignment), and to keep close to the center 
of local flock-mates (cohesion) (Figure 4.2). It suggests the framework of computer-
generated crowd and flock animation, not just constituting major visual effects in many 
movies but also providing life-like ambience in digital environments, such as the Apple 
iPhone entertainment application Koi Pond (Figure 4.3). All these dynamic phenomena in 
digital environments are part of the paradigm of generative and interactive animation, 




Figure 4.2 Bird flocking simulated by Craig Reynold’s Boids, modeling different steering 
behaviors: separation, alignment, and cohesion 
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Figure 4.3 Snapshots of the iPhone application Koi Pond 
Autonomous Behaviors 
 The distinction of organism from machine is further challenged when some more 
sophisticated organic behaviors, like autonomous action and reaction, can be simulated in 
digital environments based on techniques like artificial life (AL) systems, constraint-
based programming, or other artificial intelligence (AI)-based approaches. For instance, 
the former Oz project led by Joseph Bates in Carnegie Mellon University had one of its 
objectives to be building autonomous and interactive characters that make audiences 
believe they are alive. The team took reference of perspectives from animation artists, 
mainly Disney and Warner Brothers’ giants, to centralize emotion in creating their 
autonomous characters. Each character had its emotional state that combined with its 
personality, influenced how it acts and behaves (Bates, 1994). To me, the project 
interrogated not only what I meant by liveliness but also aliveness. As Bates put it, they 
were concerned about “degrees of believability,” which depended on not just reactivity 
but also appearance of goals, emotions, social interactions, and others. Yet, an incident 
mentioned by Bates resonates my notion of intentional liveliness. A particular character 
by mistake kept repeating an apparently foolish action, which to their surprise projects 
observers a personality and so an illusion of life (Bates, 1994). This kind of irregular 
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occurrence of programmed behaviors caught viewers’ attentions and provoked the 
intentional stance, giving rise to intentional liveliness.  
Growth and Metamorphosis 
 Other essential phenomena of life also include growth and metamorphosis, which 
can also be modeled computationally. For instance, the growth processes of many species 
of plants can be reproduced by means of many variants of the L-system based on formal 
grammar, of which the recursive framework lends itself to various self-similarity forms in 
the natural organic environment (Figure 4.4). A user would easily control the growth 
pattern of a tree model in virtual space by adjusting simple parameters. This approach 
gives rise to myriad fractal-like forms of life in computer graphic content. Besides, a 
multi-user platform allowing users to submit contents can also project an illusion of self-
evolving phenomena. The multimedia website Ecotonoha (www.ecotonoha.com), 
supported by NEC, is an exemplar of this kind (Figure 4.5). The website hosts a virtual 
tree in which every leaf is a message added by a Web user. The more users leaving notes, 
the more flourishing the virtual tree is. To a visitor, the virtual tree grows even more 
vigorously than actual trees.  
 
Figure 4.4 A screenshot of an application visualizing the L-system in a tree-like form 
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Figure 4.5 A snapshot of the virtual tree in the website Ecotonoha 
 The amplification or acceleration of growth and metamorphosis characterizes a 
pervasive quality of today’s generative and interactive animation. As the American 
cinema theorist Vivian Sobchack points out in her edited volume about the phenomenon 
of digital morphing, morphing is uncanny, and “strangely familiar,” because of its 
“‘supernatural’ acceleration of the process of change and transformation” and “effortless 
accomplishment” in digital culture and economy (Sobchack, 2000, p. xii). Later in her 
own essay, Sobchack further remarks that morphing, compared with Soviet montage and 
mise-en-scène, presents in cinema a new “reversible temporality” (Sobchack, 2000, p. 
137). She raises the “liquid metal” robot in Terminator 2 (1991) and the malleable 
bounded city in Dark City (1998) to illustrate how reversible and effortless 
transformation engages audiences like the “playful cartoon physics of animated films.” 
This notion of transformation echoes what I have been arguing the emergent liveliness, 
which arises from rhythmic or stochastic patterns that are not obviously progressive. 
Digital morphing, together with other non-progressive phenomena like snowing and 
flocking, constitute an array of emergent liveliness manifested by generative and 
interactive animation. 
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Animator versus Program 
 The aforementioned various animation phenomena show that today’s digital 
media are imbued with illusions of life, in which both emergent patterns like swarms or 
metamorphosis, and prominent behaviors like chasing have been manifested in terms of 
generative and interactive animation. I call this property a holistic illusion of life, for it 
encompasses both sides of liveliness. 
 However, these animation phenomena supported by computation still seem too 
mechanical and programmed to many animators. Instead, they believe that the act of 
animation is sensual. They insist that animation must be done by hand, whether it is by 
drawing in cel animation, by posing a puppet in stop-motion animation, or by keying 
major frames in computer-aided animation. As Paul Wells and others put it, the first acts 
of animistic animation come from the automatic and preconscious coordination of the 
eyes and the hand of the animator (Wells, 1998, p. 32). In the case of traditional hand-
drawn animation, the animator draws by one hand and flips a few pages by the other, 
observes the animated movement, makes necessary changes and flips again. The final 
animated movement is an outcome of the animator’s sensual eye-hand coordination. 
Therefore, many animators are skeptical about the sense of liveliness implemented by 
programs. It is the reason why character animation, even for CGI characters such as Buzz 
Lightyear in Toy Story (1995), is also keyed by human animators in authoring software. 
 This animator-centric view has also been challenged by today’s interactive 
generative animation systems. First, as I have pointed out, the rhythmic and chaotic 
patterns of liveliness can be generated by pseudorandom functions, such as the Perlin 
noise function. The inclusion of noise makes the autonomous output of a generative 
system look less regular, less predictable, and so more life-like. Second, some Disney’s 
animation principles, like follow-through secondary motion, or even walk cycles, can be 
automated in software of today. The effect of follow-through motion is not simulated by 
physical models, but rather “mimicked” by mathematical sequences like frame offsetting, 
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which can generate a rhythmic motion of a ponytail indiscernible from those drawn by 
hand. Yet, these rhythmic and chaotic patterns are still deterministic to designers, because 
they can always be reproduced. In order to make the system even livelier, even 
unanticipated by the designers, the system has to be interactive, which means direct 
motor control with immediate sensory feedback. To an author using a software 
application, as well as a participating observer tinkering with an interactive program, the 
system mobilizes an immediate and automatic motor-sensory coordination. The author or 
observer is able to tune the motor input in real time in response to the animated feedback 
and takes the result. The outcome is also based on one’s eye-hand coordination. In other 
words, the preconscious and sensual condition insisted by the animator-centric view is 
also facilitated in interactive generative animation systems.  
 An exemplar of this kind is Iwai Toshio’s sandbox video game Electroplankton 
for Nintendo DS gaming device. The program generates plankton moving autonomously. 
A player can use a stylus to interact with the animated plankton to generate spontaneous 
music, which in turn feeds back to the system for generating succeeding motion (Figure 
4.6). This creation process is not unlike abstract surrealists’ automatic drawing. It is also 
like Len Lye and other experimental animators’ “direct film” technique (animation 
directly drawn on film celluloid), but only that the motor-sensory loop in the new system 
is much more transient and instantaneous. The immediacy and transience of interactive 
generative animation foreground the polymorphic (in the biological sense, different forms 
in the life cycle) feature of computer systems as perceptual metamorphic movements, and 
behaviors, which constitute an expanded illusion of life, including the progressive, 
prominent “foreground” and the reversible, emergent “ambience.” It not only animates 
the image; it “animates” the computer and destabilizes the dichotomy of the animistic and 
the mechanistic views, further questioning the separation of organism and machine. 
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Figure 4.6 Interacting with Electroplankton using a stylus 
Summary: Toward a Holistic Illusion of Life 
 In summary, generative and interactive animation exhibits all-round liveliness in 
terms of the following different forms of computer-generated animation: 
• Interactional liveliness can be found in physical effect animation and constraint-
based animation. 
• Intentional liveliness is shown in AI-based animation. 
• Emergent liveliness is demonstrated in digital morphing, crowd animation, and 
natural effect animation. 
 I believe that the conventional folk classification of animation phenomena into 
animistic/mechanistic, organic/mechanical, animatic-centric/program-driven has become 
ambiguous, because these simple distinctions, as I have argued, are reductive when 
animation is expanded by generative and interactive systems. My perspective on 
animation phenomena as prominent behaviors and emergent patterns rooted in perception 
of animacy does not presume an intrinsic distinction between organism and machine, but 
rather suggests a typology of liveliness that spans a holistic illusion of life, from the high-
pass, progressive, and prominent “foreground” that draws observers’ specific attentions, 
to the low-pass, reversible, and emergent “ambience” that immerses observers in a life-
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like atmosphere. Both sides of liveliness have been actively “enlivened” by the 
generative and interactive form of animation. 
Illustrative Analyses: Types of Liveliness 
 Analyzing the liveliness of a digital media artifact needs consideration of both 
sides: (1) any prominent motion showing dynamic tension or invoking the intentional 
stance; and (2) any emergent pattern that keeps changing but makes no irreversible 
consequence to the whole environment. 
Prominent Behaviors: Intentional Liveliness 
 In today’s prevalent GUIs, many icons are animated to show prominent motion. 
For instance, in the Macintosh OS X environment, an icon whose application is not in 
focus might suddenly pop up and down in the dock in case that it has a message or 
request for the user (Figure 4.7). This unexpected, but eye-catching, action looks like 
someone jumping vigorously so as to draw attention, inciting the user to take the 
intentional stance, thinking about the reason behind this act. The GUI shows intentional 
liveliness here.  
 
Figure 4.7 An icon popping up in the dock of Mac OS X 
 Moreover, if the user clicks on an icon of a minimized window, the window 
stretches and twists into place like a playful genie coming up surprisingly from its lamp. 
Recall the first time someone saw this effect in the interface. One cannot help wondering 
why the window has to enact this “bodily performance.” It seems that it “wants” to 
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differentiate its capabilities from previous conventional windows. Again, this effect 
presents an example of intentional liveliness. 
 Animation showing intentional liveliness can also be seen in physical communal 
environments. For example, the traffic lights mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 display LED-
lit animated “green men” to instruct pedestrians when and how to cross the street. During 
each green signal, the little green man walks slowly, and then starts running faster and 
faster. The change in speed not only draws pedestrians’ attentions, but also invokes the 
intentional stance. The liveliness here implies that dangers may be approaching.  
Prominent Behaviors: Interactional Liveliness 
 Another type of prominent behavior is interactional liveliness, which is pervasive 
in video games. One of the earliest mainstream examples, as I have mentioned, is Pac-
Man. Apart from a few other programmed behaviors, ghosts in the game are able to 
switch between approaching and escaping in response to Pac-Man’s power status. The 
interchangeable predator-prey relation shows dynamic and complex interaction. After 
that, innumerable combat games (e.g., the Street Fighter series) have followed this 
principle of conditional behaviors with increasing complexity in rules and constraints, 
immersing us in a substantive visual experience of this kind of liveliness.  
Emergent Liveliness 
 On the other hand, many computer systems exhibit another side of liveliness: 
emergent pattern. Following the tradition of non-narrative films like Oskar Fischinger's 
Composition in Blue, John Whitney's Arabesque, Erica Russell's Feet of Song, and others, 
generative and interactive animation presents the liveliness of rhythm and dance. One 
canonical example is John Conway’s Game of Life (1970). The computer program 
incorporates a set of transformation rules for 2-dimensional patterns and applies to a grid 
of pixels. Running the program results in a visual display of a continuous and persistent 
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change in pixel patterns like choreography of pixels (Figure 4.8). This kind of 
transformation, in Sobchack’s words, is phenomenologically and temporally reversible. 
 
Figure 4.8 A snapshot of an execution of Game of Life 
 The computer capability of creating emergent patterns engenders countless so-
called “ambient animations” for screensaver programs, video backdrops, motion graphics 
sequence, or even movie titles. A latest exemplar is the aforementioned Nintendo DS 
sandbox video game Electroplankton. The game features a milieu with various types of 
plankton composing several mini-games. Each mini-game allows players to interact with 
the plankton, which keep making sound and repeating certain action accordingly. The 
outcomes are like musical and ballet performances of plankton orchestrated by the 
players. The sound and motion in these mini-games, although each has its own 
mechanics, share one fundamental principle: looping. When the loop continues, a player 
is able to tinker with the plankton in order to vary the output. The resulting animation 





Figure 4.9 Screenshots in Electroplankton 
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The Image: Material-Based Imagination 
 In the section “The Image” in the preceding chapter, I argued that animated visual 
images result in an embodied kind of cognitive processes. In this section, I continue 
describing how animated visual images mobilize a reflective cognitive process in which 
material-based imaginative construction and elaboration can take place through 
conceptual blends. I call this process as “material-based imagination,” characterizing 
another quality of generative and interactive animation. This kind of imagination is 
pervasive in today’s digitally mediated environments. 
 The section about understanding images reviewed major thoughts related to 
embodied and distributed views of cognition, and their contributions to the link between 
human perception, cognition, and bodily interaction. Conceptual blending theory is 
important for marking the link from image to imagination, because it introduces the 
emergent structure of integration networks that allows imaginative elaboration. Material 
anchors for conceptual blends provide a good model for integration of the material and 
the mental, suggesting that perceptual patterns can constitute part of human cognition. 
Glenberg’s notion of mesh is useful in explaining the matching of perceptual patterns and 
bodily experiences, which directly addresses embodied conceptualization. Therefore, 
material anchors and meshes together inform the cognitive grounding of perception and 
bodily interaction. However, meshes do not have the generative or elaborative power of 
blends. For Glenberg, patterns projected from experiences cannot be distorted. They must 
be “clamped,” because loosing the tie for prediction can dangerously result in 
hallucination (Glenberg, 1997). Moreover, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, Hutchins’s 
material anchors largely address stable images. In other words, both material anchors and 
meshes emphasize stability and resist imagination. Hiraga’s iconicity also focuses on the 
relationship between percepts and concepts and furthermore provides the flexibility of 
physical-mental mapping that Hutchins’s material anchors and Glenberg’s meshes lack, 
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yet her work only concentrates on static components like shape and spatial composition 
but ignores movement. All in all, none of these models are perfect for describing the 
embodied understanding of animation. 
 In fact, the new animation paradigm I have been arguing for marks the kind of 
material artifacts that have more flexible and adaptable qualities for imaginative mental 
constructions. These artifacts have distilled visual forms and compositions, like Chinese 
ideographs, architectural sketches, or film storyboards. They have actions and 
movements carrying visceral sensations, like shadow plays or animated image sequences. 
All these images not only invite people to perceive but also trigger producers to take 
further action. This kind of images always constitutes a successive “bouncing” process, in 
terms of blends, between material artifacts and mental images in the producer’s mind. 
The bouncing “speed” may vary, from the delayed – in the case of creating storyboards, 
rough cuts, or flipbook animation, to the instantaneous – in the case of shadow plays or 
real-time interactive animation. In all cases, blends of material and mental images allow 
the bouncing process to elaborate successive imaginative constructions. I call this 
imagination “material-based” based on how one perceives and acts upon material images, 
as opposed to the mentalist perspective of general thought of imagination as a purely 
mental activity.  
Elastic Anchors 
 As mentioned earlier, Hutchins coined the term “material anchor” to mean those 
material objects or images with stable patterns and structures “locking down” specific 
information or constraints for mental operations, whereas I believe that animated visual 
images “hold” not only information, but also sensation or meaning, which trigger 
imaginative elaboration in conceptual blending. These animated images are “elastic” 
material anchors for blends, which hold sensation in place, but not in shape. I use the 
term “elastic anchor” to describe these imagination-provoking artifacts. In the tradition of 
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Hutchins’s instrumentally oriented examples, material images and mental images are 
largely equivalent. The outputs of these blends, like the timepiece example, are fairly 
fixed as an entrenched cultural model (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Hutchins, 2005). For 
elastic anchors, the subtle difference between the visceral sensation represented by the 
animated image and the mental image engenders nuanced imagination. A product 
designer needs to sketch out different views of his or her design (a mental image) on 
paper in order to further develop the idea after seeing the sketches (a material image). A 
calligrapher practicing Chinese calligraphy has to repeat writing and looking at the 
words, making continuous assessments and adjustments. Practicing animators are also 
well aware of this kind of iterative processes. For example, an animatic sequence might 
suggest a visceral sensation, with which the animator can compare an intended mental 
image, combining partial structures from the animated image and the mental image 
respectively to form a new imaginative image, and then triggering adjustment or 
modification to the material image. This reflective process iterates and ultimately 
approaches the imaginative interplay of the material image and the mental image.  
 Such nuanced interplay would go even more unnoticed when the reflective 
process becomes instantaneous. It can be illustrated by the case of shadow play. Consider 
the difference of natural moving images (e.g., incidental shadows) and author-intended 
animated images (e.g., shadow puppetry) (Figure 4.10). The two images can be 
materially the same. To Hutchins, neither representation may be valuable as a material 
anchor because they are not faithful representations of an object, they are just silhouettes. 
However, the latter can be an elastic anchor for conceptual blends in which the silhouette 
in action embodying a visceral sensation is blended with the viewer’s mental image of an 
entity (whether human, animal, or even an anthropomorphic object) moving in a similar 
fashion, thus forming an imaginative understanding that the shadow is cast by an actual 
character in that mood. On the audience side, this blended image is the meaning of the 
puppet show. On the puppeteer side, this might be an interim image with which the 
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puppeteer would fine-tune for another animated shadow. In both cases, the material 
image blends with the mental image to give rise to next imaginative image.  
  
Figure 4.10 Incidental shadow vs. intended shadow 
 It follows that material images and mental images have a very intricate 
relationship. In goal-specific computational operations, they can be regarded as largely 
equivalent. In creative mental operations, to give an illustrative analogy, they may seem 
like dancing or boxing partners irregularly approaching each other, whether 
collaboratively or oppositionally. Moving images can be a vehicle for reconciling both 
understandings of this intricate relationship, because they constitute a specific type of 
embodied cognition process. Animated images, with their distilled visual forms, 
evocative movements, and the material-based reflective process, serve as an excellent 
elastic input for conceptual blends, because the flexibility and compatibility facilitate the 
partial structural projection between two images that gives rise to new blends and 
imaginative images.  
Elastic Coupling of Animated Images and Motor Action 
 If the animated images are instantaneously reactive, as in shadow play, the elastic 
anchors include not only sensory perception, but also motor action. In digital interactive 
media, elastic anchors are even more adaptable because a user might interpret his or her 
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motor input quite variably according to the perceived generative feedback. For an 
interactive system, generative animated feedback often defines, or re-defines, the 
meaning of motor action. For example, when a user scrolls the view of a window using 
two fingers on the touchpad of an Apple MacBook laptop, the scrolling effect defines the 
action as moving the viewpoint because the scrolling direction is the same as the finger 
motion. When a user touches and moves a finger on an Apple iPhone’s screen, the 
contrasting scrolling effect (just in the opposite direction) re-defines the action as moving 
the panel instead. A few other examples include leaving marks on a touch screen defines 
the touch-and-move action as drawing, a swarm of particles following a pointer defines 
the action of moving the pointing device as choreographing, turning a new page on the 
iPhone’s screen defines shaking the cell phone as flipping, the magnification effect of the 
Dock in Macintosh OS X defines the mouse-over action as considering, and giggling 
human figures in a viral interactive advertisement defines mouse-over as tickling. As 
mentioned in the section “The Body” of the preceding chapter, what Merleau-Ponty calls 
“the intentional arc” works beneath perception and absorbs motor action as bodily 
knowledge. Motion-based motor action embodies our consciousness toward something. 
Likewise, in digital interactive media, motion-based motor input embodies users’ 
consciousness “moving” toward animated feedback. Since the animated feedback is 
generative, programmable, and variable, the embodied meaning of motor action becomes 
adaptable. It follows that a coupling of animated visual images and motor input may yield 
adaptive and evocative meaning through imaginative blends. Consider the magnification 
effect of the Macintosh OS X’s Dock, both animation (the magnification) and action 
(mouse-over) may seem non-representational, but the coupling is meaningful when it 
blends with some everyday experiences (e.g., an individual asserting "pick me!" from a 
line of candidates). 
 This coupling idea echoes what I mentioned the motor-sensory feedback loop that 
characterizes generative and interactive animation. Motor action triggers animation that 
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in turn incites further bodily engagement. This loop sometimes is delayed, like in hand-
drawn animation pencil test, or computer animation preview that needs rendering. 
Occasionally, the loop is instantaneous and continuing, like that in shadow play or real-
time interactive systems. This loop, which relies on the materiality of images that one 
perceives and acts upon, is the core of elastic anchors. Elastic anchors are elastic in the 
sense that the meaning is flexibly dependent on the enduring interaction, which will be 
discussed in depth in the next section “The Body” of this chapter, between motor input 
and animated feedback. 
Summary: Properties of Elastic Anchors 
 In summary, elastic anchors are characterized by the following properties: 
• Material-based Imagining: They are material images, consisting of imagic and/or 
diagrammatic qualities. 
• Imagination Triggering: They “hold” information or sensation, which can be 
reflected back to perceivers, yielding imaginative blended images. 
• Action Inviting: They “invite” perceivers to take motor-action, like modification 
or interaction. 
• Motor-sensory Connecting: They constitute iterative motor-sensory feedback 
loops, such as those in sketching of architectural design, pencil test of hand-drawn 
animation, writing exercise of Chinese calligraphy, shadow plays, operation of the 
zoetrope, real-time animation preview, and so on. 
• Spatiotemporal Patterning: When the loop runs spontaneously and continuously, 
as in animated images, they provide not only spatial and structural patterns, but 
also temporal patterns (More descriptions about spatiotemporal embodiment will 
follow in the third section “The Body” of this chapter). 
 The loop links sensory perception and motor action on material images, forming a 
generic mental space for an imaginative integration network, which can be called 
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material-based imagination. This kind of imagination is pervasive in today’s digitally 
mediated environments. 
Illustrative Analyses: Levels of Understanding 
 The analysis of animation-driven imagination in digital media in terms of elastic 
anchors is primarily based on conceptual blending theory. Here, I would like to give a 
brief summary of major terminology to be used in following analyses. These terms are 
just part of specific vocabulary used by Fauconnier and Turner in their book The Way We 
Think. I highlight them because of their high relevance in my analyses of animated 
images. More rigorous definitions of a full glossary can always be found in many other 
volumes of relevant literature in the field. 
• Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed for local understanding 
and action (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 40), such as a particular scenario of 
transaction. They contains elements, like who, when, where, and what, and are 
typically structured by frames. 
• Input spaces are input mental spaces for conceptual blends. Early examples in 
blending theory usually involved two input spaces. 
• Cross-space mapping are partial connection between counterparts in the two input 
spaces in a blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 41). 
• Selective projection: Elements and relations from the inputs are only selectively 
projected to the blend.  
• Compression: Cross-space mapping, or called “outer-space” links between the 
inputs to the blend, will be compressed into relations inside the blend, or called 
“inner-space” relations (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 92).  
• Vital relations are important recurring relations in compression (Fauconnier & 
Turner, 2002, p. 92).  
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• Frames are long-term schematic knowledge (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 40), 
such as the sell-buy frame in the modern society, which includes roles for buyer 
and seller, merchandise, price, transaction period, terms of contracts, and so on. 
 The following is an example mentioned by the dissertation author and D. Fox 
Harrell elsewhere (Chow & Harrell, 2009b). Consider the “water-level” battery meter 
interface of the Japanese mobile phone N702iS (Figure. 4.11). The phone was 
manufactured by NEC Corporation in 2006. It comes with an intriguing gestural interface 
designed by Oki Sato and Takaya Fukumoto. The interface displays images visually 
resembling liquid water. The subtle movement of water in the interface invites the user to 
tilt the cell phone a bit, resulting in further reactive movement of the computer-generated 
water images. This motor-sensory loop runs spontaneously and continuously, building a 
material-based mental space and holding an embodied meaning (the action and reaction 
afforded by this artifact). The reactive image anchors this meaning as a direct input to the 
blend with the user’s sensorimotor experience of tilting a bottle of water (similar to 
meshes of percepts with bodily experiences), yielding an imaginative conceptualization 
of a cell phone containing water inside, in which elements including animation (flowing), 
action (tilting), and artifacts (the phone and the bottle) are selectively projected and 
compressed into the blend. These compressions rely on a match of motor-sensory 
patterns in the immediate situation and from memory, but the patterns encode not only 
spatial information (where to grip, which direction to tilt, etc.) but also temporal data 
(how fast to move, when to pause, etc.). These are motion-based input6. Imagine how, if 
the water image did not flow to the tilted side, or it flowed with a delay of several 
seconds, the match and the blend would be rendered void. Hence, in the blends involving 
elastic anchors, the spontaneous and continuous loop is the core. 
                                                 
 
 
6 The section “The Body” of the preceding chapter has described this kind of input, whose motion qualities 
are significant to output. 
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Figure 4.11 The interface of the mobile phone N702iS showing computer-generated 
imagery of water reactive to user action 
 The following diagrams illustrate two levels of blends emerging in the use of this 
artifact. Based on Fauconnier and Turner’s traditions (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), an 
integration diagram depicts the input spaces horizontally, with the output of the blend in 
the bottom. The lines between these spaces are mappings, selective projections, or 
compressions of vital relations. The top structure is the generic space, which encapsulates 
elements shared by all input spaces. In this structure, I add a circular loop to represent the 
aforementioned motor-sensory loop. Moreover, motor actions and perceptions are 
represented in terms of mathematical relations. For example, flow-inside (water, bottle) 
means that liquid water flows inside the bottle, while tilt (phone) denotes the act of tilting 
the cell phone. 
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Figure 4.12 The immediate blend of the water-level interface 
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Figure 4.13 The metaphorical blend of the water-level interface 
 In the first level (Figure. 4.12), the generic space consists of a concept of the 
motor-sensory loop, together with a hand-held artifact. For the blend, there are 
compressions of outer-space representation links (a type of vital relations, representation 
of virtual water imagery displayed on the phone for actual liquid water flowing inside the 
bottle), and compressions of outer-space analogies (e.g., tilting the cell phone cf. tilting 
the bottle), forming a new concept (the cell phone contains virtual water). The output is 
an imaginative blend of a water-filled container-phone.  
 What makes the artifact even more intriguing is that the computer-generated 
water level is in synchronization with the battery level of the phone. When checking the 
water level (just like an ordinary user checking the battery level of an ordinary cell 
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phone) intermittently, one notices that the water level descends gradually and reflects the 
ongoing energy consumption in the container-phone. This articulation further incites the 
secondary blend of water with energy in the battery (Figure. 4.13). The generic space 
now includes a concept of a level-type indicator, which reflects the amount of a particular 
resource left. In the blend, the outer-space analogy link between the water level and the 
battery meter level is compressed tightly into an inner-space category relation: the water 
level is a battery meter. The blend might then be elaborated into an imaginative narrative 
about someone in some harsh environment checking how much water is left or similar 
tales of water-conservation. The monitoring of water consumption invokes a common 
frame nowadays: conservation of energy or other scarce natural resources. The 
elaboration of such blend leaves the user a strong and provocative message: “save the 
juice!” 
 It should be noted that if the water level does not continuingly react to user action, 
or if it is not autonomously descending according to power consumption, the message of 
the interface would be totally different. The first condition of having an immediate 
experience of continuing reactivity is necessary for the first level blend. I call this 
immediate level of understanding. The second condition of coupling the water level and 
energy consumption supports the imagination of a metaphorical narrative in the 
secondary blend (In Turner’s sense, the narrative is a small spatial story, see (Turner, 
1996)). I call this metaphorical level of understanding.  
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The Body: Enduring Interaction 
 In the section “The Body” of the preceding chapter, I call for considering motion-
based motor input in designing interactive systems, because motion reveals and embodies 
intention in both space and time. This section expands this idea of spatiotemporal 
embodiment to propose a continuously changing and varying digital environment 
supported by generative and interactive animation. 
 Interaction between humans and computers is often figuratively interpreted as 
conversation or dialogue between two active participants (Crawford, 2005, p. 29). In this 
section, I argue against this conventional view because it overlooks an integral part of our 
everyday lives: spatiotemporal embodiment of meaning. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “our 
body inhabits space and time.” The embodiment of meaning depends on both space and 
time. In digital interactive media, this goal can be achieved by: (1) as I have argued, 
motion-based motor input; and (2) a continuously changing and diverging environment. I 
call the paradigm of interaction mechanisms consisting of these two vital components as 
“enduring interaction,” in contrast to the discrete, conversational types of alternate 
computer-human interaction, like the classical command-line interface, or the 
conventional point-and-click widgets found in many GUIs. 
Spatial Embodiment: Lakoff & Johnson’s Spatial Metaphors 
 To Merleau-Ponty, motility reveals our intentions toward something. After 
Merleau-Ponty, more thinkers have focused on how our bodies interact with worldly 
situations. Lakoff and Johnson believe that bodily interaction has direct contribution to 
human cognition. They assert that most of our cognitive models, named image schemas, 
are comprehended through bodily projection. For example, our bodies are containers 
taking in food and emitting waste, so we project a container metaphor onto abstract 
concepts, as when we understand a tribe as living “in” the forest (Lakoff & Johnson, 
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1999, p. 36). The theory of image schemas is a powerful tool for us to understand how we 
reason based on spatial logic. However, it also demonstrates humans’ over-reliance on 
spatial relation while downplaying temporal transition. Because time is an abstract 
concept, we are used to spatializing time metaphorically. When we say the “flow” of 
time, we may mean seeing time as a moving object (e.g., a river) from a static observer’s 
viewpoint. Meanwhile, we might see future as something fixed “in front of” us. We often 
think of how many days “to go” before a deadline, just like time is a static point to which 
we are moving. In short, we conceive of time in a source-path-goal schema in which we 
situate our body. It seems that our over-reliance upon spatial reasoning is a result of our 
body’s spatial existence in the world. However, our body also inhabits time. As Merleau-
Ponty puts it, “I belong to space and time, my body combines with them and includes 
them” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 140). The notion of embodiment should include the 
concept of time. 
Temporal Embodiment: Deleuze’s Cinematic Philosophy 
 Gilles Deleuze has attempted to theorize a perspective of time in his two famous 
volumes about cinema. He points out that our natural perception introduces “halts” or 
“fixed points” in our everyday lives (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 22-23). We tend to “immobilize” 
the continuous flow of life, slowing down the intense “flux” of data, in order to think 
(Colebrook, 2002b, p. 149). Hence, we see time as connection of those fixed viewpoints 
within some ordered whole. This model is best illustrated by the use of storyboards in 
filmmaking, and even in interface design. To an interface designer, a storyboard helps her 
or him understand the connection between input and feedback. Apparently, time is just a 
sequence of alternating stimuli and responses. In other words, Deleuze agrees that we are 
used to creating a spatial concept of time through natural perception. However, he also 
reminds us “cinematographic perception works continuously” (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 22-
23). His major theses include the concepts of the “movement image” and the “time 
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image.” The former refers to the early cinema enabled by the moving camera and Soviet 
montage, telling us movement is not just translation in space but also related to variation. 
The time image further presents the continuous variation, a divergent “becoming,” 
directly by irrational cuts. I believe cinema, with its hundred years of history, has 
changed our perception of time, and also the concept of time, making it different from the 
natural “stimulus-response” mechanism (Colebrook, 2002b, p. 149). In digital media, the 
old perception of time corresponds to the discrete, conversational style of interaction. For 
instance, the classical command prompt interface introduces “halts,” breaking the 
engagement into ordered, discrete, and alternate segments of input and feedback. Today’s 
digital media artifacts should instead present the “becoming” in temporally embodied 
interaction, engaging users in continuity and variation. The idea of embodiment should be 
re-considered as bodily engagement in a lively world, which is not only reactive but also 
autonomous and evolving. In case of an animated artifact, it should be able to project an 
illusion of a constantly evolving environment meanwhile diverging with respect to a 
user’s motion-based input. 
Enduring Transformation 
 The essence of temporal embodiment is that of a constantly changing whole. An 
engaging animated interface should present continuing and differing variation. This 
enduring transformation can be manifested with generative and interactive animation. 
With today’s computational technology, generative algorithms are able to render 
animation transforming indefinitely. In the section about growth and metamorphosis of 
this chapter, I described transformation with a focus on the temporal and 
phenomenological reversibility. Here, I elaborate the idea of transformation further to 
cover the constantly variable and divergent nature. Algorithms can take user input and 
process it in real time, supporting immediate feedback to the animation. The outcome is a 
constantly changing image readily transforming in reaction to its viewer. One of the 
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exemplars is John Conway’s Game of Life, which has been mentioned in the section “The 
Observer” of this chapter. The “game” is a two-dimensional cellular automaton in which 
the cells live, die, and reproduce according to pre-defined rules based on the neighboring 
cells. The running of the game looks like an animation of vivid patterns morphing 
constantly. Meanwhile, a viewer or player is always free to interfere the growth of the 
cells by putting extra cells in the two-dimensional grid. This motor input is motion-
sensitive, because to add cells the user just runs the pointer across the grid. At the 
perceptuomotor level, the piece is a generative and interactive animation. At the 
metaphorical level, it projects an image of life, which is constantly evolving because of 
its rules, and is always differing because of its openness to intervention. The interaction 
between the user’s motion-based motor action and the animated images exemplifies a 
temporal embodiment in a “plane” of “becoming.”  
 Besides, Craig Reynolds’ Boids is also noteworthy. As I have mentioned in the 
section “The Observer” of this chapter, it is a computational model simulating emergent 
motion of animal crowds, such as flocks of birds and schools of fish. The result of the 
model is usually called crowd or flock animation. The algorithm deals with motion of 
individual animal in relation to its neighbors. At the level of the individual, it addresses 
the translation in space. At the level of the crowd, the model presents a collective whole 
that looks like an amoeba in enduring transformation. It demonstrates what Deleuze 
means by “movement,” which is “not a change in place” but rather “a transformation of 
the body,” “a body being nothing other than its movements” (Colebrook, 2002a, p. 45). If 
individual animals were not in motion, there is no transforming amoeba. With the 
development in real-time control technology, this “amoeba” becomes interactive. The 
iPhone application Koi Pond mentioned earlier has implemented the model to render a 
pond of koi fish each of which is reactive to user taps. In other words, the whole pond is 
continuously changing on its own and possibly differing with user intervention.  
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The Enduring Environment 
 In interface design, one of the primary goals has been to make interfaces more 
“user-friendly,” or “usable.” Following the views of Ben Shneiderman, Donald Norman, 
Jakob Nielson, and others, the terms generally describe a tool that is easy to learn, 
understand, use, or manipulate. Their ideas have led to the prevalent user-centric 
approach to interface design. The paradigm emphasizes usability, efficiency, and 
productivity, rendering computer a synonym of office equipment or business machine. 
On the other hand, Paul Dourish’s phenomenological approach suggests designing 
interactive systems as environments engaging users like the everyday world. This world 
is familiar and approachable to the users. However, grounded in Heidegger’s “Being-in-
the-world,” Dourish’s perspective is about a “work-world,” which is mundane and 
routine. In designing animated systems like multimedia websites, entertainment 
applications, or digital artworks, I argue for an enduring and lively world, which is more 
habitual and intimate to humans. This environment engages human users less with 
objects and space, but more with change and time. According to Deleuze, time is not 
some ordered sections of stimuli and responses, like conversation, but rather a continuous 
and divergent “becoming.” Digitally mediated interaction of animated artifacts aiming at 
more embodied meaning should present this “becoming,” engaging human users in an 
enduring and lively world, which not only reacts to motion-based input but also presents 
continuous transformation. This constantly changing environment can be manifested with 
generative and interactive animation, making computer interaction more embodied and 
computer interfaces more reminiscent of our everyday experiences. Some good examples 
include the greeting page SnowDays at Popularfront.com (to be discussed in the 
following section), the water-level interface in mobile phone N702iS (to be discussed in 
Chapter 6), and lately the mobile application SunDial, which displays the continuous 
movement of the sun to support religious practices of Islamic users (Wyche, Caine, 
Davison, Arteaga, & Grinter, 2008). They all use animated images that transform 
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continuously, just like the running of Game of Life and Koi Pond, projecting users a 
strong sense of “becoming” and life. 
 
Figure 4.14 A mobile Islamic call to prayer application Sun Dial 
Summary: Conditions of Enduring Interaction 
 In summary, the necessary conditions of an enduring interaction mechanism 
include: 
• Motion-based Motor Input: The motion qualities of user input must have 
significant effect on system output; 
• Enduring Environment: The system still presents continuous transformation even 
without any user input. On the other hand, it would show differing output in 
response to varying input. 
 I believe more computational artifacts with interfaces of this kind will make 
computers more familiar, intimate, and close to human users. 
Illustrative Analyses: Mechanisms of Engagement 
 Hence, the analysis of bodily engagement with animated artifacts requires a new 
model derived from spatiotemporal embodiment of meaning, including motion-based 
motor input and the enduring environment. I introduce a continuum of engaging 
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mechanisms from the least to the most embodied, accordingly halted engagement, 
decelerated engagement, and continuing engagement.  
Halted Engagement 
 Halted engagement mainly refers to a kind of conversational interaction with 
artifacts or machines. The mechanism involves distinct sections of motor input and 
sensory feedback taking turns alternately. The ordered connection of these sections is the 
“immobilized” “becoming” of the environment. The use of mechanical typewriters is a 
typical example. The typewriter responds to each key tap by the typist with a 
corresponding character strike in sequential order. Any one tap that did not wait for the 
feedback of the preceding tap would cause a jam. In other words, the input and feedback 
sections cannot overlap. This mechanical constraint leads to strictly alternate sections, 
forming the defining characteristic of halted engagement. Moreover, halted engagement 
involves no motion-based motor input. In typing a text, motion qualities like how hard 
the finger hit a key or the path reaching a key could have no significant effect on the 
outlook of the printed text.  
 The phenomenon of halted engagement seems to be a result of the mechanics of 
the apparatus, yet halted engagement should not be thought of only limited to mechanical 
artifacts. In fact, “halted” examples can be found in digital environments as well, 
including the command-line environment in MS-DOS and the point-and-click mechanism 
in most graphical user-interfaces. In these cases, a system usually takes a user input and 
then responds alternately. The system would wait indefinitely for a user input. It shows 
that halted engagement is a matter of design, not mechanics. 
Decelerated Engagement 
 Decelerated engagement differs from halted in that the artifact considers motion-
based motor input. Yet, the interactive engagement would still be slowed down, so 
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decelerated, in the case of a delayed input. The result is a kind of semi-enduring 
interaction. Regarding motion-based input, some machine interfaces provide exemplars. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, professional VTRs usually come with a jog dial allowing a 
user to control video playback by rotating the knob. The motion qualities of the dial 
affect how the medium is presented. A clockwise spin results in fast-forward, whereas a 
counter-clockwise spin rewinds the tape. The faster it spins, the faster the tape plays. The 
case is similar to the mechanics of a zoetrope. The direction of rotating the zoetrope 
determines the direction of movements presented through the slits. These machines entail 
motion-based input and manifest more embodied interaction. 
 However, these machine interfaces still have inadequacies, resulting in imperfect 
enduring interaction. Although motor input in the zoetrope or the jog dial is motion-
sensitive, a delay of user input could slow down the whole “becoming” output. In case of 
the zoetrope, the viewer needs to keep spinning the apparatus in order to see the animated 
effect. The spinning speed determines what the viewer exactly sees through the slits. If 
the viewer defers the motor action, the animation would slow down and finally halt. I call 
this interaction mechanism decelerated engagement. Similar to the halted cases, 
decelerated interfaces would also wait indefinitely for user input. 
 In fact, many computer interfaces are moderately “decelerated.” While they are 
waiting for a user input, they project an illusion of continuous variation through 
multimedia, like animation or sound, but the whole environment actually makes no 
advancement. This trick is best demonstrated by some computer games in which even 
though a player-controlled character stops moving, other animated objects still keep 
wandering and the music still goes on. It seems that the environment keeps changing; in 
fact, the animation and music are looped, and the game does not proceed to next levels 
until the player takes subsequent action.  
Continuing Engagement 
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 Lastly, continuing engagement describes those systems showing ceaseless 
transformation, with or without user input. This kind of engagement is continuing in that 
the environment would continue changing autonomously even there is no input. 
Simultaneously, a user input, mainly motion-based, at any time might trigger a particular 
variation that would carry on. This “becoming” is persistent and divergent. A good 
analogy is the Japanese tea-serving karakuri. On winding up, it paces slowly with a cup 
of tea approaching the audience. When it bows, the gesture cues the audience to pick up 
the teacup. If the audience does, it would wait for the return of the cup; otherwise, it 
would not wait but turn away, and come back after a while. The mechanical doll is 
following its own rule continuously. Meanwhile, it also reacts to its audience’s timely 
action and might have a little difference in behavior. It is able to engage its audience in 
continuing and differing action. In digital media, this kind of continuing engagement is 
emerging.  
 A prominent example is the greeting front page SnowDays at Popularfront.com. 
The page displays an outdoor view of snowing somewhere. The falling flakes vary in 
shape because they are actually other visitors’ submissions. A visitor may create his or 
her own snowflake by a simple interactive cutting tool and attach a message. Once the 
visitor submits the flake, it falls in the scene and constitutes part of the “becoming.” The 
visitor can “catch” any falling flakes and check out the details and messages. Yet one has 
to take timely action, otherwise the target may fall out of the window frame. Therefore, 
motion matters in the user input of this system. Furthermore, even though the visitor does 
nothing but just watching, the background always changes with the time of day, forming 
another part of the enduring environment. 
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Figure 4.15 Snapshots of SnowDays at Popularfront.com 
 Other good examples include the water-level interface in the mobile phone 
N702iS, which has been mentioned in the “The Image” section of this chapter. The 
interface displays computer-generated images of water that react to user action. When the 
user tilts the phone, the way and speed of user motion determine how the water flows on 
the screen, yielding an illusion of a water-filled cell phone. Shaking more vigorously 
would lead to other effects like turning off the alarm. That means the user input is 
motion-sensitive. Meanwhile, even though there is no user action, the water level would 
continue falling very gradually according to the battery consumption. This subtle change 
reflects an enduring environment. All in all, the reactive and self-evolving water images 
constitute a “becoming.” 
 In short, continuing engagement includes both motion-based input and enduring 
environments. Decelerated engagement involves only the former but lacks the latter. If 
both vital components are left behind, an interactive system belongs to examples of 
halted engagement. 
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The Performer: Computer-Mediated Co-Performance 
 In the section “The Performer” of the preceding chapter about live performance of 
animation, I have shown that the emergent animation phenomena in digital media can be 
seen as a new form of live performance, which I call “puppeteerly animation.” This 
section further attempts to define liveness of generative and interactive animation. This 
notion of liveness contributes to an expanded illusion of life in two folds, namely a 
mutual sense of liveliness between observers and performers, which I have described 
when talking about performance animation, and more importantly, the contingent nature 
of life. That means, the convolution of generativity and interactivity results in 
contingency, a vital part of the new animation paradigm. 
Defining Liveness of Animation 
 Generative and interactive animation is a form of live performance in digital 
media, because there is a synchronicity of operation and reception enabled by today’s 
real-time control and rendering technologies. This technological phenomenon 
problematizes the traditional notion of liveness. It seems that physical presence, 
proximity, and immediacy are all outmoded requirements. Philip Auslander has made a 
similar remark on the phenomenal impact of media technologies and mediatization in 
performance practices. He provocatively claims that there is no ontological difference 
between mediatized and live performance, so refuting ontology of liveness (Auslander, 
1999, p. 50). He asserts that contemporary live performance is not only mass-consumed 
by a huge audience but also mass-produced and -reproduced from a recurrent text, just 
like other media content. Good examples include Broadway theaters that are adaptations 
of movies (e.g., Billie Elliot), the pop singer Madonna’s world tour concerts re-
manifesting her music videos, and others. In Walter Benjamin’s words, live performance 
has lost its aura in the age of mediatization. Yet, Steve Dixon reviews Auslander’s claim 
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with a critical lens, thinking that his view has downplayed the perceptual differences 
between live and mediatized performance. He argues that audience reception in the 
theater differs experientially from that in other media. The former is a collective 
experience while the latter a voyeuristic one (Dixon, 2007, pp. 129-130). However, there 
is no such disparity between puppetry and animation, as I have described the shadow 
theater and the shadow film in the section about performance animation. In fact, the 
reception and perception of animators and audiences in the new animation paradigm have 
become even more comparable because of real-time technologies. Hence, I am inclined to 
say that computer-mediated performance animation is live from the perspectives of 
participants, including both the performer and observer’s views. 
 Meanwhile, in new animation phenomena, generative algorithms support 
interactive experiences phenomenologically similar to live performance, which can 
present different instances on every viewing and show responsive variations on audience 
feedback. These experiences are definitely scarce in the traditional film form of 
animation. We need to describe this quality in a formal way. Here, Auslander’s 
interpretation of liveness in today’s mediatized culture may shed some light on the 
matter. He asserts that live performance exists only after recording technologies has 
engendered what we call mediatization. Inspired by Jean Baudrillard’s dictum that the 
“real” is something that can be reproduced, Auslander defines the “live” as “that can be 
recorded” (Auslander, 1999, p. 51). Although this kind of oppositional definition seems 
to be paralipsis to some people, it reminds me that real-time technologies differentiate 
“live” puppeteerly animation from traditional “playback” viewerly animation, just like 
what recording technologies did to the live and the mediatized. I propose that interactive 
generative animation should be regarded as “live” in relation to playback of pre-rendered 
animation. The latter is something already closed, complete, recorded, and materially 
stored. The former is still open, emergent, subject to change, and to be recorded, such as 
Interactive Wall: BIG SHADOW (an interactive outdoor advertising event featuring 
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shadow play connecting online web visitors and on-location viewers in real time), 
Camille Utterback’s well-known digital artwork Text Rain (more discussions follow in 
the next section), the virtual Britpop band Gorillaz’ live concert, machinima animation, 
performance in SecondLife, and others. For this kind of “live” puppeteerly animation, I 
define liveness to be inversely proportional to the amount of stored or pre-rendered 
components. High-degree liveness corresponds to less pre-rendered visual content for 
direct playback. Low degree of liveness means a major playback of stored content. In this 
regard, screening of Oskar Fischinger’s abstract films is not live while running of John 
Conway’s Game of Life is highly live. 
 
Figure 4.16 BIG SHADOW found in Tokyo 
 
Figure 4.17 Digital artwork Text Rain 
 110 
 
Figure 4.18 The Gorillaz performance in 2006 Brit Awards 
Improvised Co-Performance and Contingency of Life 
 As I mentioned in the section about performance animation, real-time control and 
rendering technologies have made possible a mutual sense of liveliness between the 
performer and the observer, destabilizing their original perspectives. The designer, 
animator, or viewers of a multimedia artifact enabled by these technologies all participate 
in a co-performance. They all become “performers” in the “live” show of the artifact 
augmented with generative and interactive animation. The artifact contributes to different 
versions of the performance, because generativity supports pseudorandom variation, and 
interactivity facilitates human intervention. Hence, each presentation is like an 
improvised co-creation between the participants and the artifact. This kind of co-creation 
is more improvised than prepared because the designer can never exactly know how or 
when the participants would take action to interfere the outcome. 
 The idea of improvisation is often positioned as an alternative to formal, well-
prepared, and structured music performance. With an aim to explore possibilities of 
music improvisation with computers, the trombone player, composer, and scholar George 
Lewis has constructed the computer-driven interactive music system Voyager. Talking 
about implication of his masterpiece regarding the controversial opposition of 
“composed” and “improvised” traditions of music making, he emphasizes that to 
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distinguish from composition, improvisation must entail real-time intervention. An 
improvising machine should be “open to input, open to contingency” (Lewis, 2000). His 
assertion also applies to generative and interactive animation, which gives rise to 
improvised co-performance, bringing openness and contingency to an artifact.  
 Regarding contingency, Dixon also ties the concept closely to live performance. 
As he puts it, live performance always carries the possibility of “unexpected” happening 
(Dixon, 2007, p. 131). In other words, contingency is an integral part of liveness. The 
degree of liveness in generative and interactive animation marks the contingency of life 
carried by an animated artifact. The higher the degree of liveness, the less stored content, 
and the more variation can be generated by algorithms or driven by participants, the more 
uncertain the outcome will be. In short, liveness brings contingency of life to an animated 
artifact, providing audiences with a more embodied experience of the expanded illusion 
of life.   
Contingency of New Animation Phenomena 
 The aforementioned ideas of improvisation and contingency in animated artifacts 
labeled as liveness also inform a distinctive characteristic of interactive generative 
animation, and digital media at large. Regarding the essences of digital media, quite a 
few media theorists have already made well-received conclusions, including Janet 
Murray’s four essential properties of digital environments (Murray, 1997), Lev 
Manovich’s principles of new media (Manovich, 2001), Peter Lunenfeld’s aesthetic of 
“unfinish” in digital media (Lunenfeld, 1999), and others. This section, rather than 
arguing for another distinguished point of view, attempts to augment the lively discussion 
by marking the role of contingency in today’s digitally mediated context. As a subgenre 
of digital media, the new animation paradigm, with its contingent nature destabilizes the 
respective roles of performers and audiences, animators and viewers, throwing new light 
on the broader theoretical context of post-structuralism.  
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 Barthes’s pronounced dictum “Death of the Author,” which is generally thought 
of as marking the birth of post-structuralism, provokes subversion to the hegemonic 
authority of the author and turns the reader from a consumer into a producer of meaning 
(Barthes, 1977a). As he puts it at the end of his essay, “a text is made of multiple 
writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, 
parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that 
place is the reader, … we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow 
the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of death of the Author.” In another 
essay “From Work to Text,” he further talks about the consumption of a text, suggesting 
that we “abolish (or at the very least to diminish) the distance between writing and 
reading” (Barthes, 1977b). He draws an analogy from the art of contemporary music, in 
which the performer or interpreter is regarded as the co-author of the score, to advocate 
reader collaboration and improvisation in writing. The idea is comparable to Umberto 
Eco’s notion of the open work or its subgenre work-in-movement, which refers to the 
kind of works that are always open for interpretation, intervention, and to be completed 
(Eco, 1989). He raises a wide array of examples, including James Joyce’s Finnegans 
Wake, Alexander Calder’s mobile sculptures, abstract expressionist paintings, and even 
live television broadcasts in which each director is free to choose from a set of cameras in 
order to complete his or her narrative. However, Eco’s view is less radical than Barthes’s 
concept of writerly text, because Eco presumed that the direction of “movement” in a 
work is still intended, proposed, and so steered by the author (Eco, 1989, p. 19). In fact, 
Eco’s work-in-movement is more similar to Nelson Goodman’s notational system of art, 
like a musical score or a woodblock print, of which the constitutive component is usually 
prescribed by the author while the contingent component is open to the performer or the 
printer (Goodman, 1976, pp. 116-118). All in all, these (relatively) contemporary 
thoughts mark the contingent nature in the world of creativity. 
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 Actually, what Eco and Goodman describe are author-intended rule-based 
systems with contingent instances reactive to user actions, which also lie at the heart of 
interactive generative animation. Instead of completely subverting the role of the author 
as did the writerly text, the new animation paradigm still assumes that the author plans, 
designs, or programs the expanded illusion of life, while the user and the computational 
artifact co-enact various versions of the live performance. The degree of liveness is 
inversely proportional to the amount of pre-rendered or stored material content. Hence, 
higher degree of liveness indicates less certain output, resulting in more divergent 
possible outcomes. The notion of liveness I have been arguing for incorporates the idea 
of improvised co-performance, better describing and capturing the contingent nature of 
digital media, in which users always experience differently on each system instantiation 
and outcomes at all times vary with every user intervention. 
Summary: Liveness of Animation 
 In summary, this section defines liveness for analyzing and designing interactive 
generative animation, followed by its implication on the contingent nature of life 
manifested in such artifacts: 
• Liveness versus Playback: The degree of liveness is inversely proportional to the 
amount of stored components in playback during the improvised presentation of 
an artifact. 
• Contingency: Less pre-rendered, pre-captured materials result in higher degree of 
liveness, in turn invoking an embodied experience of the contingency of life. 
• Post-structuralist Inclination: Liveness reflects contingency, being a reference 
indicator of the post-structuralist inclination embedded in the design of an artifact. 
Illustrative Analyses: Degrees of Liveness 
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 Liveness of generative and interactive animation brings the contingent nature of 
life to digital media artifacts, contributing to an expanded illusion of life. Higher degree 
of liveness implies more embodied experience of life. To illustrate the idea, I list several 
examples of animated artifacts in order of their respective degrees of liveness. 
Playback Animation 
 As I have mentioned, all direct playback of the traditional film form of animation, 
including stop-motion animation, hand-drawn animation, abstract films, and CGI 
animation, is not live. The status is regardless of whether the presentation is a film or 
video projection, on a television screen, or in an Internet browser, as long as the whole 
presented content is playback of pre-recorded or pre-rendered materials stored in certain 
medium, such as a film reel, a videotape, a disc, a hard disk, or a memory board. It 
follows that a playback of the Pixar’s animated short film Luxo Jr. (1986) on YouTube or 
the opening movie of an interactive multimedia websites is not live. 
Slightly Live Animation 
 On the other hand, a playback of movie clips with very minimal interaction (just a 
little more than hitting the “play” button) on a website can be slightly live. A good 
example can be seen in the web advertising viral campaign at the website 
Comeclean.com. The multimedia website first presents its visitor with a subjective view 
of looking down at a sink basin and prompts a confessed message. Once the visitor types 
in a message, the website shows that the message is handwritten on the photographic 
palm of a hand and then is washed away with a cleansing foam in a real-time composite 
moving image. The display seems like a playback of live-action movie segments, which 
in fact is not a pure direct playback, but rather real-time composite imagery in response to 
visitor keyboard input (the confessed message typed by the visitor is superimposed on the 
palm in the segment in real time). Therefore, one should not presume that only computer-
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generated visual content could be “live.” The liveness of prepared visual content, no 
matter live-action or animation, can be increased by real-time user intervention. 
 
Figure 4.19 Screenshots of Comeclean.com where confessed messages input by users can 
be washed away 
Fairly Live Animation 
 Meanwhile, a few interactive animated comics on the Internet or other digital 
media are fairly “live.” Examples include Han Hoogerbrugge’s works such as Modern 
Living published in Hoogerbrugge.com and Erik Loyer’s “opertoon” (a cartoon story one 
can play like a musical instrument) Ruben & Lullaby. In these animated comics, most 
visual content is direct playback of hand-drawn animated clips with simple variation in 
order of appearance according to user intervention. They involve very limited real-time 
manipulation on stored materials, such as color manipulation, image processing filter 
effects, timing or speed control, and the like. Yet, they all demonstrate possibilities of 




Figure 4.20 A screenshot of Modern Living in Hoogerbrugge.com 
Highly Live Animation 
 Most highly “live” animation phenomena can be found in the GUI of many 
computer systems. Exemplars are those commonly seen generic-styled screensavers, 
which can be traced back to John Whitney’s renowned abstract computer animation 
(Figure 4.21). There can be very limited or even no stored materials in the running of 
those screensavers. They are purely live. Meanwhile, animated GUI mechanisms in the 
Macintosh OS X system, such as the magnification effect in the dock, the genie effect of 
windows, bouncing of icons, and others, can also be called “live” animation because 
playback of stored content is only limited to still graphic imagery, like icons or fonts. 
 
Figure 4.21 John Whitney’s Catalogue (1961) 
 Other alternative, but equally salient, examples of live animation can be seen in 
many works of digital art. One of the important installations in this area is Camille 
Utterback and Romy Achituv’s Text Rain. The work shows a projection of animated 
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letters falling like raindrops. A participant standing in front of the projection can move 
her or his mirror image shown on the screen to catch, lift, and then let fall any letters. 
During this embodied interaction, the only stored content is those falling typographic 
alphabets. The motion and reaction of letters, together with the participant’s image, are 
all produced and composed in the presence of the participant.  
 Another interesting work worth mentioning is the aforementioned interactive 
outdoor advertising event Interactive Wall: BIG SHADOW. The event took place in the 
city center of Tokyo outside a commercial building, featuring a huge shadow play on the 
façade. The projection showed silhouette images of on-location players and a gigantic 
dragon in direct interaction, with the latter controlled by online web visitors in real time. 
The event successfully put people in different physical locations virtually together in 
terms of images, in which the dragon’s silhouette is partly stored computer-generated 
content, but the people’s silhouettes are certainly captured and transmitted on the 
location. The overall effect is an excellent demonstration of live puppeteerly animation. 
To sum up, the following figure illustrate the continuum of liveness labeled with the 
above exemplary works: 
 
Figure 4.22 The continuum of liveness 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has delineated the four principles of interactive generative animation, 
each of which garners the relevant knowledge and perspective of an indispensable part of 
the new animation phenomena, namely the observer, the image, the body, and the 
performer. The observer focuses on different types of liveliness presented in the 
phenomena, which blur the boundary between organism and machine. The image 
provokes material-based imagination at different levels, centralizing animated images in 
the nexus of perception, cognition, and bodily interaction. The body of the viewer or user 
is engaged in an array of interaction mechanisms with the artifact, embodying intention in 
motor action upon the environment. The viewer or user acts as the performer improvising 
with the artifact in various degrees of liveness and experiencing the contingency of life. 
All these defining characteristics are supported by the generativity and interactivity of the 
artifact. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the essences of the two notions include autonomous 
system and reactive instance, which engender different types of liveliness, invoke 
imagination, engage users in motor-sensory loops, and provide them with divergent and 
contingent experiences, by means of autonomous, reactive, metamorphic, and contingent 
kinds of animation phenomena intended by an author. 
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The text of the section “The Image” of this chapter, in part, contains material that is a 
reprint of, or has been submitted for publication in (Chow & Harrell, 2009a, 2009b). The 




METHOD OF ANALYSES: 
THE VARIABLES AND THE TAXONOMY 
 
 In the last chapter, I delineated the four principles defining generative and 
interactive animation. Each principle emerges from one of the four essential constituents 
of the new animation paradigm, representing knowledge and perspectives from the 
observer, the image, the body, and the performer respectively. To the observer, today’s 
autonomous multimedia artifacts exhibit a holistic illusion of life, consisting of both 
prominent behaviors and emergent patterns, forming all-round liveliness. The reactive 
animated image mobilizes a motor-sensory feedback loop in the viewer, enabling an 
embodied understanding of meaning and sensation, provoking material-based 
imagination in terms of conceptual blends with elastic anchors. Meanwhile, the viewer 
also embodies meaning through bodily engagement with the artifact, comprising motion-
based motor action taken upon an enduringly evolving environment. Finally, the viewer 
and the artifact co-participate in a live performance, reflecting the generativity, 
interactivity, and most inspiringly contingency of the system. All in all, a media artifact 
augmented with generative and interactive animation provides us with embodied 
experience of an expanded illusion of life, including autonomy, reactivity, 
metamorphosis, and contingency. 
The Variables 
 In order to better encapsulate the notions of the four principles, I propose a set of 
qualitative variables describing the defining characteristics of a media artifact in the new 
animation paradigm, which has been briefly introduced in the previous chapter. The set 
includes the types of liveliness perceived from the observer’s point of view, the levels of 
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imaginative understanding provoked by the image, the mechanism of bodily engagement 
with the artifact, and the degree of liveness of the co-performance between the user and 
the artifact. 
The Observer: Type of Liveliness 
 With generative and interactive animation, a digital media artifact exhibits various 
types of liveliness, spanning from more prominent intentional or interactional behaviors, 
which concentrate the observer’s attention on intention and dynamics, to relatively 
emergent patterns, which dilute one’s attention over the ambience of a life-like 
environment. A lively media artifact should be able to show phenomena not only 
heightening a particular type of liveliness, but also encompassing an array of different 
behaviors and patterns. For instance, a lively cartoon film should have a figure 
prominently moving to show its own internal impulse and to react to external forces, as 
well as background elements subtly moving in rhythmic or stochastic patterns to 
complement the figure’s action. 
The Image: Level of Understanding 
 An animated image allows its viewers to understand the meaning or sensation it 
carries by conceptual blending. At the immediate level of understanding, the image acts 
as an elastic anchor, holding a viewer’s sensory perception and motor action, and blends 
with the viewer’s past sensorimotor experiences, to yield a largely automatic and 
unnoticed concept bridging the virtual environment and physical reality. At the 
metaphorical level, the image further provokes the viewer an imaginative story with a 
simple structure, usually alongside a well-known frame, resulting in more evocative 
messages. An animated artifact or system can be said as an embodied one if it 
incorporates tight immediate compression of cross-space mapping. Meanwhile, tight 
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metaphorical mapping implies an evocative and expressive artifact. In this regard, the 
water-level interface described in the previous chapter is an exemplar on both levels. 
The Body: Mechanism of Engagement 
 Most animated multimedia artifacts invite viewer participation. A viewer takes 
bodily action upon an artifact and embodies one’s intention through bodily engagement. 
The embodied intention or meaning hinges on first, the qualities of the viewer’s bodily 
movement in time and space (e.g., speed and orientation), and second, a constant 
variation of the environment. These two qualities define the mechanism of engagement, 
reflecting the embodied friendliness or intimacy of an artifact to its human users. The 
least intimate mechanism is halted engagement, which involves no motion-based user 
input or enduring transformation of the environment. The moderately intimate 
mechanism is decelerated engagement, which lacks variation of the environment. The 
most intimate mechanism is continuing engagement, which entails both motion-based 
input from the viewer and enduring changes in the environment. Therefore, an animated 
interactive artifact with continuing engagement can be seen as a more human-friendly 
interface. 
The Performer: Degree of Liveness 
 Generative and interactive animation is open to user intervention, like an 
improvised live performance. The degree of liveness measures this openness, and so the 
contingent nature of an animated artifact or how well a user can experience the 
contingency of life in the artifact. A high degree of liveness corresponds to what I call 
“highly live animation,” which usually comprises very minimum amount of stored 
material content in playback. In contrast, low-degree liveness can be found in the type of 
“direct playback animation,” which is always a direct playback of pre-rendered or pre-
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recorded materials. Those in the middle of the continuum can be called as “fairly live 
animation.” 
 The above four qualitative variables and their possible values are summarized in 
the following tables: 
Table 5.1 The variables and possible values 
Intentional Prominent behavior 
Interactional 
Rhythmic 
Type of liveliness 
Emergent pattern 
Stochastic 








Degree of liveness 
Highly live 
 
 With different possible values, these four variables form a multidimensional 
continuum for describing the features of any particular animated artifact with respect to 
those four essential facets of interactive generative animation. For instance, a video 
game, such as Pong (1972), might show an interactional type of liveliness, enable only 
immediate level of understanding, implement decelerated engagement, and present highly 
live co-performance. Meanwhile, a work of digital art, like Text Rain (1999), might show 
both interactional and emergent type of liveliness, provoke metaphorical level of 
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understanding, entail continuing engagement, and also demonstrate highly live 
improvisation. 
 These four qualitative variables, each of which is devised from one of the four 
principles of the new animation paradigm, constitute a descriptive framework for 
analyses of generative and interactive animation.  
The Taxonomy 
 Toward analyses of generative and interactive animation, I propose an 
unconventional taxonomy, in which a thoughtfully composed corpus of media artifacts 
will be categorized according to an array of the four variables. These variables altogether 
span a multidimensional space, in which each dimension refers to one variable and the 
corresponding possible values distribute along the axis. In this abstract space, each 
artifact in the corpus articulated by this taxonomy will be tied to one specific coordinate 
point. In other words, each artifact will be represented by a profile of these variables in 
particular values, for example, (Type of liveliness: Interactional; Level of understanding: 
Immediate; Mechanism of engagement: Decelerated; Degree of liveness: Highly live), or 
(Type of liveliness: Interactional and Emergent; Level of understanding: Metaphorical; 
Mechanism of engagement: Continuing; Degree of liveness: Fairly live). These 
articulations render the proposed taxonomy radically different from a conventional 
classification with simple distinctive boundaries between its classes. 
 While the word “taxonomy” is usually concerned with classification of 
organisms, the use of the term here is relatively metaphorical. It identifies different 
species of animated artifacts, especially those mediated with machines or computers, 
which persistently evolve with our technologies, cultures, communities, and economies. 
Today, they have been developing into many different sorts of our everyday objects. We 
are used to regarding them separately as digital videos, video games, user interfaces, 
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digital artworks, multimedia websites, and the like. This folk classification can also be 
seen as the basic-level categories in digital media. 
 Based on studies in cognitive psychology and other fields, basic-level categories 
refer to the level of categorization at which children first learn about categories and 
objects (Lakoff, 1987, p. 14). It is the “level of distinctive actions” (Lakoff, 1987, p. 32). 
For example, people “play” video games, “browse” or “visit” multimedia websites, and 
“read” or “appreciate” digital artworks. It is also the level at which things are first named 
and used most frequently (Lakoff, 1987, p. 32), such as video game, multimedia website, 
and digital artwork. Further down the hierarchy subordinate categories, like action game, 
role-playing game, simulation game, and others come under video game. Conversely, 
working up results in certain superordinate categories, like digital media artifact. 
However, categorizing animated artifacts according to the basic-level categories, such as 
video game, multimedia website, or digital artwork, would definitely overlook many of 
their intricate qualities reflecting the long-standing human pursuits for the illusion of life.  
 The situation is like the classification problem of games raised by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (Lakoff, 1987, p. 16). The classical theory of classification supposes clear 
separation between categories. Each category has a set of common properties shared by 
all its members. This classical model does not apply to game because we cannot find any 
common properties shared by all games. Yet, games are like families. A game might have 
something in common with another game, which might in turn connect to the third game 
by some other shared properties. These connections spread and form an intricate network 
among all games. Wittgenstein calls it “family resemblance.” By the same token, the new 
animation paradigm is like games and families. We might not find a single collection of 
properties shared by all members of interactive generative animation in the digital age. 
The variables I suggested do not mean the rules all animated artifacts must follow, but 
instead sketch out the directions and possibilities that members of this emergent kind are 
inclined to. Hence, the taxonomy based on these variables is not to subdivide the corpus 
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of animated artifacts into some mutually exclusive and pre-defined subcategories, but to 
disentangle and uncover subtle qualitative links in the corpus constituting the illusion of 
life. 
 Unlike a classical “box” classification (Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 10), the 
taxonomy I proposed does not precede the corpus itself. Instead, it is a vehicle toward 
convergence of qualitative analysis and humanistic interpretation of the corpus. The 
upshot is three-fold: 
 First, the variables establish us a novel but accessible vocabulary. Based on the 
theoretical underpinning described in previous chapters, the variables provide us with a 
set of shared analytical tools for describing and discussing the features of any artifacts in 
the emergent animation paradigm. Each of the variables marks a particular inclination of 
an artifact. On the one hand, this coding allows us to focus on the disposition of one 
particular attribute among a group of works. For instance, one can compare the emergent 
liveliness of a John Whitney’s analog computer animation with that of an ordinary 
screensaver on a desktop computer. On the other hand, also more importantly, the coding 
helps differentiate the nuances between convoluted attributes of an intriguing work, 
which may be overshadowed by the tight integration of form, content, function, and 
context of today’s multimedia artifacts. Consider the aforementioned water-level 
interface. It is primarily a utility application: a battery meter. Yet, its function is 
manifested in the form of computer animation and implemented in the context of 
everyday use of consumer electronics, altogether bringing out a provocative message. It 
seems that the function, form, and context are all tied together with the content. The 
variables help us extricate the knot by rethinking from four different perspectives one by 
one: how we perceive the lively movement, how we interpret the image, how we act upon 
the artifact, and how we cooperate with it. Through determining the value for each 
variable, we iteratively look into the connection between human perception, bodily 
action, and cognition. 
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 Second, the taxonomy and the corpus are continuously evolving to reflect the 
emerging animation paradigm. With different values taken by the variables for each 
artifact, the corpus of artifacts distributes in the multidimensional space and sketches out 
an abstract terrain. By examining possible links between attributes and works, we look 
for patterns, norms, and peculiarities. Any unbalance in distribution would suggest a 
review of the corpus selection and composition. For instance, if the majority of the 
samples incline to the emergent type of liveliness over the prominent one, a researcher 
may consider whether it is a latest tendency of the animation paradigm, or only due to 
sample bias as some typical or salient candidates are excluded. That means the collection 
of samples is a dynamic and explorative process, aiming at a comprehensive and 
illustrative distribution of the properties of artifacts best demonstrating the new animation 
phenomena. Overall, the corpus represents a paradigm of generative and interactive 
animation, also a perspective on animated artifacts in the digital age. I admit that the 
corpus presented in this dissertation to certain extent reflects the vantage point and 
cultural baggage of the author too. I am open to any suggestions of artifacts to the 
collection with a primary objective of upholding the pervasiveness of the new animation 
paradigm in the basic-level categories of digital media (More discussions on the corpus is 
included in the next chapter). 
 Third, the taxonomy and the corpus constitute a new definition of animation in the 
digital age. In the taxonomy, the variable values determine the position of an artifact in 
the multidimensional space. The variables describe the interactional properties of the 
samples rather than the inherent ones. The former are based on our interactions with 
artifacts provided with our bodies and cognitive apparatus (Lakoff, 1987, p. 51). The 
latter are common properties defining the boundaries in classical theory of classification. 
As a result, the comparison between the distribution of the samples in the 
multidimensional space and their cognitively established basic-level categories reveals 
useful information for researchers and animation scholars. For example, video game, 
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multimedia website, user interface, digital artwork, and so forth, are digital media basic-
level categories, because they are the most commonly used labels and each of them has 
its own cognitive image in our minds. However, they also largely overlap in the 
multidimensional space with only minor discrepancies, implying that they enable 
comparable perceptions and interactions. Hence, it is sensible to speculate that they might 
belong to a greater superordinate category: generative and interactive animation. I believe 
the results would shed new lights on basic-level effects (Lakoff, 1987, pp. 46-47) in 
digital media studies and suggest an embodied cognition approach to defining animation 
in the digital age. It is like understanding the concept of furniture, which exists at the 
superordinate level of categorization, requires mental images of basic-level objects, such 
as chair, table, bed, and the like (Lakoff, 1987, p. 52). Each type of furniture differs from 
others in terms of form, function, and motor requirement, but their interactional 
properties form “clusters” inclining to furnishing a living or working environment. 
Likewise, to define new animation in the digital age, we require a corpus of subordinate 
basic-level digital media objects orienting toward an expanded illusion of life. 
 In the next chapter, I shall talk about the composition of the corpus, followed by 




ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
 With an array of qualitative variables formulated in previous chapters, this chapter 
proceeds to give detailed analyses of a corpus of media artifacts. Each artifact will be 
described and articulated with a profile of values taken by each variable, formatted as a 
quadruple in order of (Type of liveliness; Level of understanding; Mechanism of 
engagement; Degree of liveness). Explication of the values with respect to the artifact 
then follows. 
 The corpus consists of diverse kinds of artifacts. The collection apparently has no 
specific focus on a particular type of media forms, yet there are reasons for its broad 
scope and particular selection. This intentional diversity serves the following purposes: 
 First, the corpus consists of works from a wide range of media categories, 
including films, video games, entertainment applications, user interfaces, digital 
art/performance, multimedia websites, and others. The variety of media types is 
intentionally included in the corpus in order to reflect the ubiquity of the new animation 
paradigm in today’s digitally mediated environment. Every person in the modern world 
is, to a certain extent, exposed to these emerging animation phenomena. 
 Second, the corpus includes works from creators with very different motivations 
or ambitions. Some works might have practical purposes, such as user interfaces or 
multimedia websites. Some others aim to express poetic or critical messages, like in 
digital artworks or animated films. Some of them purely are intended as entertainment. 
Furthermore, a few of them were created for demonstration or experimentation of novel 
ideas. The vast differences in nature and objectives show that the emergent animation 
phenomena are independent of the genre, context, purpose, or meaning of a work. Works 
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of completely contrasting directions might be synchronous in projecting an illusion of 
life. 
 Third, there are both canonical and idiosyncratic works in the selection. Some of 
these works are typical examples of their own kinds (e.g., the GUI of Macintosh OS X, 
the entertainment application Koi Pond, and the multimedia website Comeclean.com) 
whereas some others are more eccentric, but still salient, examples (e.g., the interactive 
web comics on Hoogerbrugge.com, the digital artwork Text Rain, and the video game 
Passage). I include each of them in order to demonstrate that generative and interactive 
animation is not limited to either ordinary or extraordinary artifacts – it is a new 
animation paradigm in the digital age. 
 More importantly, the diversity in the corpus does not mean that the selection of 
samples is arbitrary. In fact, the following selection criteria persist in the process of 
analyses: 
• The samples exemplify the new paradigm in terms of the properties captured by 
the variables. 
• The samples are different from each other in at least one of the variables. 
• Each sample is a representative from its own category only. 
• The samples altogether span a widest terrain in the multidimensional space of the 
variables. 
• The results would be somewhat different if any of the samples were not included. 
 All in all, artifacts from these basic-level media categories come together 
constituting the superordinate notion of generative and interactive animation. 
The Corpus 
Short Animation Films 
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 Film7 is intrinsically a linear medium. No matter whether one is materially stored 
on plastic film, on videotape, as a DVD-video, or as a computer file in a hard disk, it 
presents its content in playback. It belongs to the category of playback animation. 
Although the playback of films affords very primitive interactivity, such as play, pause, 
fast-forward, reverse, and stop, nearly all animated films are considered as non-
interactive in the narrow sense. They normally engage audiences in terms of visual 
perception but seldom incite bodily motor action, except very subtle body postures like 
reclining or upright viewing positions. Hence, the variable about bodily engagement 
might not be applicable to films. However, it is still informative to look at the types of 
liveliness shown in animated films, and the levels of understanding they provoke. 
John Whitney’s Arabesque (1975) 
(Type of liveliness: Emergent; Level of understanding: Immediate and Metaphorical; 
Mechanism of engagement: not applicable; Degree of liveness: Direct playback) 
 John Whitney, Sr. is well known for his innovative attempts in producing abstract 
computer animation composed of geometric patterns. His earlier works, like Catalogue 
(1964), were produced using his mechanical analog computer. After receiving an IBM 
research grant in 1966, he began to produce animation with the aid of digital computers 
(Russett & Starr, 1988, p. 180). His renowned works at this stage included Permutations 
(1967) and Arabesque (1975), which demonstrate his interest in harmony between 
computer vision and music. At a later time, he developed and experimented with an 
interactive audio-visual software system, which allowed one to compose visual and 
musical output in real time, producing so-called “visual music,” such as Spirals (1987) 
(Moritz, 1997; Russett & Starr, 1988, p. 26). As he put it, the system provides “a set of 
                                                 
 
 
7 The term “film” here refers to moving images in general, such as those in video, computer files, and 
plastic film. 
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controlled parameters that determine speed, color, shape, position,” and the like, which 
are also “connected with the pitch and duration of tone” (Russett & Starr, 1988, p. 26). In 
other words, the computer connects sensory perception, including the visual and the 
auditory, with real-time control. To me, Whitney’s interactive system is not only a 
manifestation of his aim of achieving ultimate harmony between visual and sound, but is 
also one of the earliest attempts to expand the notion of animation for the digital age. 
 Whitney’s Arabesque is an ideal example for analysis, because it stands in the 
middle of his creative investigation’s trajectory from analog computer animation to 
digital interactive animation, marking a turning point of his study in generative computer 
graphics from the traditional film form to interactive media. It serves as a good 
transitional representative of generative and interactive animation. Moreover, the title and 
the middle-eastern style music soundtrack by the Iranian-American santurist8 
Manoochehr Sadeghi imply a strong association with certain culturally-derived aesthetic 
rather than purely formal geometric beauty, which would invite further imagination from 
most audiences, resulting in more levels of understanding. Meanwhile, the geometric 
visual form of the piece, just like other Whitney works, together with the synchronized 
musical rhythm, demonstrates a typical example of emergent patterns of liveliness like 
dancing. 
Liveliness 
 The film starts with an opening credits sequence featuring a border of swirling 
motifs, which resembles arabesque – the outstanding form of Islamic art commonly 
found decorating the walls of mosques – in continuous motion. The fluid movement of 
the patterns throughout the film is emergent in the sense that one could not perceive any 
                                                 
 
 
8 Santur is a type of traditional Persian musical instruments. 
 133 
prominent origin of impulse, center of gravity, or interplay between action and reaction. 
Instead, momentum seems to be distributed amongst visual elements over multiple 
different parts of the frame. All these animated components play a role in drawing the 
viewer’s attention. Another characteristic of emergent liveliness the film presents is lack 
of noticeable progression and consequence in happenings. The movement in the film is 
phenomenologically and temporally reversible. That means reverse playback of the film 
would not result in significant change in the viewer’s perception of liveliness. These 
features make the swirling curves a demonstration of emergent liveliness. 
 
Figure 6.1 An opening screenshot of Whitney’s Arabesque 
Understanding 
 In addition, the swirling patterns are always in sync with the music soundtrack. 
The former moves increasingly vigorously in alignment with the latter. The complexity 
of the movement also increases with the number of soundtrack layers. To an audience, 
the film is a piece of choreographed work and the curves are performers. This 
understanding takes place immediately through a process of conceptual blending. At the 
very beginning of the opening credits, the curves move along the border rhythmically 
with the music, looking like a line of performers walking in sync on the stage. Later on, 
there are two sets of curves, like two groups of dancers, one at the up and down stage 
twisting slowly, and the other in the center moving quickly, each of which keeps pace 
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with the corresponding music track. When a viewer sees the patterns swirling on the 
screen and listens to the music, the synchronicity emerges from cross-space mappings 
with the observer’s sensorimotor experiences of seeing, or even participating in, dance 
performances. (Although a viewer might only perceive a dance rather than actually taking 
part in the dance, the animation can still be regarded as a sensory-based elastic anchor if 
the action-perception coupling argument suggested by activation of mirror neurons is 
taken into account.) The outer-space relations include the analogy relation between 
patterns and dancers, between swirling lines and moving body parts, the category relation 
between soundtrack and music, and the analogy relation between screen and stage. They 
are selectively projected or compressed into the blend, in which patterns dance along with 
the soundtrack on the screen-stage. The following integration diagram illustrates the 
blend (Regarding the representations of elements and their relations in the diagram, 
please refer to “The Image” of Chapter 4). 
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Figure 6.2 The immediate blend in Arabesque 
 Furthermore, the title “Arabesque” and the Persian instrumental (santur) music 
soundtrack remind audiences of association with Arabian context. They invoke the frame 
of Islamic art at large, including not only decorative patterns arabesque found in Islamic 
architecture but also Arabic dance (e.g., belly dance), as well as motifs of the related 
costumes. Given this frame, the patterns in the film resemble motifs or outlines of Arabic 
dance costumes in the viewer’s stereotypical impression of the Arabian, and the whirling 
movement is visually similar to the swing of bits and pieces of Arabic costumes in dance. 
Hence, the dancing patterns in the film provoke a blend with Arabian dance performance, 
outputting an imaginative Arabic dance in the dark with only vivid colored motifs of the 
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costumes being seen. This secondary blend, illustrated in the next diagram, provides 
audiences with a metaphorical, contextual perspective of abstract animation of pure 
geometric forms. 
 
Figure 6.3 The metaphorical blend in Arabesque 
Pixar’s Luxo Jr. (1986) 
(Type of liveliness: Intentional, Interactional, and Emergent; Level of understanding: 
Immediate; Mechanism of engagement: not applicable; Degree of liveness: Direct 
playback) 
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 Pixar Animation Studios has become a renowned computer animation studio in 
latest two decades. The studio has produced over a dozen of massive feature-length 
animations, as well as numerous creatively explorative and technologically influential 
short films. Luxo Jr. is the first short film produced by Pixar and directed by John 
Lasseter, featuring a pair of anthropomorphic desktop lamps, one bigger and elder, the 
other smaller and much younger. The story starts with the lonely elder Luxo in the dark, 
woken up by a plastic ball, followed by disturbance from the fascinated and excited Luxo 
Jr., who later unwittingly and blunderingly bursts the ball. After feeling remorse for a 
short period of time, the baby lamp surprises his dad again by getting another even bigger 
ball. The simple but affective plot involving minimum number of characters (Luxo and 
his Jr.), certain suspense in the middle, and a little surprise at the end, not only makes the 
short a canon of its kind but also sets a typical story model for many following 
independent works of computer animation with characters. The film demonstrates a 
classical way of showing liveliness through anthropomorphic objects and constitutes 
some embodied understanding of body gestures. 
Liveliness 
 As usual in character animation, the film features its characters in very prominent 
actions, imbuing originally still objects with both interactional and intentional liveliness. 
The opening focuses audience attention on a desktop lamp with a spotlight. A ball rolls 
in, coming to a halt beside the lamp. Everything seems to follow the laws of physical 
reality, until the lamp suddenly wakes up. The unanticipated movement surprises the 
audience and provokes them into taking the intentional stance, seeing the lamp having 
intention toward the ball. The lamp shows intentional liveliness. At a later time, when the 
ball bounces back twice, the audience is inclined to guess where the ball wants to go, 
until the baby lamp jumps in. While the dad keeps his eye on the kid chasing after the 
ball, and then looks downward on his blundering kid, interactional liveliness seems to 
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pervade. This kind of switching between the two prominent behaviors is commonplace in 
mime, as well as character animation.  
 On the other hand, emergent liveliness also persists throughout the short in terms 
of secondary animation, like the wave of the power cord following through the jumping 
of Luxo Jr. These movements do not captivate viewers’ main attentions, nor do they 
contribute to any progression in narrative, but they provide a life-like ambience to the 
scene. They are indispensable for an all-round lively world. In making Luxo Jr., the 
approximation of the wave motion by computational methods is believed to be one of the 
technological feats. With subsequent advancements in computer graphics after this work, 
computer animation films have become increasingly saturated with various types of 
emergent movements, like sway of grass straws, Tinker Bell-like dust effect, splash of 
water, and so on. 
Understanding 
 As I have mentioned in Chapter 3, animation constitutes embodied understanding 
of sensation or intention, which is justified by conceptual blending theory and 
neuroscience accounts of mirror neurons. When an audience sees an anthropomorphic 
object performing, he or she immediately understands the intention or sensation by 
blending one’s own sensorimotor experience with the perceived action. In the beginning 
of Luxo Jr., the audience automatically follows that the lamp is “curiously” (a sensation) 
looking at (an intention) the ball. By simply mapping the light bulb with the eye, the cap 
with the head, one recognizes a common act of examining. The following figures 
illustrate this immediate blend. 
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Figure 6.4 A screenshot showing Luxo examining a ball 
 
Figure 6.5. The immediate blend in Luxo Jr. 
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 By the same token, when the lamp jumps to its feet, we know that it is struck. 
Some might say that we recognize the animation because it looks similar to what we saw 
before, for example, the reaction of a frightened cat. In fact, we understand that a cat is 
frightened all because we blend the perceived action with our own motor experience of 
shock. Since the blend is so frequent that just gone unnoticed, we immediately know 
there is a shock when something suddenly recedes. Moreover, the activation of mirror 
neurons that suggests the coupling of perceived and performed actions also provides 
promising reference to this immediate embodied understanding of sensation.  
 Arabesque and Luxo Jr. are both animation generated by the computer. The 
former, regarded as abstract film, exhibits emergent liveliness, while the latter, so-called 
character animation, shows more different types of liveliness. In contrast, the former 
provokes more levels of imaginative understanding than the latter. It may be because the 
non-representational form in Arabesque lends itself more readily to flexible metaphorical 
projection, whereas the photorealistic representation in Luxo Jr. confines viewer 
interpretation more to the director-intended meaning. The above analyses of these two 
salient works show that computer animation is not homogeneous in demonstrating 
liveliness and conveying meaning. 
Video Games 
 Computer animation films, including Whitney’s generative pure animation and 
many typical CGI films like Luxo Jr., are only marginally a type of generative and 
interactive animation, because they are not real-time interactive in the sense of 
responding to user feedback. On the other hand, video games provide us with quite a few 
good examples of the new animation paradigm because they show many graphic 
elements in motion that are reactive and transforming in real time. The phenomenon is 
more obvious in subgenres of games such as action, sports, and simulation. Since there 
are innumerable examples in these groups, I select just a few because they illustrate the 
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variables clearly enough. They include one “classic” arcade game that is regarded as 
almost antique, but is actually still influential in terms of game mechanics, and one mini-
game that looks like typical platform games, but is exceptional in meaning. Readers 
should note that the analyses here do not intend to focus on common parameters of game 
studies like rules and genres, nor do they attempt to revitalize the contention between the 
ludologist and narratologist camps. Instead, this section concentrates on how these games 
demonstrate the emerging animation phenomena in digital media. 
Pong (1972) 
(Type of liveliness: Intentional and Interactional; Level of understanding: Immediate; 
Mechanism of engagement: Decelerated; Degree of liveness: Highly live) 
 Pong was arguably the first arcade video game in the sports category, released by 
Atari Inc. in 1972. The game simulates a table tennis game with a rudimentary two-
dimensional graphical representation of two paddles in opposite sides and a ball. The ball 
bounces back and forth between the two opposing paddles, which are controlled by two 
competing players or a player versus the computer, but constrained to move along only 
one axis to hit the ball. To me, the game is more like a table hockey game in that all 
movements take place in a two-dimensional plane rather than three-dimensionally as in 
table tennis. Although Pong is an early video game, its mechanics are very influential to 
many of its successors and variants. Today we could still find some mini games that have 
implemented similar gameplay, such as Break’ Em All (2005) released on the Nintendo 
DS platform and Touch Hockey among many iPhone applications. I choose this game not 
just because of its legacy in the history of video games, but actually due to the fact that it 
does distinctively demonstrate the features of generative and interactive animation. 
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Figure 6.6 A screenshot of Pong 
Liveliness 
 The classical game features three prominently active characters, the two paddles 
and the ball. They contribute to some quite prominent liveliness. First, the rivalry 
between the paddles in the game definitely shows an interactional type of liveliness. To 
an observer, both paddles often act like racing toward the elusive ball, which on the 
contrary seems always like getting through either one of them toward the bottom line. 
These motions make visible the dynamic tension between these characters. Second, the 
act of a paddle, even though it might be computer-controlled, sometimes would surprise 
and provoke the observer into taking the intentional stance and speculating its tactics. 
That means dynamic tension is not the unique force governing a paddle’s behaviors. 
Sometimes a paddle would perform suspiciously and unexpectedly. For example, it might 
overshoot the actual touch point of the ball by a little and so quickly recede. It seems to 
make mistakes, even if this computer opponent might be actually programmed. 
Furthermore, in some later variants of the game, the computer contender could even 
suddenly change its direction when hitting the ball in order to play tricks like adding spin 
onto the ball. All these unpredictable acts reveal certain extent of intentional liveliness of 
the system.  
Understanding 
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 Like many other action games after it, immediate blends take place in Pong’s 
game mechanics, entailing the motor-sensory connection between player action and 
animated visual feedback. In the original arcade and home version of Pong, the player is 
provided with a rotary knob through which one is able to move the corresponding paddle 
along the bottom line to hit the ball represented by a white dot. When the player turns the 
knob, one could see the paddle on his or her side moving accordingly to bounce off the 
ball. How fast and how far the paddle goes instantaneously reflects how the player acts 
on the knob. This motor-sensory feedback loop makes the virtual paddle become an 
extension of the player’s body, constituting an elastic anchor for an immediate blend with 
the player’s sensorimotor experience of playing table hockey. In the blend, the identity 
relation between the paddle and the player is compressed into an imaginative whole in the 
virtual space (it is the reason why some players incline their bodies with the paddle when 
playing the game); the visual representation relation between the white dot and a small 
puck is compressed into a virtual puck; the analogy relation between the screen and a 
table is compressed into an imaginative slippery table; the player action and sensory 
perception are also selectively projected. The following diagram illustrates the structure 
of this blend. 
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Figure 6.7 The immediate blend in Pong 
Bodily Engagement 
 Since most action games incorporate animation that is real-time interactive, we 
could look into their mechanisms of bodily engagement. As an action game, Pong 
engages its players through not only sensory perception but also bodily interaction. The 
player’s hand connects to the virtual paddle through the rotary knob, which enables the 
player to control the sliding speed of the paddle. The hand’s turning act determines the 
paddle’s moving speed. Moreover, in hitting the puck, the moving direction and speed of 
the paddle simulate adding spin and so affect the bouncing pattern. In other words, 
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motion qualities of the player’s motor input have significant effect on the animated 
feedback. The input to Pong is motion-sensitive.  
 On the other hand, the gameplay of Pong follows the ordinary two-on-two ball 
game. This kind of game requires the tight alternation of the opposite sides taking turns to 
act. In case any one side withdraws from the game, it would come to a halt. In Pong, if 
the player stops taking action, the immediate result would be very likely that the player 
loses one point. If the player further refuses to kick off next point, the game just pauses as 
long as the player resumes the action. It is not sensible to say the environment would 
continue persistent transformation and give rise to divergent outcomes without the player. 
Hence, Pong falls short of facilitating an enduring interaction, and only affords 
decelerated engagement. 
Liveness 
 Pong, as a sports video game, like its actual counterparts, can be seen as a form of 
performance. The animation phenomenon shown in this performance is also highly live, 
because the amount of stored visual content is kept to a minimum. The paddles and the 
puck are only represented by a bar and a dot, which need not be pre-rendered and stored, 
but just generated on the fly. The motion of the computer paddle and the puck is also 
simple enough that can be computed in real time. The high-degree of liveness in Pong 
implies that the system is very contingent, and the game can be regarded as an 
improvised performance between the system and the player. The player would enjoy 
being both the performer (when hitting the puck), and the audience (when seeing the 
opponent running for it), of the game show, especially for an experienced player. 
Passage (2007) 
(Type of liveliness: Intentional and Interactional; Level of understanding: Immediate and 
Metaphorical; Mechanism of engagement: Continuing; Degree of liveness: Fairly live) 
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 The disposition of Pong in terms of the variables reflects the status of most action 
or sports games. The action of opponents or antagonists commonly shows interactional 
and intentional liveliness, because they are programmed to defeat or disturb the player, 
such as the ghosts in Pac-Man (1980). The control allows the player to take action 
directly in real time, enabling immediate embodied understanding, like the Nintendo Wii 
Sports series. Once the player stops action, the game would not advance to next levels. 
The animated graphics is usually highly live. Meanwhile, other genres of video games 
might show certain different patterns. For example, sandbox games like Electroplankton 
for the Nintendo DS device do not involve competition, and the intentions of animated 
components might not be clear. Simulation games such as the SimCity series would show 
enduring and diverging transformation of the environments even without any player input 
for a certain period of time. Some serious games or expressive games would further 
provoke metaphorical levels of understanding, like Jason Rohrer’s mini game Passage. 
 Jason Rohrer is an independent game designer, who has made several mini games 
that have been very well received on the Internet and in both the indie game and 
academic game studies communities. One of his most notable works is Passage, which is 
an expressive game written for meditation on life and death and as a reminder of 
mortality. As Rohrer puts it in his creator’s statement, “Passage is a game in which you 
die only once, at the very end, and you are powerless to stave off this inevitable loss” 
(Rohrer, 2007). He believes that computer codes could “make us cry and feel and love” 
and intends to turn video games into artistic vehicles for exploring the meaning of life 
(Fagone, 2008). Hence, Passage is imbued with evocative metaphors of “life is a 
journey,” presented literally as a long screen of a maze. A player starts the game with a 
character walking alone in a maze with many obstacles. The character sprite’s fixed 
position on the screen shifts from the left edge to the right gradually within the five-
minute game time. Simultaneously, the sprite is depicted as increasingly older (going 
bald and grey, becoming hunched, etc). Along the way, the player accumulates points. 
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One might collect treasure chests for additional points, or walk with a companion for 
double points. However, once the character bumps into his spouse, the couple walks hand 
in hand and becomes less agile to collect treasures. The player has to make a trade-off. 
Meanwhile, the most poignant part is that no matter how many points one got, the 
character has to die after reaching the right end in five minutes. 
 
Figure 6.8 A screenshot of Passage with the player character at the beginning of his life 
journey 
Liveliness 
 Unlike most other maze games, Passage does not involve any lively adversaries 
who disturbingly challenge the player character. The only character other than the player 
character is his spouse, who contributes to the minimum interactional liveliness of the 
game. At the beginning, the lady just stands still in the maze. Once the player walks close 
enough to her, she snaps to the player and they start walking side-by-side. The couple 
shows a magnetic type of action and reaction in the game. Besides, when the player 
character, with or without his spouse, is exploring down south into the maze, the 
behaviors would elicit the intentional stance from an observer, speculating whether there 
are treasures nearby. In other words, the resulting animation also shows intentional 
liveliness. Unfortunately, the work did not demonstrate any emergent patterns. 
Understanding 
 Although Passage only involves two characters and a passage, there is a wealth of 
metaphors provoking multiple levels of understanding. Apparently the work looks like a 
primitive maze game with the player character wandering and searching around. Yet the 
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presentation of Passage differs from an ordinary maze game in at least two folds. First, 
the screen is intentionally made to be exceedingly wide such that only a horizontal slice 
of the maze can be seen. Second, at the early part of the game, the region at the far right 
end of the screen seems to shrink and blur. Those visions would become clearer and 
clearer only when the character moves forward. These nuances render an immediate 
blend in Passage much tighter than in most maze games like Pac-Man, or even platform 
games. In Passage, when a player presses the arrow keys on the keyboard, the screen 
scrolls and reveals more walkway ahead of the character, and also the player. Compared 
with a fixed overview of the maze in some maze games, this incremental unfolding is 
more reminiscent of our sensorimotor experience of exploring an unfamiliar walkway in 
which the further you move, the more you see. This motor-sensory connection mobilized 
by the animation acts as an elastic anchor to the immediate blend. The identity relation 
between the player and the character is compressed into an avatar concept, an embodied 
extension of the player in the virtual space. The representation relation between pixel 
graphics of the maze and an unfamiliar walkway is compressed into a virtual passage. 




Figure 6.9 The immediate blend in Passage 
 As mentioned, Passage is imbued with metaphors related to the basic “life is a 
journey” metaphor. First, the game presents a long horizontal slice, and the character gets 
older and older as time goes by. When the character walks from left to right in the 
passage, the prevalent metaphor of space as time projects the journey on the wide screen 
to the lifespan of the character. At the end, the character approaches the right edge and 
then leaves only a gravestone, a conventional symbol of death. The five-minute screen 
journey represents the character’s short life. Second, in the course of his journey/life, he 
will see a lady. One could approach her making a life-long companion, or just leave her 
alone. The two options correspond to two fundamentally contrasting kinds of living. In 
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the former the couple becomes unable to explore the narrow alleys down south and 
collect rewards that seen nearby. They could just enjoy the mainstream passage. This 
limitation echoes the common frame of marriage, bringing out the author’s intended 
imaginative perspective on how marriage limits possibility. These rules and constraints 
form the secondary blend of the game with a story of life and death. As shown in the 
following diagram, the analogy relation between the screen journey and a life with 
marriage, and that between a narrow sideway and a slim opportunity, are compressed into 
the new blend, together with the representation of death by gravestone. In the blend, the 
message: “till death do us part!” is invoked. While this diagram only refers to one 
possible imaginative blend, the work also provokes other understandings such as the 
adventurous and treasure-rewarding bachelor life. The analysis here only emphasizes one 
primary interpretation of the game. 
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Figure 6.10 A metaphorical blend in Passage 
Bodily Engagement 
 As a mini maze game like Pac-Man, Passage allows its players to control the 
motion of the character in only four directions, namely up, down, left, and right. In its 
computer version, players use arrow keys to move the character. One might say this input 
is not very motion-sensitive because qualities of finger motion like speed or direction do 
not have significant effect on the resulting animation, except maybe on the change of 
moving direction. In the iPhone version, however, the arrow keys are turned into four 
touch-screen buttons allowing a player’s finger to just “slide” on the screen to control the 
direction. This button arrangement makes the character sensitive to finger motion 
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qualities, including motion path and speed. The player feels like orchestrating the 
character in motion by moving finger. This fairly motion-based input can also be 
achieved in the computer version if the touchpad (a basic input device of laptop 
computers in today’s common configuration) is taken into use. Hence, the motor input to 
Passage is fairly motion-sensitive. 
 While some mini maze games might have motion-based input, the mechanisms of 
bodily engagement are mostly decelerated because the game environment would not 
advance once the player drops the control. This is not the case in Passage. If the character 
stands still, his position on the screen would shift toward the right at regular time 
intervals. That means even though the character’s absolute position in the maze does not 
change, the screen position changes due to camera movement. In the meantime, the 
rendering at the right side of the screen is getting clearer and clearer, while those at the 
left side is becoming hazy. Hence, the game environment still shows ceaseless 
transformation without any user action. Apart from a continuingly changing environment, 
the character also gradually transforms from a young look to an elderly no matter whether 
he moves or not. If the player takes over the control again, the camera keeps track of the 
character and the screen would display properly changed and transformed visuals 
accordingly. Therefore, Passage engages its players continuingly and divergently in 
transformation.  
Liveness 
 Compared with rudimentary action games like Pong or Pac-Man, Passage has 
more stored visual assets (sprites, terrains, and audio as well). The pixel graphics of the 
characters and those quite a few treasure chests were made and stored in advance. The 
structure of the maze was defined first, while the rendering, especially the shrunk and 
hazy effect, is likely to be generated on each instantiation, because it depends on how a 
player navigates in the maze. Furthermore, the compositing of all these elements into the 
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screen display is definitely done in real time. In other words, the only stored visual 
materials are still images of some pixel graphics. There are contingencies in playing out 
the game, resulting in a fairly live improvisation between the player and the game. When 
the character is wandering, the player is a performer. When the player notices the 
changing environment and character appearance, one becomes an audience too. 
 There are a myriad of video games. They are commonly classified into different 
genres whose boundaries in fact are not clearly separated. It might be hasty to say that 
action or sports games should show interactional liveliness and involve motion-based 
input, simulation games would present enduring environments, serious or persuasive 
games might provoke more levels of understanding. As Pong and Passage, both of which 
can be seen as mini action games, behave quite differently in terms of the variables, 
looking at video games from the perspective of the new animation paradigm sheds us 
new light on game studies too. 
Entertainment Applications 
 With the advent of hand-held devices like the Apple iPhone, there has been an 
explosion of mobile applications in the consumer market in recent years. Applications 
constantly come up from various genres, including games, entertainment, social 
networking, productivity, lifestyle, travel, news, and many others. The games category 
consists of numerous applications that are created less for ordinary life and more for 
amusement. These applications run like video games on the mobile device, which have 
been generally covered in the previous section. Applications in other categories have 
more practical or serious purposes related to our everyday lives. For example, social 
networking applications enhance one’s social communication with others regardless of 
time and space, productivity applications allow users to continue their office works on 
mobile devices, lifestyle applications enrich one’s quality of life, travel applications 
provide travelers with many useful information or convenience, and so on. Between 
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amusement and practicality lies an emergent kind of entertainment applications, which 
explore to provide extraordinary, digitally mediated experiences enabled by emergent 
interactive multimedia technologies. They do not pre-define any explicit goals or rules of 
play, nor do they assume any application domain. Some of them reproduce everyday 
embodied experiences, such as popping bubble wrap, squashing cockroaches, gazing at a 
fish tank, and the like, in digital media. A few others simply create pure novel 
experiences we never have, such as Spawn mentioned in Chapter 3. To me, many of these 
applications are actually experiments with creating illusions of different forms of life. 
This section talks about a typical and good example of such an application. 
Koi Pond 
(Type of liveliness: Interactional and Emergent; Level of understanding: Immediate; 
Mechanism of engagement: Moderately decelerated; Degree of liveness: Fairly live) 
 Koi Pond was one of the best selling iPhone entertainment applications of 2008, 
released by The Blimp Pilots. The application is a computer simulation of a pond with 
colorful swimming koi fish beautifully rendered. When a user runs the finger across the 
touch screen, the koi dart away and water ripples spread out. After a while of rest, the koi 
come back again in tranquility. Together with situated ambient sounds like breezes, rains, 
or frogs, the application aims to immerse the user in an illusive life-like virtual 
environment (please see Figure 4.3).  
Liveliness 
 The motion of the koi is likely to be implemented by clones of Craig Reynoids’s 
Boids. Each koi seems to swim freely without bumping one another. There is no one 
major prominent force steering the fish. Instead, each of them leads their own way. The 
overall balance of forces projects an emergent type of liveliness. Meanwhile, the 
application allows a user to set weather condition, such as breezes and rains, which would 
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disturb the water surface. The resulting water ripples come and go, here and there, now 
and then, without making irreversible consequences to the pond, adding extra emergent 
liveliness to the virtual environment. On the other hand, when the user disturbs the pond 
by touching, a repulsive impulse drives all the koi away. If the user holds his finger still 
on the screen for a while, the touch point would turn into a center of gravity attracting all 
the fleeing koi back. Yet, any sudden movement of the finger would make them dash 
away again. By shaking the device, food is dropped into the pond, and they would come 
back again. This interplay of attraction and repulsion noticeably forms interactional 
liveliness in the pond. The emergent pattern of motion and the prominent behavior of 
interaction complete a holistic illusion of life. 
Understanding 
 Making use of the latest multi-touch technology, Koi Pond, like many other hand-
held applications, is able to constitute an immediate level of understanding. When a user 
touches the screen and runs fingers across it, he or she inevitably and automatically 
recalls the sensorimotor experience of gazing into a pond and dipping fingers into it. This 
analogy of bodily action, also a vital relation, is tightly compressed into an inner-space 
similarity relation, with a major clash of the tactile experience being resolved in an 
immediate blend. Meanwhile, the user sees the reaction of water and koi in terms of the 
graphics on the screen and the sounds from the device, which projects a life-like 
counterpart to an actual pond environment. This representation relation is also 
compressed into a conceptualization of virtual ponds. Elaboration of the blend results in a 
nearby, accessible, and ready-at-hand lively virtual world in which the koi, water, and lily 
pads are all reactive to our finger motion. The following diagram shows one major 
phenomenon of the koi reaction. 
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Figure 6.11 The immediate blend in Koi Pond 
Bodily Engagement 
 The virtual world now featured in Koi Pond engages its users in a fairly 
“welcoming” environment. On launching, it invites one to touch and run fingers on the 
screen by showing beautifully rendered swimming koi. Various qualities of finger 
motion, including number and position of contact points, the pressure of touch, speed, 
motion path, frequency, and the like, determine what the next water imagery would look 
like, or which direction the koi would go. Hence, the motor input in Koi Pond is 
definitely motion-based. 
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 Besides, the application does not simply wait for input and react, but instead 
shows its continuous “becoming” all the time. With koi constantly swimming around and 
water ripples in case of rains and breezes, an illusion of continuous variation is created. It 
seems to be an enduring environment. In fact, the pond makes no actual advancement in 
status. For example, the koi would not grow nor die, water keeps crystal clear even 
without cleansing, rains or breezes are turned on or off explicitly by the user only, and 
water would not overflow even raining ceaselessly. Hence, the case of Koi Pond is just 
marginally like a fully enduring environment, and the engagement is moderately 
decelerated and partly continuing. To make the application more self-evolving, one of the 
promising way, like SnowDays or Sun Dial mentioned in previous chapters, can be to 
reflect the time of day or the weather of the user’s geographical location on the virtual 
pond, with information live fed from the Internet. These methods can make the virtual 
pond really enduring. 
Liveness 
 The real-time simulation system in Koi Pond enables its users to partly control the 
koi behaviors, like when and where the koi gather or disperse, and lets them gaze into the 
resulting animation. Users of Koi Pond are both orchestrators and audiences of the 
improvised performance. In the application, the stored components include the graphics 
of all the koi, the tiles, and the lily pads, while the koi’s deformation and motion, water 
ripples, changes of color tone, and so on should be generated in real time. Hence, the 
improvisation is fairly live, reflecting a certain extent of generativity, interactivity, and 
contingency of the application. 
 The variables’ values of Koi Pond position the work in the middle ground of the 
multidimensional space, where all four principles are moderately demonstrated. While 
the mobile application market is booming lately and is likely to flourish in future, this 
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domain provides us with a huge archive for studying the tendency of the new animation 
paradigm, which deserves continuation in future research. 
User Interfaces 
 Films, video games, not to mention entertainment applications, are generally seen 
as forms of amusements. Yet, the new animation paradigm by no means refers only to 
amusement. In fact, one of the major application domains of generative and interactive 
animation is conventionally very productivity- and usability-oriented. That is interface 
design. Since the demonstration of Ivan Sutherland’s Sketchpad (1963), Douglas 
Engelbart’s early computer mouse, and others, user interfaces have become one of the 
indispensable constituents of computer systems, giving rise to the area of study HCI in 
the computing discipline. In addition, the idea of direct manipulation, together with the 
innovative designs from Xerox PARC and Apple, have steered user interfaces toward a 
graphical presentation. In recent years, the advances in technologies like computer 
graphics and interactive multimedia have even “animated” most of the user interfaces, 
not only on personal computers but also of many mobile devices and electronic gadgets. 
This section starts with discussing a very typical and well-known example of GUIs, the 
Macintosh OS X environment, followed by another relatively peculiar interface of a 
Japanese cell phone. 
The GUI of Macintosh OS X 
(Type of liveliness: Intentional and Emergent; Level of understanding: Immediate; 
Mechanism of engagement: Largely halted; Degree of liveness: Fairly live) 
 In the early 1980s, Xerox, Apple, and others, respectively started to offer 
graphical user interfaces for their own computer systems. Just a couple of years later, 
Apple released the first version of her most successful series ever, Macintosh OS 1.0. The 
GUI of this initial version already incorporated most basic concepts of today’s interface 
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design, including the desktop, folders, files, the trash, as well as the typical windows and 
icons. The similar framework has been adopted in many later variants and clones, with 
major front-end advances in number of colors and graphical details only, until the release 
of Macintosh OS X around the turn of the century. The brand new operating system 
imbued its interface with many animated visual effects, including the bouncing effect of 
icons, the “genie” effect of windows, and the magnification effect of the dock (alias icons 
grouped at the periphery of the screen). These effects demonstrate the characteristics of 
generative and interactive animation, creating an expanded illusion of life. 
Liveliness 
 As described in Chapter 4, icons, windows, and the dock in the GUI of Macintosh 
OS X exhibit both prominent and emergent types of liveliness. The prominent behaviors 
are mainly performed by two lively widgets, namely bouncing icons and stretching 
windows. An icon of a launched application not in user focus sometimes would pop up 
and down in the dock, because it has a message or request for the user. This unanticipated 
but arresting action seems like someone jumping up and down in order to arouse others’ 
attention, inciting the user to take the intentional stance and to think about what happened 
to the application. Moreover, a minimized window, in case of a user click, would stretch 
and twist into place like a playful genie coming up from its oil lamp amazingly. On 
seeing this “body gesture,” a user likely wonders the reason behind this act. The window 
seems to “show off” its magical power that previous counterparts do not have. These 
erratic behaviors from these extraordinary widgets project GUI users an intentional type 
of liveliness. 
 Besides, the GUI also shows emergent patterns in the magnification effect of the 
dock. The dock contains a list of user-collected alias icons made easily accessible to the 
user. When one moves the pointer across the icons, they scale up and down successively 
forming like a wave traversing with the pointer along the dock. In other words, the user 
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feels like moving the wave in a stadium. Yet, this wave is always reversible in motion, 
and the pattern is emergent. 
Understanding 
 Like what Luxo Jr. and some other character animation did on still objects, the 
GUI of Macintosh OS X anthropomorphizes its widgets. When a user moves across the 
dock, the icons scale up and down successively. If the user clicks on one, the icon would 
respond with bouncing restlessly. The user understands that the application is beginning 
the process of opening by immediate blending. The user effortlessly blends the action of 
running across icons, clicking, and seeing bouncing feedback, with socially recognized 
forms of body language for anticipation: restless shifting between upright and reclining 
positions, or even jumping up and down, as experienced in one’s life competing for 
candidacy. The outcome is a new concept of calling a responsive and attentive 
application in. 
 Meanwhile, if the user clicks on a minimized window, it would “enact” a playful 
genie, stretching and twisting into place. The user knows the connotative meaning when 
blending the click and the perceived twist with the genie from film or television. In the 
blend, the motor-sensory loop of click and twist has a counterpart in our sensory 
experience of seeing a cartoon film (e.g., Disney’s Aladdin), in which someone rubs the 
oil lamp and then the genie comes out. The analogy relation between the user click and 
the rub is compressed into an imaginative act of calling. The similarity relations of the 
window twist to the genie twist, as well as the desktop to the film background, are also 
compressed into a virtual and magic spectacle. The new concept after elaboration of the 
blend is a “powerful” and “magical” genie application serving at your wish in a 




Figure 6.12 The immediate blend in the genie effect of Mac OS X 
Bodily Engagement 
 Since Sutherland’s Sketchpad and Engelbart’s computer mouse demonstrated the 
spatial manipulation feature of pointing devices, the mouse, the stylus and tablet, or lately 
the touchpad, has broadened the horizon of motor input other than the classical 
command-response mechanism. This paradigm draws our attention to the dimension of 
space and to the least extent, some parameters of motion, like direction and distance. For 
instance, the layout of the desktop always depends on which direction and how far we 
drag the icons. The dock is also usually set to show when the pointer moves to a 
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particular far edge of the desktop. However, other specific qualities like moving speed or 
motion path do not really matter much in most cases. Bouncing of a clicked icon does not 
depend on how the pointer reaches it. That is to say, the motor input to the GUI is not 
very motion-sensitive. In addition, the Macintosh OS X environment seldom shows 
continuous and autonomous transformation without user input, except the start of 
screensaver programs. Although some screensavers do show visual effects playfully 
altering the appearance of the desktop, these effects do not actually change the desktop 
arrangement because everything would be reverted once the user activate the machine 
again. Hence, the engagement in the GUI is largely halted. 
Liveness 
 It is quite an alternative view to see the use of an operating system through the 
GUI as a performance. As I have argued in Chapter 4, today’s operating systems, like 
other real-time control systems, turn users into puppeteers, as well as audiences, of the 
performance animation enacted by those widgets. In the Macintosh OS X environment, 
users can trigger and then watch the genie-like performance of windows, or orchestrate 
and gaze at the harmonic wave sliding across the dock like a line of dancers. In these 
visual effects, the stored visual materials should include all the graphical icons and the 
window motif. Meanwhile, the scaling of icons and the stretch and twist of windows are 
rendered in real time. The degree of liveness is fairly live, indicating that the GUI 
environment is quite contingent and open to user intervention at all times. 
The Water-Level Interface 
(Type of liveliness: Emergent; Level of understanding: Immediate and Metaphorical; 
Mechanism of engagement: Continuing; Degree of liveness: Highly live) 
 While the term user interface primarily refer to computer interfaces, today many 
electronic devices and gadgets also have user interfaces. Compared with the 
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homogeneities like the desktop metaphor in the GUI of personal computers, the designs 
of gadget interfaces are much diverse because the uses of these devices contrastingly 
differ from one another. For instance, a touch-screen interface might be convenient for a 
digital camera user to select a region to be focused, but might not work very conveniently 
for a driving cell phone user who wants to rely on the tactile sense to make a dial while 
keeping the visual sense on the road. However, the variety in the context of use also 
opens up possibilities of novel designs. An example is the aforementioned “water-level” 
interface of the NEC mobile phone FOMA N702iS. The intriguing gestural interface 
displays computer-generated imagery of liquid water that looks as if “contained” inside 
the phone’s screen. When the user tilts the phone, the rendered water surface moves in 
response to the action. Moreover, the water level represents the battery level. In other 
words, the interface is also a running battery meter.  
Liveliness 
 The perceptually realistic water wave effect displayed in the interface constitutes 
an emergent type of liveliness. Although the water wave movement is reactive to the 
user’s hand action, the resulting interactional liveliness is very least because the action 
and reaction is unidirectional only. That means the water imagery is always passive. 
Conversely, the wave presents a rhythmic kind of patterns that is perceptually reversible, 
especially when the user keeps shaking the phone. The resulting successive wave effect is 
emergently lively. 
Understanding 
 The simple water simulation in the interface surprisingly invokes multiple levels 
of understanding in the user’s mind. As described in Chapter 4, the first blend takes place 
immediately and effortlessly. The subtle water movement first incites the user to slightly 
tilt the mobile phone, which in turn senses the user-driven motion by means of the built-
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in accelerometer and computes and displays the reaction of the water surface. This motor-
sensory loop constitutes an elastic anchor, blending with the user’s sensorimotor 
experience of holding a bottle of water, yielding an imaginative conceptualization of a 
water-filled mobile phone. The representation relation between the water imagery and 
actual liquid water is tightly compressed into a virtual form of water (which differs than 
real water at least in mass), and the analogy relation between the phone and the bottle is 
compressed into a new concept of container-phone. The following diagram illustrates this 
imaginative conceptualization (reprinted from Chapter 4). 
 
Figure 6.13 The immediate blend in the water-level interface 
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 The secondary blend emerges at the metaphorical level, when the user notices that 
the water level is descending gradually and reflecting the ongoing energy consumption in 
the container-phone. This articulation gives a concept of a level-type indicator, which is 
shared by the interface and an ordinary battery meter. The analogy relation between the 
act of checking water level and checking battery meter level is compressed into checking 
how much resource is left. The frame of conservation is invoked. The blend elaborates an 
imaginative narrative about someone in some severe environment monitoring some 
limited resource, leaving a provocative message: “save the juice!” 
 
Figure 6.14 The metaphorical blend in the water-level interface 
Bodily Engagement 
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 The water movement shown in the interface invites the user to shake the phone. 
The resulting motion will be accurately measured by the built-in accelerometer, and the 
responding water wave will be simulated and displayed accordingly. That is, the changes 
in speed and orientation of the user’s motor action determine how the virtual water 
surface reacts. The motor input to the interface is obviously motion-sensitive. Moreover, 
the water level is persistently descending with or without user input, as well as 
divergently waving with respect to user shake at any particular level, in which water 
waves at higher levels of water definitely flow very differently from those at lower levels 
with less water. Hence, the interface environment is enduring. To sum up, the interface 
entails a continuing engagement. 
Liveness 
 Like the GUI of personal computers, mobile device interfaces are generally not 
related to any sense of performance. First, they are designed for individuals, a very 
personal artifact. Second, they aim at high productivity, rather than amusement. 
However, after seeing a series of engaging and focusing seminars by Steve Jobs with his 
popular “companion,” the iPhone, on stage, it is completely sensible to say that 
interaction with a user interface can be a form of performance. The FOMA N702iS 
invites its users to take action in the performance, and engages them with moving images, 
which are totally rendered instantaneously. There is nearly no stored visual content in the 
interface. Hence, the interface is very live, echoing the contingency of life. 
 The interfaces discussed in this section can be regarded as utilities applications of 
which the primary objective is about productivity and usability. They are designed for 
certain functional purposes, such as measuring, organizing, and presenting information. 
Yet, they perform quite differently in terms of the qualitative variables. It follows that 
generative and interactive animation is orthogonal to the practicality of an artifact. 
Multimedia Websites 
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 Apart from amusement and utilities, generative and interactive animation also 
plays a substantial role in mass communication, mainly over the Internet. The Internet 
was originally a communication network for specific communities, like academia. Yet, in 
late nineties of the last century, the World Wide Web has made the Internet emerge as the 
massive channel of general communication. From the text-based HTML-encoded 
websites of the early days, to today’s ubiquitous flash-enabled multimedia websites, 
animation has become an integral part of presentation, and also representation, on the 
Internet. Because of animation, many multimedia websites are not only able to present 
information but also successful in representing illusory virtual environments that absorb 
users into imaginative worlds and stories. This section talks about two examples, one of 
which is a popular and addictive website intended for personal messaging, and the other 
is a typical one for promotion.  
SnowDays by Popular Front 
(Type of liveliness: Emergent; Level of understanding: Immediate and Metaphorical; 
Mechanism of engagement: Continuing; Degree of liveness: Live) 
 Messaging, besides web browsing, is another major activity on the Internet, and 
quite many websites have incorporated the feature of messaging. For example, one could 
easily find on Amazon.com a hyperlink labeled “Share with Friends,” which allows one 
to send friends electronic recommendation of an item. While many of these sites make 
messaging an explicit option, SnowDays (mentioned previously) incorporates this feature 
more seamlessly and elegantly in its virtual world. The popular website is a greeting web 
page presented by the digital service agency Popular Front. It depicts a scene of a 
snowing day in which every falling flake was “handcrafted” by a web visitor. The visitor 
may leave a message “inside” the flake and the receiver would be notified by the website. 
The receiver, or in fact any other visitor, may go to the page, look at snowing, appreciate 
the meticulous details of the falling flake, and respond. In other words, the site projects 
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visitors an illusion of messaging through snowflakes in the virtual world (Figure 6.15). 
Since the launch in 2002, the website has accumulated over nine million user-created 
snowflakes by the end of 2009. 
 
Figure 6.15 Cut-out snowflakes tailor-made by individual users carry their greeting 
messages evocative of personal memories 
Liveliness 
 The page of SnowDays displays a graphical representation of an outdoor open 
space, with a few trees, covered with snow. Snowflakes of different sizes, some of which 
are large enough for the feathers to be seen, are descending constantly and steadily all 
over the screen. The movements of these flakes do not seem to be driven by a particular 
impulse, nor do they result in any irreversible consequence in the environment (for 
example, the snow on the ground will never get thicker). In fact, the falling flakes do not 
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really land on the ground, but loop back to fall from the sky again sooner or later. 
Although this recurrence of snow differs from actual snowing, the rhythmic effect in 
SnowDays still imbues the virtual snowy space with emergent liveliness.  
Understanding 
 The recurrent snowing images of the website is able to constitute multiple levels 
of understanding. When a visitor glazes at the graphical scene and moves the pointer over 
any particular falling graphic, a close-up view of a snowflake pops up and a motor-
sensory immediate blend comes about. The representation relation between the falling 
sprite and an actual falling flake are compressed into a piece of virtual flake in delicate 
sixfold symmetry. The motor action of moving the mouse, or a finger in case of the 
touchpad, in the elastic anchor connects to the act of catching a snowflake to examine in 
a real snowing day from one’s past sensorimotor experience. Similarly, the perception of 
zooming connects to that of looking closely at something. These links are compressed 
into an imaginative act of pointing for examining a virtual flake when one is looking 
through a “window” in a snowing day. This immediate imaginative blend is illustrated in 
the following diagram. 
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Figure 6.16 The immediate blend in SnowDays 
 Apart from exhibiting the beauty of ice crystals, the virtual flakes in SnowDays 
have other even more intriguing features. First, each flake carries a message from its 
creator to the receiver. This messaging function makes the flake comparable to airmail, a 
long-distance call, or even a note from the sky. The website narrows the distance between 
the sender and the receiver. Second, the sender creates a snowflake tailor-made for the 
receiver, with the tiny tool provided in SnowDays. The tool simulates the little trick that 
many people learned to construct their cutout snowflakes in elementary schools. The 
memory of such experiences can be integrated with the sensorimotor experience of using 
the site, and then compressed into an act of making a gift for the special one, with the 
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season’s greetings frame invoked. This metaphorical blend elaborates an imaginative 
narrative of exchanging heartfelt greetings and handcrafted gifts with someone from a 
distance in a lonely winter day. With the attendant visceral and nostalgic association 
triggered, the hidden meaning is evocative and affective: “you are not alone!”  
 
Figure 6.17 The metaphorical blend in SnowDays 
Bodily Engagement 
 The sensorimotor experience of using the website relies not only on the animated 
graphics it presents, but also the bodily engagement it affords. When first being shown 
the snowy scene on the website, a visitor is invited to catch a falling flake. One can move 
the pointer freely to pick a flake, but timing and motion path are very determining. Since 
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all flakes are descending continuously, the visitor has to perform well with eye-hand 
coordination in moving the pointer to reach a flake in motion. If the visitor misses the 
time, the flake would fall out of frame and might not come back in the near future. If the 
visitor moves the pointer toward a target too hastily, he might run across an unintended 
flake in the middle of the path and zoom in another flake. Moreover, the cutout tool of 
the site requires a visitor even more attention to the direction and distance of the pointer 
motion, because it is just like how we do cutout by using scissors. All these embodied 
interaction mechanisms show that the site takes motion-based motor input. 
 In addition, SnowDays also demonstrates an enduring environment. Although the 
virtual snow on the ground, as mentioned, would not get any thicker as time goes by, the 
scene does show other enduring transformation to reflect the change of time. With the 
Internet connection, SnowDays is able to change the background color and atmosphere 
according to the actual time of day and weather. For instance, the site would show an 
orange sky during sunset. Furthermore, with the unlimited number of web surfers (most 
of them just want to kill time) at all times, there are always new flakes falling into 
different parts of the scene even though a user just gazes into the scene without taking 
any action. Therefore, the virtual snowy space is enduringly changing, and the 
mechanism of engagement is continuing. 
Liveness 
 The SnowDays website enables its visitors to create their own flakes, packed with 
messages, and then let the flakes descend in the virtual world. The visitors act like 
wizards in this imaginative world, collectively manipulating the virtual snowing. 
Meanwhile, they are also individual audiences of the beautiful natural scenery. In short, 
what SnowDays presents is an improvised performance between the site and the visitors. 
In this performance, the major visual components include all the graphic sprites. With 
over millions of flakes, the amount of sprites should also be huge. Fortunately, all flakes 
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are sixfold symmetric. The system only needs to store the cutout path, and a complete 
sprite can be generated by simple procedures. In other words, less than one-sixth of 
graphic content is really stored, together with other static background elements. Since all 
the snowing and changing sky color effects are also generated in real time, the resulting 
performance can be regarded as live. 
Come Clean 
(Type of liveliness: Intentional; Level of understanding: Immediate and Metaphorical; 
Mechanism of engagement: Halted; Degree of liveness: Fairly live) 
 Besides messaging and social networking, the Web is also a common platform for 
promotion, marketing, or advertising today. Rather than the conventional push strategy 
used in old media like television or newspaper, many web-marketing campaigns adopt 
the pull strategy, motivating consumers to request information, services, or products 
through the Internet. With the bidirectional communication channel and interactive 
multimedia websites, advertisers are able to immerse potential consumers in imaginative 
worlds or narratives, arousing their interests in some intended promotional items. 
Comeclean.com is the website of a typical promotional campaign. The site invokes 
standard interface mechanisms like data entry and real-time composite moving images to 
make web visitors believe that the advertised product can help wash away sins. A visitor 
is first presented with a subjective view of looking down at a sink basin and is welcomed 
by a consoling voice speaking in English with a South Asian accent, prompting a 
confessed message. Once the visitor types in a message, the site shows that the message 
is handwritten on a lady’s palm and then is washed away with cleansing foam. Moreover, 
the visitor can see confessed messages from other online users also being cleaned up. 
Both personal and social experiences persuade one to look into the advertised cleaning 
supplies (please see Figure 4.19). 
Liveliness 
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 When a user first enters the website, one hears the consoling voice and the sound 
of tap water. Yet, the photographic image is static, until the user types in a message. To 
the user’s surprise, the lady’s palm has the message handwritten on it! This prominent act 
of showing is an intentional type of liveliness. The user wonders what she is going to do 
next. It follows that she applies the cleansing foam and washes the dirt away. Throughout 
the whole process, the lady’s prominent action leads the user’s attention and provokes 
him or her into taking the intentional stance.  
Understanding 
 Like most other advertising campaigns, Comeclean.com provokes multiple levels 
of understanding. At the immediate level, it entails a motor-sensory connection between 
keyboard entry and real-time composite imagery. Typing in a message and then seeing it 
on the lady’s palm constitute an elastic anchor, blending with a user’s sensorimotor 
experience of writing notes on the palm. The typing action in the elastic anchor has an 
analogy counterpart, the action of writing notes, in another input space. The identity 
relation between the lady’s palm and the user’s palm is compressed into a virtual palm of 
the user, which shows whatever the user intends to “write” on it through the keyboard. 
Meanwhile, the real-time composite moving images represent what the user would see on 
the virtual palm. This blend can be shown in the following diagram. 
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Figure 6.18 The immediate blend in Comeclean.com 
 At the metaphorical level, the greetings made by the consoling voice in South 
Asian accent invoke the confession frame, making the user form a metaphorical blend 
between the micro-narrative of washing one’s hands using particular cleansing supplies 
and the user’s wish image of becoming spiritually clean after confessions. The analogy 
relation between the consoling voice and the priest during confession is compressed into 
a conceptualization of spiritual-physical cleansing foam. The output of the blend is an 
imaginative image of the foam that is able to “clean up” both the body and the soul, 
motivating the user to look into the product. 
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Figure 6.19 The metaphorical blend in Comeclean.com 
Bodily Engagement 
 In Comeclean.com, the major motor input is done through a classical input 
device, the keyboard. A user is prompted to type a message. Before the user hits the 
return key, the website keeps displaying the subjective view of the basin with water 
constantly flows from the tap, meanwhile ambient sound and music come along 
ceaselessly. In fact, both the visual and audio are looping. The website would wait 
indefinitely for user input. Once the site receives an input, it responds with a real-time 
composite movie, and then waits for another input again. This form of alternate input-
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feedback sections is a typical halted bodily engagement in interactive digital 
environments. Moreover, unlike SnowDays, which continuously shows falling flakes 
created by other online users while waiting for user action, Comeclean.com requires the 
user to explicitly switch to another page for viewing other people’s confessions. This 
switch further disrupts the continuity, that is to say, “becoming,” of the environment.  
 To make the engagement more continuing, suggestions include replacing 
keyboard input by “finger-writing” on the touchpad enabled by character recognition 
technology, and showing others’ confessed messages intermittently while waiting for 
user input. The former measure enables more motion-sensitive input, and the latter 
projects an illusion of an enduring environment. 
Liveness 
 The website provides a platform on which the user and the system co-perform a 
ritual of confession. The user is responsible for the message input, while the system takes 
care of generating photorealistic visualization. This consoling ritual is only fairly live, 
because most of the presentation materials are pre-recorded and stored, including 
photographic moving images, voice-over, and the music. The only part that is open for 
user control is what is written on the palm.  
 The Web is an emergently massive platform for different forms of social 
communication, like personal messaging and online marketing. This section introduced 
two examples corresponding to the suggested forms. They are selected because they 
demonstrate the principles of the new animation paradigm. Compared with the ordinary 
use of traditional film animation as primarily mass propaganda, generative and interactive 
animation is able to permeate particular social networks, triggering livelier 
communication through the Internet. 
Digital Signs 
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 Regarding the role in social communication, animation first emerged in the old 
media like the cinema, and then pervaded the Web, and now it spreads to even the 
physical communal space. When technologies of digital displays or projections are 
becoming more accessible today, animation phenomena can be found in many of our 
digitally mediated public areas, such as on an LED sign in a train station, on an 
information kiosk in a shopping mall, on the façade of a building, and even on the traffic 
lights of a pedestrian crossing. This section talks about a very inspirational and 
innovative use of animation on traffic lights to invigorate communication. 
Animated Traffic Lights 
(Type of liveliness: Intentional and Emergent; Level of understanding: Immediate; 
Mechanism of engagement: not applicable; Degree of liveness: Slightly live) 
 Traffic lights for pedestrians conventionally use static icons of “green man” and 
“red man” alternately to signal people when to cross the street. Some exceptional traffic 
lights in a few cities, for example, in Taiwan, Spain, and Mexico, display LED-lit 
animated green men to tell pedestrians how to cross the road. During each green signal, 
the little green man walks in a cycle. After a while, he starts running faster and faster as 
the system counts down to the red signal. This animation phenomenon, like those in 
animation films, is considered to be non-interactive, because the system does not take a 
pedestrian’s bodily response into account when generating subsequent output. Hence, I 
exclude the discussion on the bodily engagement of this artifact here. Besides, all other 
three variables, including the amount of stored component in playback, are worth closer 
reading. 
Liveliness 
 The little green men in these traffic lights demonstrate emergent liveliness as well 
as intentional liveliness consecutively. First, when a green man is walking rhythmically 
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and steadily in a cycle, his repeating action does not seem to bring about any irreversible 
consequence. This walk cycle is an emergent pattern. Second, when the green man 
suddenly starts to run, it seems to a pedestrian that the green man has initiated this 
prominent action. One cannot help taking the intentional stance and wondering what the 
green man is running for. It is probable that dangers are pending. Here, the intentional 
liveliness draws a walker’s attention from a relatively diluted mode (just walking 
steadily) to a more concentrated mode (better hurry up). 
Understanding 
 When seeing the little green starts to run, a walker would immediately feel that 
the green man is in hurry because the perceived motion evokes one’s motor experience in 
case of a rush, as the research of mirror neurons has suggested. The walker would then 
blend the green man’s situation with his or her own situation of crossing the road. In the 
blend, the outer-space link between the green man and pedestrians is compressed into an 
inner-space identity relation, which implies that the green man stands for all walkers, 
including the viewer. The traffic light is linked metonymically to the road. Seeing the 
green man running on the traffic light integrates with the viewing walker’s experience of 
seeing other human walkers running across the road. Elaboration of this immediate blend 
outputs an image of running with other imaginative walkers on the road, compellingly 
suggesting the viewing walker: “hurry up!” 
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Figure 6.20 The immediate blend in traffic lights 
Liveness 
 The animated traffic lights incite pedestrians’ bodily responses. On seeing an 
animated green man on a traffic light, a walker would either keep walking or accelerate. 
Although the traffic light system does not take into consideration these responses to 
output next walking cycle, the artifact differs from simple playback of stored animation 
videos in that it is able to drive viewers to take action. To a very least extent, all 
pedestrians are supposed to “perform” (walk or run) with the little green man. In this co-
performance, the durations of walking and running vary in different crossings. This 
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divergence in timing is made possible because the animation of the green man is not a 
purely playback of stored content. In fact, the stored visual material is only a looped 
sequence of rudimentary images in a matrix of LED points representing a walk cycle. 
The illusion of changing from walking to running is created through altering the playback 
speed. Therefore, the pace of green men on different traffic lights can be programmed 
and adapted to different traffic conditions accordingly. This subtle variation might not be 
noticeable to most pedestrians, but it does make the system slightly live. 
 With more and more electronic displays or projections being installed in our 
everyday communal areas, we can actually see the new animation phenomena not only in 
living rooms, classrooms, or offices, but also in café, buses, or even on the street. 
Although the traffic light system described in this section is not interactive, it opens up 
new possibilities of creating an expanded illusion of life in communal areas. When some 
of these displays become touch-sensitive, or when projections come with motion-sensing 
technologies, I believe animated artifacts in the communal space will be like their 
counterparts in digital environments, becoming reactive to people’s bodily action and 
sensitive to their motion in the near future. 
Digital Artworks 
 After discussing such domains as amusement, utilities, and communication, this 
section looks at artifacts in the realm of the arts. Art has been a platform for humans to 
express, to interrogate, and to experiment. It contrasts with all the previous domains in 
terms of creators’ motivations, but it also shares with them in demonstrating certain 
extent of animation phenomena. Many works of art, like Alexander Calder’s mobile 
sculptures, mechanical automata, not to mention animated films, are exemplars showing 
an illusion of life. For an expanded illusion of life, digital artworks, by which I mean 
works whose discourse processes rely on the use of digital technology, are particularly 
illustrative. This kind of works usually incorporates computer programs to produce 
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variable instances that show autonomous, reactive, transformative, and contingent 
behaviors. Among the innumerable digital artworks that have emerged in recent decades, 
I select one canonical and celebrated installation work, Camille Utterback and Romy 
Achituv’s Text Rain (1999), and one more peculiar but also well-known interactive web 
comics, Han Hoogerbrugge’s Modern Living (1998-2001). Although the former is an 
interactive video installation and the latter purely runs on the Web, I see both of them as 
digital artworks because I found that generativity and interactivity are indispensable in 
their meaning-making processes. 
Camille Utterback and Romy Achituv’s Text Rain 
(Type of liveliness: Intentional, Interactional, and Emergent; Level of understanding: 
Immediate and Metaphorical; Mechanism of engagement: Continuing; Degree of 
liveness: Highly live) 
 Text Rain is probably one of the most widely known works of digital art by the 
end of the last century. The award-winning work has been exhibited in many art festivals 
around the globe, and was collected in several art museums. It has also been widely 
covered and closely discussed in the literature of digital art, including Jay David Bolter 
and Diane Gromala’s Windows and Mirrors: Interaction Design, Digital Art, and the 
Myth of Transparency (2003). I do not intend to re-celebrate its vitality with respect to art 
theories and practices. Instead, I focus on how this artwork manifests the new animation 
phenomena in terms of the variables. 
Liveliness 
 The work shows a projection of animated letters falling like rain. A participant 
standing in front of the screen is able to see her or his mirror image being projected in the 
virtual rain (Please see Figure 4.17). The mirror image is in fact created by flipping 
horizontally a real-time image captured through a camera placed by the side of the 
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screen. When the participant raises hand, she would see her screen image following, 
exactly like what she sees in a mirror. Hence, one can “move” her screen image to catch, 
lift, and then let fall any letters in the rain. The overall moving images on the screen 
project a holistic illusion of life. First, the letters fall continuingly and randomly all over 
the screen. There is no single obvious impulse driving the falling letters, and the virtual 
rain does not seem to result in any progression of events or happenings. It is an emergent 
type of liveliness. Second, when a participant moves her mirror image in the rain, letters 
might bounce off and slide away from her body. An observer would take the physical 
stance to perceive this interactional liveliness. Third, each raindrop is in fact a letter 
coming from a poem, and sometimes a participant might want to look for a word or a 
phrase along the body silhouette, resulting in abrupt movement or bizarre posture. This 
kind of behaviors would provoke an observer into taking the intentional stance, looking 
into which word or phrase the participant is targeting. Here, the participant also 
contributes to the intentional liveliness of the work.  
Understanding 
 As a poetic work of art, Text Rain is expressive. It entails both immediate and 
metaphorical levels of understanding. When a participant moves her body parts and then 
sees her mirror image following in the rain of letters, one immediately blends this elastic 
anchor experience with her sensorimotor experience in actual rains (Figure 6.21). The 
outer-space representation link between falling letters and falling raindrops is compressed 
into a concept of virtual raindrops. The outer-space link between the mirror image and 
the participant is compressed into an inner-space identity relation, so seeing the mirror 
counterpart receiving the rain is the same as oneself being in the rain. The elaboration of 
this immediate blend results in an imaginary space in which the participant can dance in 
the virtual rain without getting soaked.  
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Figure 6.21 The immediate blend in Text Rain 
 The metaphorical understanding emerges as the participant notices that adjacent 
letters seem to form meaningful words or phrases. Whenever the participant reads the line 
of letters accumulated along the body silhouette and realizes the resulting verse, the 
experience is analogical to receiving a celestial message from the sky. The “divine light” 
frame is invoked and blended with the virtual rain experience (Figure 6.22). The analogy 
relation between the virtual rain and the divine light is compressed into a new concept of 
poetic rain, which carries poetic messages. The action of holding raindrops is analogical 
to the action of embracing light from the sky. Elaboration of the blend provokes a 
metaphorical narrative of someone like a prophet receiving celestial and spiritual 
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messages via the body and the surroundings. The animation of falling letters and the 
interaction with them generate what the artists might describe as an imaginative 
integration between body, nature, and soul. 
 
Figure 6.22 The metaphorical blend in Text Rain 
Bodily Engagement 
 Making use of real-time video capturing and processing technologies, Text Rain is 
able to accept a user’s full-body input without intermediate input device. During this 
embodied interaction, nearly all motion qualities of motor input are significant. For 
instance, angle, direction, or speed of a participant’s hand movement might determine 
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which letters are held or slipped away. Both the resulting outlook and message of the 
accumulated letters would be affected. In other words, the input to Text Rain is highly 
motion-sensitive. 
 Moreover, the projected environment in Text Rain is also enduring. Even without 
any participant, or the participant doing nothing but just standing still, it keeps falling 
letters. Since the words from the poem are selected and let fall randomly, the resulting 
raining pattern on the screen is always transforming. If the participant fails to catch a 
particular falling verse of the poem, she might not encounter the same verse again near 
the same position. One has to seek for it somewhere at some other time. This ever-
changing environment, together with different acts of individual participant at different 
time, can lead to very divergent outcomes. All in all, Text Rain provides a good example 
of enduring interaction. 
Liveness 
 Being an interactive video installation that involves the participant’s real-time 
image on the presentation screen, Text Rain is intended to be a platform for live 
improvisation between the system and the participant. As some documentary videos on 
the work’s official website has shown, many participants enjoyed taking part in the 
performance, with their own creative inputs. For example, someone brought in a real 
umbrella to perform “dancing in the rain.” Several others stood hand in hand and formed 
the wave to bounce off the rain. They all actively participated in creating the performance 
animation facilitated by the system. During the show, the only stored visual components 
are the typographic characters of the poem text. The participant image is captured and 
reproduced in real time, which would affect the motion of the falling letters on the fly. In 
other words, the animation is very live, contingent, and open to participant intervention. 
Han Hoogerbrugge’s Modern Living  
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(Type of liveliness: Interactional; Level of understanding: Immediate and Metaphorical; 
Mechanism of engagement: Decelerated; Degree of liveness: Slightly live) 
 Like many works of art, Text Rain was first exhibited publicly in an art gallery. In 
contrast, another work to be discussed in this section emerged in a strikingly different 
platform. It was originally intended to show on the Web. Since 1997, the Dutch comic 
artist Han Hoogerbrugge has started to make use of the Internet publishing interactive 
animated comics on his website Hoogerbrugge.com. The first work, Modern Living / 
Neurotica (1998-2001), featuring nearly one hundred short animated films, addresses 
small observations in the artist’s everyday life, which also resonate some major issues of 
our personal life, including workaholics, social impositions, and the like. Apart from a 
few looped animated GIF sequences, most of the shorts are interactive. The collection 
can be seen as a documentation of the artist’s experiments with mouse-mediated 
interaction. He is inspirationally successful in remapping conventional mouse actions like 
pointing and clicking to many different intentions. For instance, in #43 ‘Itch’, a click 
makes the character (a self-portrait of the artist) “itch” wherever the mouse pointer is 
located. Through these couplings of motor action and animated feedback, the work 
mobilizes motor-sensory connection and projects an expanded illusion of life. 
 
Figure 6.23 #43 ‘Itch’ in Modern Living 
Liveliness 
 Among the archive of animated pieces in Modern Living, we can find at least two 
types of liveliness, including the interactional and the emergent. The former can be seen 
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in many pieces in which the character tends to “get away” from the mouse pointer. For 
example, in #61 ‘Drowning’, a user can move the pointer to play hide-and-seek with the 
character. In #54 ‘Jumpy’, a mouse-over action seems to drive the character jump around. 
In #68 ‘Obedience’, keeping the pointer over the character’s head can “bring” him to his 
knees, and after making a kowtow he immediately stands up again. All these reactions of 
the character demonstrate interactional liveliness. On the other hand, some other pieces 
show relatively emergent liveliness by displaying multiple reactive characters that 
distribute a viewer’s attention over multiple areas of the frame. In #60 ‘New Religion’, 
the characters line up to form four rows. When the pointer moves across the characters, 
they stand up and then bend down continuously forming a wave very much like the 
magnification effect in the dock of Macintosh OS X. In #85 ‘Material Guy’, when a user 
runs the pointer across the faces of the characters, they swell up and vomit home 
appliances like washing machines, dryers, toasters, and the like. There are often 
simultaneous happenings and movements in the frame, which dilute our attention. 
Moreover, the action and reaction in these pieces are reversible. That is to say, one can 




Figure 6.24 #61 ‘Drowning’, #54 ‘Jumpy’, & #68 ‘Obedience’ in Modern Living 
 
Figure 6.25 #60 ‘New Religion’ & #85 ‘Material Guy’ in Modern Living 
Understanding 
 As mentioned, many pieces in Modern Living remap conventional mouse actions 
to novel meanings. These new mappings are formed with the help of immediate blending. 
Furthermore, some pieces even provoke metaphorical understandings. To illustrate, I 
focus on an example. In #83 ‘Possessed’, the character sits behind a task table facing the 
user. It seems like he is using a mouse. When the user puts the pointer on the task table, 
the character would move his mouse to follow. The immediate blend here lets the user 
easily control the character by directing him to desired location, like the mechanism of 
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controlling shadow puppets by moving rods. The analogy link between the character and 
a rod puppet is compressed into a concept of virtual puppet in the animated piece. Hence, 
when one moves the pointer, the virtual puppet moves his hand. 
 
Figure 6.26 #83 ‘Possessed’ in Modern Living 
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Figure 6.27 The immediate blend in #83 ‘Possessed’ 
 What makes the piece eccentric is that the character keeps popping bizarre 
appearances over his head and making curious sounds while the user moves the pointer 
around. This effect invokes the “web surfing” frame in the user’s mind, suggesting an 
metaphorical blend of the animation with an imaginative story in which people surfing 
the Web, including the user, often have their attentions wandered and diverted by many 
hyperlinks. In the blend, the mapping between the character and the user, both are 
moving a mouse, is compressed into an inner-space identity relation. The animation 
becomes like a mirror reflecting the mental status of the user. This example shows a 
typical way of how Modern Living echoes our personal experiences. 
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Figure 6.28 The metaphorical blend in #83 ‘Possessed’ 
Bodily Engagement 
 In Modern Living, most animated pieces are interactive. The system considers the 
position of the pointer and the timing of a click in user input. For example, in #70 
‘Eternal Love’, the position of the pointer determines whether the character in the 
foreground or the picture in the background is in focus. In #87 ‘Vaudeville’, many 
“dummy” versions of the character travel across the frame at various speeds. A user can 
point and click on any heads to see the pop-up, like playing a classic carnival game. 
 193 
Whether a head pops certainly hinges on the motion and timing of the user’s motor 
action. These interaction mechanisms can be considered slightly motion-sensitive. 
 
Figure 6.29 #87 ‘Vaudeville’ in Modern Living 
 In case of no user action, most pieces just come to a halt. Even though a few 
pieces do show some changes, like #63 ‘Perfect Day’ in which the character keeps 
swinging along the background music, the audio and the visual are just in very simple 
loops. The environment does not really transform into next stage until the user moves the 
pointer. It is not an enduring environment. Hence, Modern Living only entails decelerated 
engagement. 
 
Figure 6.30 #63 ‘Perfect Day’ in Modern Living 
Liveness 
 Although Modern Living is regarded as interactive web comics, it also opens up 
possibilities of improvisation between the user and the artist. An example piece best 
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demonstrating this idea is #71 ‘El Mariachi’. The piece features on stage five characters, 
each of which holds a guitar. A user can cast a spotlight on any particular character, and 
that character would start to play. Although all characters and guitars look similar, each 
of them makes a different sound. Hence, by moving the pointer the user is like playing a 
synthesizer with five different instrument tracks. The result is a performance. In this 
performance, the stored components include the audio and the animated drawings 
prepared by the artist. Meanwhile, the spotlight effect is still added in real time. The 
performance can be said as slightly live. 
 
Figure 6.31 #71 ‘El Mariachi’ in Modern Living 
 This section has talked about two exceptional digital artworks. They differ from 
each other in presentation format, intended message, and representational style. I include 
both of them because they both rely on generative and interactive animation to project an 
expanded illusion of life, as the above analyses has proved. Since the two works are also 
widely covered in the literature of digital art, they are very influential in their respective 
sub-domain. In this regard, I believe there are many more followers, and they altogether 
continue defining the new animation phenomena in the digital age. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has conducted close reading on a wide array of media artifacts, 
which evenly come from such basic-level media categories as animation films, video 
games, entertainment applications, user interfaces, multimedia websites, digital signs, and 
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digital artworks. The survey mainly includes descriptions of the artifacts and analyses of 
their properties with respect to the four principles of generative and interactive animation. 
The results can be summarized in terms of the four variables and juxtaposed for 
comparison in the following table: 
Table 6.1 Variable values taken by the corpus 
Basic-level 
Category 
Artifact Type of 
Liveliness 






Arabesque emergent immediate, 
metaphorical 
n/a playback Short animation 
films 
Luxo Jr. interactional, 
intentional, 
emergent 
immediate n/a playback 
Pong interactional, 
intentional 





continuing fairly live 
Entertainment 
applications 






on Mac OS X 
intentional immediate halted live User interfaces 
 










continuing highly live 
Multimedia 
websites 
SnowDays emergent immediate, 
metaphorical 
continuing live 
 Come Clean intentional immediate, 
metaphorical 
 
halted fairly live 
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Digital signs Walking green 




immediate n/a slightly live 
Digital artworks 
 





continuing highly live 




decelerated slightly live 
 
 Based on the above table, we can examine the distribution of the variable values 
among the corpus of artifacts. There are three observations. 
 First, the four variables are orthogonal. No one variable seems to take a particular 
value tied with another of any other variables. For example, consider first the type of 
liveliness and focus on those artifacts showing emergent liveliness. They might provoke 
just immediate understanding (e.g., Koi Pond), or multiple levels of understanding (e.g., 
SnowDays). Some of them entail decelerated engagement (e.g., Modern Living) while 
some others continuing (e.g., the water-level interface). Their respective degrees of 
liveness can be highly live (e.g., Text Rain), slightly live (e.g., animated traffic lights), or 
even purely playback (e.g., Arabesque). Locking down any one variable also would not 
render us any obvious pattern in other three variables. Hence, these variables are 
independent of one another as far as the corpus is concerned. In short, the results 
demonstrate my initial suggestion of looking at the new animation phenomena from the 
four orthogonal perspectives and latter theoretical development of each principle.  
 Second, no one basic-level category has bias toward certain value in any 
particular variable. In contrast, each category has spanned a fairly broad terrain in all the 
variables. For instance, most categories have some artifacts involving continuing 
engagement, as well as some others decelerated. Even for a category like entertainment 
applications that only contains one artifact, the single sample also shows both 
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interactional and emergent types of liveliness. On the one hand, it follows that although 
now the sample size of each category is kept minimum in the corpus, it is still able to 
encompass the largest possible variety in each quality of the new animation phenomena. 
On the other hand, this finding tells us that each category has equal potentiality in 
demonstrating an expanded illusion of life. 
 Finally, with all samples considered together, each variable has taken all its 
possible values without apparent prejudice. For instance, about half of the samples 
provoke both immediate and metaphorical understandings while the other half only 
immediate. Meanwhile, nearly one third of the samples entail continuing engagement and 
another one third only decelerated. Although in Chapter 4 I painstakingly advocate the 
four principles, including material-based imagination, enduring interaction, and so on, the 
unbiased presentation of values in this chapter show that it is no easy task to have an 
artifact exemplifying in all four variables, that is to say, multiple levels of understanding, 
continuing engagement, and so forth. Sometimes, an artifact might be able to provoke 
multiple understandings but only involve halted engagement (e.g., Come Clean), or an 
artifact with continuing engagement might not demonstrate all types of liveliness (e.g., 
Passage). Therefore, the samples tend to compensate one another, resulting in a 
featureless distribution. All in all, this observation implies that the four principles still set 
a challenging and ambitious objective for designers and creators of digital media artifacts 
to achieve in the future. 
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The text and figures of this chapter, in part, contain material that is a reprint of, or has 
been submitted for publication in (Chow & Harrell, 2009a, 2009b). The dissertation 






 In previous chapters, I introduced new principles of animation each of which is 
articulated by a qualitative variable. I then applied these variables with different possible 
values to a corpus of media artifacts, including typical and salient examples from various 
basic-level media categories. The attributes of these artifacts conceptually spread and 
cover a terrain across the multidimensional space in which each dimension denotes one 
variable and the corresponding possible values distribute along the axis. The terrain 
reflects the inclinations of the new animation paradigm exemplified by the corpus.  
 Most important of all, the absence of any bias in variable values lets us know that 
not every existing animated artifact can epitomize all four principles of generative and 
interactive animation, and so there is still room for multimedia designers and developers 
to explore and improve. Hence, for designers and developers, the principles and variables 
work as an index informing the position of a particular work with respect to the whole 
existing terrain. Based on this relative positioning, designers or developers can set 
adaptive and situational benchmarks for evaluation and assessment. Meanwhile, the 
multidimensional space not yet covered by the terrain can remind them of new 
possibilities for more embodied, evocative, and affective forms of interactive generative 
animation. People can determine their ambitious and feasible goals with respect to 
constraints in resources and time.  
 Practically, the set of principles and variables suggest new design possibilities 
(perhaps even paradigms) in two areas. On the one hand, some parameters like emergent 
liveliness, metaphorical understanding, and so on suggest provocative approaches to 
designing animation and motion graphics in addition to the classic principles of 
animation introduced by Disney. On the other hand, such new concepts as elastic 
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anchors, motion-based motor input, puppeteerly animation, and so forth, constitute a new 
set of interface design principles rooted in animacy, proposing an alternative to the 
prevalent user-centered and the contending agent-based approaches. This chapter 
describes these two design implications. 
Motion and Animation Design 
 Today we can see animated images on many different types of screen, such as 
animated films in cinemas, motion graphics on television, computer graphics on video 
games, Flash movies on the Web, commercials on electronic billboards, and the like. In 
contrast to these diverse application domains, the major principles of animation most 
animators follow are still limited to the Disney’s heritage in the cel-animation era. 
However, if one looks at typical works of Japanese animation, it is not difficult to notice 
that most Disney’s principles do not apply, as will be shown below. The disparities are 
even more obvious when animation is juxtaposed with motion graphics, as we have seen 
in many movie titles, music videos, commercials, outdoor projections, and so on. In this 
regard, the principles of generative and interactive animation are able to accommodate 
the varieties of general motion and animation design in the digital age. 
Disney’s Principles of Animation and the Rival 
 Based on over decades of experiences, Walt Disney Studios established the well-
known twelve principles of animation. Although emerging from the cel-animation 
context, the principles are so well recognized that they are regarded as dogma even in 
computer animation production. Yet, the principles almost only address character 
animation. Out of the twelve principles, many, including Anticipation, Staging, 
Exaggeration, and Appeal, aim to make action or gesture clear to audiences. As the noted 
Disney animators Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnson put it, Walt Disney called this 
approach “aiming,” which is one of the first Walt’s insistences (Thomas & Johnston, 
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1984, p. 20). In my words, it corresponds to intentional liveliness. Meanwhile, a few 
other principles, like Squash and Stretch, prescribe the conservation of volume in an 
animated body while changing shape in order to show elasticity and register weight 
(Thomas & Johnston, 1984, pp. 18,30). It is partly concerned with interactional liveliness. 
These principles concentrate audiences’ attentions on prominent postures or actions. The 
few others pertinent to diluted attention are Follow Through and Secondary Action. The 
former states that the loose flesh on a moving figure would move slower than the 
skeleton, while the latter suggests adding subsidiary actions to the dominant action. These 
extra details help distribute certain audiences’ attentions to scattered parts of the main 
figure, adding “richness to the scene” (Thomas & Johnston, 1984, p. 32). Unfortunately, 
the Disney animators also unintentionally disparage this kind of “effect animation” as 
“mechanical” (Thomas & Johnston, 1984, p. 29). 
 Conversely, some rivals of Disney celebrated the mechanical, such as the one-
time contender Fleischer Studios. In order to compete with Disney in the beginning of the 
battle around the 1930s, the Fleischer animators dismissed the Disney style and attempted 
their own way. For instance, in Betty Boop’s Snow White (1933), we cannot easily find an 
example of Anticipation or Squash and Stretch that follows the laws of physics, but 
instead we see many rhythmic animation cycles and metamorphoses. Norman Klein has 
repeatedly juxtaposed Disney and Fleischer in terms of metamorphosis and the human-
machine opposition (Klein, 1993, 2004). He sees Disney as flesh and Fleischer automata 
(Klein, 1993, p. 76). The former insists an illusion of life that hides the animator (Klein, 
2004, p. 254), while the latter celebrates technologies of animation and self-reflexivity 
(Klein, 1993, p. 168, 2004, p. 255). Regarding shape-shifting, Disney required animators 
to keep a character’s volume constant, whereas the Fleischer animators were free to 
transform their characters’ bodies into any form. For example, when the clown in Betty 
Boop’s Snow White is turned by the evil queen into a ghost, he involuntarily keeps 
dancing in “loops” and morphing without bound, even into a medal in chain. Klein 
 202 
describes this type of morphing phenomena as hesitation or lapse, for it is always 
unstable and seemingly reversible (Klein, 2004, p. 254). These seemingly reversible 
phenomena demonstrate emergent liveliness, and Klein’s use of the term “lapse,” which 
literally means temporarily loss of concentration, particularly resonates with my idea of 
diluted attention. Hence, Fleischer is more obsessed with emergent patterns and acts like 
a perfect complement to Disney’s emphasis on prominent behaviors, forming a holistic 
illusion of life. 
Japanese Anime 
 Some might argue that the failure of Fleischer Studios and the prevalence of the 
Disney style suggest that emergent liveliness, which dilutes our attentions, does not 
appeal to mainstream audiences. This argument is revealed to lack grounding when we 
switch the context to another side of the globe. Japanese animation, commonly called 
“anime,” represents a substantial part of Japanese cinema that not only has established 
massive markets in Asia but also has started to gain increasing international recognition. 
When one looks at an anime, regardless of a television series of limited animation 
(animation done in less than 24 frames per second, usually 12), a Hayao Miyazaki’s 
feature film, or an OVA (original video animation released directly to home-video 
formats), it is easy to notice the striking differences in visual composition and animation 
style from the western counterparts. Generally, anime works might have more and longer 
holds of characters without movement, more animation loops, more planar movements of 
multiple layers composited together to imitate camera movement (based on a visual 
phenomenon called motion parallax) (Lamarre, 2009, p. 39), and less continuous and 
complete character action without cut. Part of these phenomena, like loops and holds, are 
believed to be results of the low budgets facing most anime productions in the post-
WWII period, arguably set by the successful precedent case of Osamu Tezuka’s Astro 
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Boy released in 1963, and later turned into a distinctive and well-received style of anime 
(Ono, 2007, pp. 106-107).  
 Interestingly, this signature of anime manifests the vitality of emergent liveliness 
in animation phenomena, especially when loops, holds, and parallax are concerned. An 
example would help illustrate the point. Consider a three-minute sequence (Figure 7.1) in 
the Mamoru Oshii’s animated cyberpunk film Ghost in the Shell (1995). The whole three-
minute features primarily emergent liveliness, diluting audience attention over different 
parts of the frame rather than on particular figures. The sequence exhibits nostalgic 
images of a city with many recognizable Hong Kong elements, like flyovers, narrow 
streets, commercial billboards, dashing cars, and trotting crowds, plus imaginary tram-
boats and canals. In many shots, it applies multilayer movement, like steady flow of canal 
water with reflection of a moving boat, billboards running across in the foreground while 
people working in a commercial building at the background, pedestrians passing by in 
front of a shop display reflecting some animated commercials, and so forth. Dynamics 
are distributed over the frame, and movements seem reversible with meaning intact, 
constituting typical emergent liveliness. Although the protagonist appears in some shots, 
she stays relatively still, with moving billboards at the background, her hair swaying in 
the breeze, or varying window reflection in the front. In the later half of the sequence, 
raining adds even more emergent liveliness to the seemingly timeless city through lines, 
ripples and running highlights (Figure 7.1). All in all, the sequence exemplifies emphasis 





Figure 7.1 Screenshots of Ghost in the Shell 
 Disney’s emphasis on character animation, Fleischer’s love of morphing and 
technologies, and the distinctive style of anime represent different inclinations toward 
different types of liveliness. Yet, these approaches to animation are by no means clearly 
separate from one another, but actually there are rising mutual influences. When seeing 
the computer-generated character Sulley in Pixar’s Monsters, Inc. (2001) acting 
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prominently with all his three million hairs moving individually, or the Forrest Spirit-
turned headless gigantic body in Miyazaki’s Princess Mononoke (1997) looking for its 
head with deadly fluid extending everywhere in the landscape (Figure 7.2), one would be 
aware that today’s animation tends to manifest a holistic sense of liveliness. Hence, in 
designing animation, even character animation, the new principle about holistic illusion 
of life reminds designers and animators of the vitality of the usually denigrated emergent 






Figure 7.2 Screenshots of Princess Mononoke 
Motion Graphics 
 This holistic sense is also commonplace in a cousin of animation, motion 
graphics, with its increasing reliance on computing technologies in creating an illusion of 
motion. The term arguably emerged since John Whitney started to produce abstract 
geometric animation by his computers and the graphic designer Saul Bass applied 
animated graphics to create title sequences for movies. Their most notable collaborative 
work is the motion title of Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958), which features swirling 
patterns superimposed in a woman’s eye, symbolizing an unstable state of the mind. The 
uses of emergent patterns in moving images, on the one hand, add diluted attention to 
concentrated attention, forming a holistic sense of liveliness, on the other, help provoke 
multiple levels of understanding the images. The ideas can be better illustrated by Bass’s 
another outstanding work, the title of Hitchcock’s North by Northwest (1959). The 
sequence starts with a green background of grid lines. The film title and names of 
featured actors consecutively move up and down with several-second holds in the middle 
of the frame. A prominent vertical movement of a name is often accompanied with a 
horizontal paddle moving in the adjacent column. Soon after, the grid dissolves into the 
mirrored façade of a building, reflecting busy yellow cabs traveling horizontally on the 
grid. These additional animated graphic elements not only bring in emergent liveliness to 
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balance concentrated attention, but also provoke metaphorical understanding that the 
moving types are elevators and the paddles are the balancing weight. Other following 
shots, like flocking crowds in the streets and finally the main actor walking out of an 
elevator, help invoke the frame of the story: fast-paced chasing in an urban city. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Screenshots in the title sequence of North by Northwest 
 Whitney, Bass, and other designers like Maurice Binder, the creator of many 
James Bond movie titles, have paved the way for combining motion design intriguingly 
with moving images as title sequences. Unlike feature animation, these sequences usually 
do not recount narratives in the narrow sense, because there is no obvious action and 
reaction, nor cause and consequence being unfolded. Instead, they convey meanings more 
through emergent patterns and metaphorical understanding. Consider one of the latest 
James Bond movies, Casino Royale (2006). In the film title, we see gorgeous moving 
patterns of poker suits, intertwining with metaphorical transitions, including a Queen to a 
lady, a Spade to a bullet, a Diamond to a killing dart, a roulette wheel to a riflescope, and 
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others. These emergent motion graphics invoke the dark side of the special business, 
building a background atmosphere for the audience to go into. Today motion graphics 
have been spreading widely to television, the Web, music videos, commercials, and even 
art and literature9. A major difference in context from animation is about duration. 
Motion graphics usually consume just very limited time, but convey succinct meanings 
and project emotional ambience. In this regard, holistic consideration of liveliness and 
metaphorical understanding advocated in the new principles would help motion designers 
synthesize and evaluate their creation with strong theoretical underpinning. 
Interface and Interaction Design 
 Apart from animation design, the new principles, especially the latter two about 
the body and the performer, also give us new implication on interface design. In the 
analyses of the corpus of media artifacts, I show that generative and interactive animation 
opens up possibilities of creating interfaces that engage users in a lively, imagination-
provoking, continuing, and contingent environment. I propose that this kind of interfaces 
can throw new light on the two contending approaches to HCI, namely direct 
manipulation interface and intelligent software agent.  
Direct Manipulation Interfaces 
 In interface design, one of the primary goals is to make interfaces more “user-
friendly,” or “usable.” Following the views of Donald Norman (Norman, 1988), Jakob 
Nielsen (Nielsen, 2000), Ben Shneiderman (Shneiderman & Maes, 1997), and others, the 
terms generally describe a tool that is easy and rapid to learn, understand, operate, or 
                                                 
 
 
9 For example, the Electronic Literature Organization published a collection of works in 2006, many of 
which include motion typography as an integral presentation element, such as Brian Kim Stefans’s The 
Dreamlife of Letters. 
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control. Their ideas have led to the prevalent user-centered approach to interface design. 
The paradigm emphasizes usability, efficiency, and productivity. 
 I take the perspective that user-friendliness can be interpreted with the broader 
perspective of user-centricity. The quality depends on which type of users the system is 
targeting to. To expert users, granting full access to the system projects a sense of full 
empowerment. The user feels that everything is in control and for his or her “direct 
manipulation” (Shneiderman, 2003 [1983]). For example, in the MS-DOS command-line 
environment, an experienced user is able to directly “order” the system to take a 
particular action and might think that the system is straightforward and efficient to use. 
This kind of “manipulation” is in a metaphorical sense. In contrast, this empowerment 
might overwhelm a novice user, who is not familiar with the system and not used to 
directly controlling it. To help this type of users, Norman’s idea of natural mapping 
comes into play (Norman, 2002, pp. 75-79). By mapping an intuitive, ordinary, and 
everyday environment to the system, the interface becomes familiar to the novice user. 
The most illustrative example is the GUI environment, which “imitates” the physical 
working environment consisting of “desktop,” “folder,” “trash,” and the like. This 
“imitation” hinges on the user’s mental operation, Fauconnier and Turner’s “conceptual 
blending,” which is largely preconscious, mapping various interface actions to everyday 
physical actions, such as “click and drag” to “grasp” (Fauconnier, 2001). Through this 
immediate blending, the user feels directly manipulating the components in the system as 
natural as what one usually doing in the physical environment. This is a literal sense of 
“manipulation.” The two senses may correspond to different design solutions, but both of 
them are also user centric, seeing machines as instruments, aiming to build systems easy 
and efficient to use. 
Intelligent Software Agents 
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 Whether targeting the expert or the novice, designers of user-centric interfaces 
regard computers as an instrument for users’ direct manipulation. Another contending 
approach to “user-friendliness” is to make it really like a friend, a companion you are 
working with, or even a delegate working on your behalf. The former major proponent 
Pattie Maes believes that today’s computer users need this kind of software delegates to 
give them advices because most of them are novices and they are overloaded with 
information in digital environments (Shneiderman & Maes, 1997). Yet, this agent-based 
approach is relatively ambitious, if not futuristic, because being a qualified 
representative, the agent has to be intelligent enough to make prompt decisions favorable 
to its master. It is about not only designing an interface, but rather designing an 
“intelligent” system. This idea emerged within artificial intelligence research, often using 
symbolic AI approaches, over the past two decades. Earlier examples of seemingly 
intelligent software agent include Joseph Weizanbaum’s conversational program, ELIZA. 
Yet, the program, rather than serving as a delegate, is an attempt to cheat its users into 
believing that “she” is a human psychotherapist, in other words, an address to the famous 
Turing’s test. Later, other projects started to import AI techniques to create “smart” 
software assistants, such as ALICE the chatterbot (Suchman, 2007, p. 216) and not to 
mention many of Maes’s works. This stream has triggered once charged interface versus 
agent debate in the field.  
 In fact, since the Turing test, to latest critiques by Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 
1972), critics have informed that strong artificial intelligence, which aims at general 
human intelligence, is a challenging task, because the human mind is not just a pre-
programmed information-processing unit but actually incorporates other situated and 
embodied cognitive processes. Implementing intelligence with a software model would 
just limits and compromises a user’s behaviors to that model. Jaron Lanier even cynically 
stated that such a “smart” system is only possible if we, the human user, “make ourselves 
dumb!” (Lanier, 1995) To this, Maes contends that sometimes users just want to leave 
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problems to experts (and to be ignorant), and so they can do other things instead 
(Shneiderman & Maes, 1997). Hence, agents would let every user focus on another levels 
of interest or expertise. 
 However, the idea of intelligent agents might not be welcomed by all users, as 
reflected in many western science fictions and movies, like the cyborg monster in Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, or the Hal computer in 2001: The Space Odyssey (1968). As 
Sherry Turkle puts it, if the computer is too smart, too humanlike, it becomes 
unpredictable. This “psychological machine” might not be a friend, a safe companion, or 
a faithful delegate of humans (Turkle, 1984, p. 238). The cyber-culture writer Steven 
Johnson also pictures the overwhelming and chaotic future resulted from the abuse of 
agent-based technologies by so-called “push media” and the turbulence caused by the 
notoriously unpredictable feedback mechanisms (Johnson, 1997). 
An Animacy-Oriented Approach 
 At the level of vision, the interface approach differs fundamentally from the 
agent-based approach in that the former treats computers like a tool or an instrument 
while the latter regards computers as an assistant. At the level of application, both of 
them are in fact inadvertently concerned with productivity or usability of a system, 
making computer a synonym of office equipment or business machine. They share 
similar application domains, primarily utilities.  
 However, with latest advances in multimedia and information technologies, the 
meaning of application is not limited to utilities. Today we have numerous software 
applications for amusement, education, social communication, and even artistic 
expression, as I have illustrated in the corpus of media artifacts (see Chapter 6). People 
dealing with these applications are not just users, but also players, participants, 
performers, and “interactors.” The utilitarian criteria like productivity, efficiency, rate of 
errors, and so on might not fully apply to these types of computer systems. Hence, the set 
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of principles of generative and interactive animation I have described suggests an 
alternative approach to designing these emergent paradigms of digital media artifacts. 
The principles about animacy and imagination highlight how liveliness and motion in 
both motor input and sensory feedback allow digital media artifacts to convey non-verbal 
meaning to users through elastic anchors. For example, considering the types of liveliness 
lets designers of a system know if the animated feedback concentrates a viewer’s 
attention on the progressive action signaling a change of state, or dilutes one’s attention 
in an imaginative story world provoked by the system. Furthermore, the level of 
understanding tells designers how provocative the tie between the motion-based motor 
input and the animated feedback is, and how it constitutes an elastic anchor for 
imaginative blending.  
 Meanwhile, the notion of enduring transformation in digital environments 
emphasizes the use of continuing engagement to give users a sense of spatiotemporal 
embodiment in the virtual world. For instance, by reviewing the mechanism of bodily 
engagement, designers can assess which specific parts of motion or animation in the 
interface contribute to providing embodied experience of an illusion of autonomously and 
continuously changing life. Finally, liveness reminds designers of the contingency of a 
system. A highly live system means that it is more open to user intervention, more 
adaptive and personalized, even to the extent that Maes supposes software agents to be 
(Shneiderman & Maes, 1997). 
 Some might think that the principles I have described are just another attempt to 
anthropomorphize the computer. Shneiderman particularly dismisses the idea of adding 
animation to user interfaces. He thinks that “anthropomorphic representations destroy the 
users’ sense of accomplishment,” making them feel like lost control of the systems 
(Shneiderman & Maes, 1997). To Shneiderman, and even Maes, the term 
“anthropomorphic” implies imitation of all sorts of human activities including thoughtful 
speech and intentional act. Making machines performing these activities are ambitious 
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goals and might lead to undesirable outcomes. Therefore, my suggestion is that we can 
aim at a kind of  “softer” anthropomorphism in animacy-oriented interfaces, which 
imitate not human intelligence but just liveliness of animate beings and divergent 
transformation of environments. What I mean here is to make human-computer 
interaction more like humans’ everyday experiences with life. This kind of 
anthropomorphism represents a middle ground between seeing the machine as an 
instrument or turning it into an intelligence. The aim should not be to make machines act 
“as” humans, but rather to act “familiar” to humans. 
 As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, Joseph Bates and his team have consciously 
related Disney’s principles of animation to their aim of creating believable characters 
(Bates, 1994). They proposed that emotion is one of the significant qualities in this make-
believe process, so the team put their emphases on how to represent emotions internally 
and develop AI architecture for generating and expressing emotions. In fact, it is just 
another symbolic AI-oriented mission. As Suchman puts it, “Bates’s creatures are 
simultaneously presented as illusions of life and as important steps along the path to the 
real thing” (Suchman, 2007, p. 212, original emphasis). I add that it is more about a 
simulation than an illusion, more on aliveness than liveliness. In contrast, my proposal 
suggests a shift of focus toward perception of animacy and embodied cognition on the 
human side in the interaction mechanism (though computer representation and generation 
still persist on the other side). I believe that interface designers can eschew the goal of 
designing seemingly intelligent systems while still taking advantage of liveliness and 
embodied understanding enabled by animated elements in an enduring environment to 
project an image of computers that is more familiar, intimate, and close to humans, that 
is, a general sense of anthropomorphism, which is softer in approach but strong in vision. 
Conclusion 
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 This chapter has looked into two inherently separate design disciplines, in which 
animation design is generally related to the film art while interface design primarily 
emerges from the field of HCI. However, as I have demonstrated, with today’s accessible 
and ubiquitous computing technologies, interactive generative animation connects the 
two lineages of design, expanding the theoretical perspective of animation design and 
bringing promising approaches to interaction design. To designers, this interdisciplinary 
study of animation and interaction recentralizes humanistic theories and interpretation in 
the analysis and design of multimedia artifacts, giving rise to more “human-familiar” and 
“life-like” design solutions. To developers, the integration of computational and cognitive 
research results with interpretive approaches from humanities disciplines provides a new 





THE GENERATIVE VISUAL RENKU PROJECT 
 
 Previous chapters covered the theoretical aspects, analyses, and implications of 
interactive generative animation. The new design principles advocate presenting a 
holistic illusion of life including both prominent behaviors and emergent patterns, 
provoking multiple levels of imaginative understanding, engaging users in motion-based 
input and enduring environments, and providing them with divergent and contingent 
experiences. To illustrate these ideas, this chapter describes an ongoing digital artwork 
project related to the new animation paradigm. It starts with introduction of the 
theoretical and artistic background, followed by discussions on the design considerations 
in generative algorithms, transformational rules, and interaction mechanisms with respect 
to the principles. Lastly, the corresponding variables will be articulated with design 
evaluations. In short, this chapter demonstrates how the design framework resulted from 
previous chapters can be applied to creating generative and interactive animation 
phenomena in digital artworks, and also multimedia artifacts at large.  
 The Generative Visual Renku (GVR) project, developed by D. Fox Harrell and 
the author, presents a new genre of generative and interactive visual art inspired by 
generative models from contemporary art, Japanese renku poetry, and an account of the 
interplay between iconicity and conceptual metaphor by Masako Hiraga and C. S. 
Peirce’s semiotics (Hiraga, 2005). Works of this new genre generate expressively 
meaningful compositions of images dynamically through interactive co-creation between 
the user and the system. Generative Visual Renku, as a genre, could be considered an 
example of a digital media practice that Harrell terms “Phantasmal Media,” wherein 
imagery (broadly construed) and ideology intersect in computational processes of 
meaning construction and transformation (Harrell, 2009). 
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 Traditional renku is a type of linked haiku poetry, consisting of a series of links 
between topical elements in verses. The visual renku described here uses animated 
images in place of traditional written text, and the linked disposition of these images is 
maintained algorithmically. It is generative in that algorithms are used to dynamically 
compose variable instances of imagery. It is also interactive, outputting different 
instances of imagery in response to different user actions upon depicted visual elements. 
The current GVR implementation is built upon the GRIOT platform, a computational 
system designed by Harrell to support semantics-based interaction and generation for 
multimedia works (Harrell, 2007). Initial cases of GRIOT application, however, were 
primarily textual. One of the objectives of the GVR project is to extend the GRIOT 
architecture to implement meaningful constraints for visual composition (Harrell & 
Chow, 2008). Meanwhile, the project aims to explore possibilities of the computational 
framework based on cognitive semantics accounts of imagination engaging the cultural 
practices in which meanings in both visual and mental imagery are conveyed in some 
non-Western discourse artifacts, such as Chinese character forms and Japanese renku 
poetry. 
 As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, generativity and interactivity jointly give rise 
to phenomena of liveliness, including autonomous transformations and reactive 
behaviors. During the GVR project development, we found that the new genre inevitably 
entails these new animation phenomena (Chow & Harrell, 2009a) and so, designing GVR 
works also demand considerations of the new principles I have proposed. This chapter 
first introduces the artistic and theoretical framework of the project, and then focuses on 
an example of generative visual renku, followed by discussions on the application of the 
new principles. 
Artistic and Theoretical Framework 
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 The GVR project draws upon an interdisciplinary theoretical framework including 
generative visual and literary arts, Japanese renku poetry, cognitive science and computer 
science research results, and Chinese character forms. In (Harrell & Chow, 2009), Harrell 
and the author comprehensively delineate this framework. The following is a brief 
summary. 
Generative Visual and Literary Arts 
 Generative art or literature generally refers to a type of creative works that 
strongly emphasizes the processes giving rise to specific instances. The process is usually 
designed by the artist or writer in terms of a set of rules, a computer program, or a 
machine, and then is executed automatically (Galanter 2006) (For more discussions on 
Galanter’s definition of generative art, please see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). The Oulipo 
(Workshop for Potential Literature) group is perhaps the most prominent proponent of 
this concept in literature (Mathews & Brotchie, 1998). In the case of visual art, many 
contemporary art practitioners have created inspirational exemplary works, such as Josef 
Albers’ Homage to the Square (the 1960s), Frank Stella’s The Protractor Series (1967-
69), Sol LeWitt’s Incomplete Open Cubes (1973-4), Jennifer Bartlett’s Rhapsody (1975), 
and Xu Bing’s Book from the Sky (1988). In such works, the aesthetic sensibility focuses 
on directing viewers to considering processes rather than individual instances of output. 
Meaning is embedded in the form as opposed to content. Although opponents criticize 
that these formal avant-garde approaches to the arts are often emotionally dry, we found 
that the related generative models, such as the procedural, serial, and combinatorial 
methods, are excellent references for the design of generative rules in the GVR project. 
The Link and Shift in Renku 
 Linked poetry is a kind of collaborative literary work. It requires two or more 
poets to alternate in the creation of verses to form a complete poem. In Japan, renku, a 
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form of haiku with linked verses in the style of the Basho school, is highly praised as a 
national heritage and is growing in popularity in international literary circles (Higginson 
1996). To compose a poem, renku poets have to create “links” between successive verses 
through object, meaning, or scent, which mean a consistency in mood or emotion. 
Meanwhile, “shifts” are used to avoid throwbacks or too many repetitions of ideas or 
themes. The key is to balance connection and diversity. The poet’s choice of words then 
depends not only on personal aesthetic sense but also the context. 
 A classic example of renku poetry by Matsuo Basho follows (with added 
bracketed words to indicate linking and shifting) (Higginson, 1996):  
 Around the town 
 the smells of things … 
 summer moon 
 [link] 
 “It’s hot, it’s hot” - 
 the voices from gate to gate 
 [shift] 
 the second weeding 
 not yet done, and ears 
 out on the rice 
The first and the second stanzas are linked by the summer season and its hotness. The 
second stanza is connected with the third stanza through the auditory – voices to ears, but 
the location is shifted from the residential area implied by the multiple “gates” to the rice 
field. 
Cognitive Semantics: Metaphor, Blending, and Analogy 
George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and others have studied metaphors as mappings between 
domains and have shown that many basic metaphors are based on everyday life 
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experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner have extended 
this framework in their conceptual blending theory, which describes how concepts are 
integrated both unconsciously in everyday life and in more complex thought such as in 
art and literature (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner, 1996). Quite related to metaphor is 
the concept of analogy, in which the concept of one mental space is understood in terms 
of another. What allows for analogical inferences to be effectively made, it has been 
argued, is the structural similarity between the two spaces (Gentner, Holyoak, & 
Kokinov, 2001). These approaches to imaginative association based on structural 
similarity constitute the theoretical grounding for algorithmically implementing the link 
and shift designs, as well as discourse structures, in the GVR project. 
Computational Narrative and Imaginative Discourse Generation 
The perspective on computational narrative and imaginative discourse generation here 
builds upon D. Fox Harrell’s approach to producing what he calls “Phantasmal Media.” 
At the broadest level, his practice called imagination computing describes how formal 
and code-based semantic representations can be leverage for subjective, cultural, 
critically-aware needs such as in generating narrative or poetry. Based upon cognitive 
semantics theories above, and using Joseph Goguen’s theory of algebraic semiotics to 
provide a method for formalization (Goguen, 1999), a jointly developed algorithm for 
conceptual blending called Alloy (Goguen & Harrell, 2009) and a novel framework for 
computational narrative, Harrell designed and constructed the GRIOT system for 
implementing generative and interactive narratives (Harrell, 2007). The GRIOT system 
allows authors to create interactive and generative multimedia works (especially 
narratives, but including other imaginative discourse forms) where user interaction drives 
a wide range of guided and structured, but not scripted, eventualities of discourse content 
and style. 
Iconicity and Metaphor in Chinese Characters 
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 In her book (Hiraga, 2005), Masako Hiraga describes a significant relationship 
between C. S. Peirce’s semiotic notion of iconicity and the recent cognitive science 
results mentioned above. She first reviews Peirce’s categorization of signs as icon, index, 
and symbol, and the division of icon into image, diagram, and metaphor. She then points 
out that both iconicity and metaphor are based on relationship of similarity, but just along 
a continuum spanning from perception (concrete visualization) to conception (abstract 
conceptualization). We found a parallel between Peirce’s typology as articulated in 
Hiraga’s framework and the categorization of Chinese character forms. Simple characters 
like pictographs (e.g., “人” (people), “山” (mountain), and “火” (fire)) correspond to 
images, and ideographs (e.g., “上” (up), “下” (down)) correspond to diagrams. The 
former pair refers to similarity in shape while the latter in spatial/graphical structure. 
Compound characters, which are composites of two or more simple characters, usually 
generate new meanings by association of paradigms or iconic moments (e.g., “隻” 
(single) from which one can form “雙” (double), or “災” (disaster), which is composed of 
“川” (river) and “火” (fire)), many of which are metaphorical icons. This 
compositionality of meaning has proved inspirational for the visual composition 
framework in the GVR project. 
An Example of GVR 
 An example work of the GVR project described here presents a type of 
topographical renku, in which a poetic landscape is interactively co-created by the 
author-designed system and the user. The landscape is always composed of a series of 
modular graphic images, which I call topographical tiles, for each of them depicts a topos 
in our mundane world. The arrangement of the tiles is meaningfully constrained by the 
structural (i.e., diagrammatic) properties along the edges and then linked perceptually 
(i.e., imagic) or conceptually (i.e., metaphorical) to one another in response to the user’s 
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successive input. The output is like a topographic map of poetic landscape “picturing” the 
particular user inclination bouncing back and forth an opposition of organic objects 
(natural or handcrafted) and modular artifacts (mass-produced or consumerist) that 
saturate our lives, with animated human figures, or personas, traversing the topography 
and accumulating their “adaptations” (bodily experiences) to the topoi they have 
journeyed through. 
 This section describes the generative algorithms implemented in this work for 
autonomous and reactive phenomena, the rules applied in producing enduringly 
transformative personas, and the development of interaction mechanisms to involve 
motion-sensitive user input. 
Semantic Annotation 
 The initial set of modular graphic images consists of twelve tiles each of which is 
semantically annotated with perceptual, conceptual, and structural qualities, following the 
Hiraga’s (and thus Peirce’s) theory mentioned above. These qualities suggest how the 
tiles can be put together successively in response to user input. 
Perceptual and Conceptual Qualities of Tiles 
 Perceptual qualities include some basic visual attributes, including shape and 
pattern, together with some labels of other multimedia elements, such as movement and 
sound. At the conceptual level, tiles are divided into two groups representing the 
dichotomy of modular and organic objects. The former consists of post-industrial 
artifacts, which are mostly mass-produced, standardized, and institutionalized. The latter 
are relatively natural, handcrafted, and local culturally developed (Figure 8.1). 
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Figure 8.1 A diagram showing the associational (link) and oppositional (shift) 
relationship between the tiles 
Structural Qualities of Tiles 
 Structural qualities determine how tiles may or may not be conjoined. They 
implement a combination of cinematic and graphic design conventions considering shot 




Figure 8.2 A graph showing the edge qualities of the tiles in cinematographic convention: 
close-up (CU), full shot (FS), wide shot (WS), etc. Please note there exists some 
tolerance between WS and FS incorporating variability and divergence. 
Matching Algorithm 
 In conceptual metaphor, blending, and analogy theories cited above, elements are 
mapped from one mental space to another. Building upon insights gained from the Alloy 
algorithm, Harrell developed an algorithm to find analogous, or “matching,” tiles based 
upon structural similarity10 between metadata descriptions of multimedia assets. A 
general description of the approach follows. 
 Tiles are put together consecutively. For each pasted tile, the set of possible next 
tiles is determined using the matching algorithm, which first shortlists possible images 
based on the weighted structural qualities, and then computes how well the candidates 
match the previous tile. The degree of a match depends on some combination of the three 
qualities. The author can specify the relative weightings of the perceptual, structural, and 
conceptual aspects of images in computing a match. This enables authors to determine 
their own notions of what comprises a match. In this example work, I set the weightings 
of the perceptual negative, the conceptual positive, and the structural zero. Hence, a link 
                                                 
 
 
10 What mathematicians call homomorphism. 
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is a positive-degree match in which the two tiles belong to the same conceptual group 
(either modular or organic) but differ in shape and pattern. In contrast, a shift is a 
negative-degree match, also available to the user, and the two tiles would have opposite 
conceptual group (modular vs. organic) but similar perceptual qualities (e.g., shape). In 
short, the juxtaposition (either link or shift) of tiles is always constrained by the structural 
qualities, and the perceptual and conceptual qualities, along with user input, are used to 
determine whether the juxtaposition is a link or a shift (see Figure 8.3 & 8.4). 
 
Figure 8.3 A perceptual link (conceptual shift) from factory to walkway, with a structural 
constraint from WS to FS 
 
Figure 8.4 A conceptual link (perceptual shift) from amusement park to train track, with a 
structural constraint from WS to FS 
 The above matching algorithm enables the landscape to extend according to an 
internal logic. The system always suggests next tiles to be linked either conceptually or 
perceptually. While the system allows the user to select a direction to extend the 
landscape, the opposite weightings between perceptual and conceptual qualities force a 
change in concept to be along with a match in shape or pattern. Therefore, the user would 
soon realize that a conceptual shift and a perceptual link are coupled. This matching 
pattern reveals the autonomous transformation of the poetic landscape. 
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Transformational Rules 
 Another part of the work is to populate the landscape with context-sensitive 
human figures in order to charge the output with more evocative metaphors like 
traditional renku poetry. This transforming figure exemplifies what Harrell has referred to 
as a polymorphic persona, in this case transforming based upon how it naturalizes in each 
environment based on appropriate, context specific use or possession of artifacts (Harrell 
2010). When the figures traverse the landscape, the personas will change to reflect the 
human adaptation in different modular or organic topoi. For example, a persona walking 
in the forest would carry a shotgun. When entering the parking lot, the shotgun-man 
would be further loaded, becoming a shopping-cart-shotgun-man. In other words, a 
persona accumulates the track record, and so history, of the walking character, resulting 
in a transforming persona. This type of transformation is combinatorial, as each of the 
graphical elements for new artifacts are modular and can be combined with any image of 
the human. Transformation can occur in other ways, however. A special type of 
combinatorial relationship is a recursive one. In this type of relationship a graphical 
element may be nested inside of another one. Finally, we also can transform characters 
using procedural techniques such as distorting the image using a visual filter, altering the 
color, or performing a scaling, shearing, or rotating mathematical transformation. Figure 




Figure 8.5 Rules for transforming personas and some examples 
 Transformation according to the rules above brings about liveliness in the walking 
characters. They seem to metamorphose and evolve autonomously. In case that the 
system is set to render the link and shift even without user input, for example, by 
randomly choosing a direction to extend the landscape while idling for a while, the 
transforming personas would demonstrate the phenomenon of metamorphosis. On the 
other hand, if the user controls the direction of the traversal, the characters seem to walk 
in reaction to user input and transform accordingly. In this light, the transforming 
personas are also reactive. 
Interaction Mechanisms 
 The early implementation of this example work accepted only simple mouse 
clicks as user selection. After that, we have been developing the interaction mechanism 
of the work. First, we added the shift-focus effect to the conventional pointing device 
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input. Second, we are currently exploring the possibilities of implementing other forms of 
motion-sensitive input. 
Shift-Focus Effect 
 Initially, user input is accepted solely via conventional mouse clicks. In each 
interaction cycle, a user is provided with possible subsequent tiles in different direction 
(left, right, up, or down) suggested by the system, and the system would wait for a user 
click confirming on either one option. In order for an enduring interaction, additional 
motion-based input is considered. For example, the optional tiles are blurred with respect 
to how far the mouse pointer moves away from them. When the pointer moves closer to a 
particular optional tile, the tile would become sharper, imitating the shift-focus effect in 
cinematography. This simple interactive visual effect is motion sensitive because the 
degree of blurriness depends on the relative position of the pointer to the tile at any 
moment. Moreover, this motor-sensory interaction constitutes an elastic anchor for 
immediate imaginative blends with the user’s sensorimotor experience of moving the 
eyes, or a camera, to wander around and focus on one target at any one time. Further 
imaginative elaboration of the blend would result in the frame of “decision-making in 
everyday life.” When the pointer rests on a tile, the tile would be clearer than others but 
still subtly floating around the pointer like something up in the air, invoking a sense of 
uncertainty because of an experientially based metaphor “unknown is up; known is 
down” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, pp. 20-21). Once the user clicks on a floating tile, it 
would be pinned down and confirmed, telling that the decision is irreversible. 
Finger-Walking Input 
 Although the shift-focus effect provokes imagination and varies significantly with 
certain motion parameters, the interaction mechanism is not very enduring because the 
system would wait indefinitely for a user click so as to confirm a tile. Although the 
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characters would keep walking without user input, they are animation loops rather than 
enduring transformation. We started to think of substitutes for mouse clicks. Hence, the 
touchpad comes into play in our ongoing development, as it is the most accessible 
motion-sensitive input device for us. Instead of clicking on the touchpad or moving the 
pointer, we could implement gesture recognition engines to accept various finger actions, 
such as circling, rubbing, pinching, and others. Meanwhile, this specific motor input 
should be able to join with the sensory output generated by the system to form a tight 
motor-sensory connection, making the animated renku an elastic anchor, triggering 
imaginative elaboration. In the output, the exploration of the landscape and the 
transformation of the personas are already loaded with rich evocative metaphors. The 
global one is “life is a journey” back and forth between the post-industrial and the 
primitive (please see the artists’ statement in (Harrell & Chow, 2009)). In order to echo 
this main theme, the motion-based input should embody a user’s intention to traverse the 
landscape. For example, finger walking can be a good candidate, with walking pace 
affecting the transforming personas’ traversing speed and a turn in walking direction 
triggering a shift. The act of finger walking ties tightly with the traversal in the landscape, 
giving rise to new imaginative blends of “a landscape of forking paths” and a life of 
choices.  
Considering New Animation Principles and Variables 
 When developing this example GVR work, we found that animation phenomena 
are indispensable in the presentation of generative and interactive visual artworks. 
Generative rules and interaction mechanisms jointly lead to autonomous transformations 
and reactive behaviors. The result is a kind of interactive generative animation. Hence, 
analyzing the example work with respect to the new animation principles and the 
corresponding variables informs us of room for further development and exploration in 
the GVR project. 
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Types of Liveliness 
 The output of the topographical renku work is an extending poetic landscape 
populated with walking human characters. On the one hand, both the landscape and 
characters exhibit emergent liveliness, because the transformations, including the 
changing brightness of tiles (reflecting the passing time of day) and the walk cycle of 
characters, are looping. In these loops, no obvious singular source of impulse can be 
observed. Nor do they bring about irreversible consequence to the topoi. On the other 
hand, the characters seem to have certain intention as they carry different possessions or 
change their personas when entering different topoi. These transformative adaptations 
incite the intentional stance. A user would speculate the reason behind, for example, 
carrying a shopping cart to the forest. Hence, the work also shows certain extent of 
intentional liveliness. Apart from that, there is no prominent interactional liveliness, 
because we do not intend to incorporate obvious causal relationship in the discourse of 
the work. In summary, the work presents a holistic illusion of life with a bias toward 
emergent animated patterns. 
Levels of Understanding 
 The human figures and topoi in the topographical renku work are depicted in 
rudimentary graphic forms, like iconographic or calligraphic styles. The animations, for 
example, the walk cycle, are reminiscent of our experiences of seeing someone 
promenading in the park or actually walking by ourselves. When a user selects a direction 
to extend the landscape, the sensory output blends with the user’s sensorimotor 
experiences of walking out in certain physical environments. In the blend, the connection 
between the user’s finger walking and promenading is compressed. The output is an 
imaginative navigation back and forth between nostalgic and urban areas. In addition, the 
aforementioned shift-focus effect adds another immediate blend in which the user “looks 
at” the possible paths one at a time when standing at a crossroad. The mapping between 
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pinning down a tile and walking into a chosen path is compressed into a decision made 
when navigating the poetic virtual space. 
 Next, the links and shifts in the poetic landscape, together with the transformative 
adaptations of human figures, provoke further imaginative elaboration on the blends. 
When the user notices, for example, a character with a shopping cart walking across the 
boundary between the parking lot and the forest, both of which look similar in shape (see 
Figure 8.1), the animated output invokes the frame of consumerism and yields a 
metaphorical narrative in which one inevitably brings along consumer goods of modern 
societies in his or her everyday life. Since the transformational rules of the personas are 
thoughtfully designed by the authors, various metaphorical blends emerge from different 
links/shifts between topoi and the associated changes in character appearance, critically 
evoking how our social identities transform with subtle traces of memories based upon 
our environmental and social contexts and utilization of artifacts. 
Decelerated Engagement 
 As described in the section about interaction mechanisms, initial versions of the 
work largely rely on conventional mouse clicks as input. After suggesting a possible 
subsequent tile, the system waits indefinitely for a user click. This interaction is halted 
engagement. To make the engagement continuing, one condition is incorporation of 
motion-based motor input. Hence, the interactive shift-focus effect is added to consider 
the relative position of the mouse pointer at any moment and then display corresponding 
blurriness on the floating tiles. However, the engagement is still decelerated because 
without a user click no floating tile would be confirmed and the landscape would not 
extend. Although the human figures keep the walk cycle and some topoi continue 
animation loops, the whole environment does not evolve. In other words, there is no 
enduring transformation without user action. To address this inadequacy, the system can 
be programmed to execute automatic selection of outstanding tiles after a certain while of 
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idling. Yet, this idea is dismissed because this mechanism violates the essential 
collaborative ordered structure of linked poetry. Finally, decelerated engagement is 
regarded as a feature of the topographical renku work. 
Degree of Liveness 
 Stored visual materials in the example GVR work include primarily a set of 
modular graphic images, comprising all the tiles and human figures. Most 
transformations, such as the changing brightness of the tiles, the rain or snow effect, the 
swing of the private ship in the amusement park, and the like are (or will be) 
implemented algorithmically and dynamically. One exception is the walk cycle of the 
human personas, which is represented by a sequence of still images (a sprite). Yet, 
through the transformational rules, including combinatorial, procedural, and recursive 
methods, the system generates a wide array of possible transformative walking personas. 
Together with the employment of pseudorandom generation in selection of tiles, 
deployment of weather effects, and so on, the work is able to cast fairly contingent 
output, forming a fairly live co-performance between the user and the system. 
Summary 
 The GVR project attempts to extend form-dominant generative approaches in 
contemporary art to incorporate emotional meanings and evocative contents. The 
sequentially connected structure and the multitude of emotion-laden topics in renku 
poetry make it a good candidate to serve as a departure point for our research inquiry. In 
designing and developing the particular example of GVR works described in this chapter, 
we construct a semi-structured annotation system of semantic qualities based on Hiraga’s 
framework, and then apply it to an array of visual images. In addition, we adapt the 
matching algorithm in the GRIOT system to implement new generative system 
dynamically outputting images constrained on perceptual, structural, and conceptual 
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bases when accepting user input. Finally, dynamic generation and interaction of images 
from the system with the user naturally manifest the new animation phenomena I have 
described, including autonomous transformations, reactive behaviors, metamorphoses, 
and contingencies.  
 When designing generative rules and interaction mechanisms for this 
topographical renku work, I found that the principles of interactive generative animation 
and the associated variables help not just imbue the artifact with an expanded illusion of 
life but actually conjoin the form and content. On the one hand, scrutinizing the types of 
liveliness and the decelerated engagement directs my attention to the form of presentation 
and interaction. On the other hand, analyzing the levels of imaginative understanding 
points me to the content. The two sides converge when I examine how the artifact acts as 
an elastic anchor enabling the motor-sensory connection and triggering imaginative 
elaboration. In this light, I believe the set of new principles can inform authors or 
designers a promising way of integrating interactive generative visual artworks with rich 
evocative and affective meanings. In this new kind of digital media artifacts, content 
emerges from form, and form hinges on content. 
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The text and figures of this chapter, in part, contain material that is a reprint of, or has 
been submitted for publication in (Chow & Harrell, 2010; Harrell & Chow, 2009). The 






 This dissertation introduced a new perspective on animation in today’s digitally 
mediated contexts. This perspective shifts away from existing medium-centric views 
toward a broader interdisciplinary phenomenon-oriented approach that emphasizes the 
motor-sensory feedback loops mobilized during human interaction with multimedia 
artifacts imbued with the new animation phenomena supported by interactive 
computational generation. This new notion of animation, which I call interactive 
generative animation, builds upon four areas of knowledge from the vantage points of (1) 
the observer, (2) the image, (3) the body, and (4) the performer, giving rise to four 
principles with an array of qualitative variables. I constructed a corpus of media artifacts 
exemplifying the principles and demonstrating the inclinations of the respective 
variables, resulting in a novel taxonomy of the new animation paradigm. This taxonomy 
brings new insights to interaction design from humanistic animation studies and 
centralizes embodied cognition ideas in designing animation, suggesting designers or 
developers alternative design perspectives and possibilities. To illustrate the application 
of the new framework, I described an ongoing generative and interactive visual art 
project, GVR, and discussed the animation phenomena implemented in the related work. 
During the project development, the proposed principles and variables reminded us of 
current inadequacies and suggested possible directions toward achieving all-round 
liveliness, imaginative understanding, enduring interaction, and divergent computer 
improvisation. I believe the approach argued for here would benefit the creation of not 
just digital artworks, but also multimedia artifacts at large, because interactive generative 
animation makes computational artifacts more “human-familiar” and “life-like.” 
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 Generative and interactive animation expands the meaning of “illusion of life.” 
The expanded illusion includes images that not only move, but also show reaction, 
autonomous transformation, metamorphosis, and contingency. These dynamic 
phenomena of life characterize interactive generative animation, and also reciprocally 
expand the meaning of “animation.” As I have talked about many meanings of the term at 
the very beginning of this dissertation, here come several new ones, which resonate with 
the broad theoretical context of art, poetics, media, and technology. 
Animation as an Illusion of Life in the Age of Interactive Computational Generation 
 In his 1935 seminal essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction,” Walter Benjamin marks the impact of reproduction technologies 
emerging at that time on the authenticity of the art object (Benjamin, 1968). Mechanical 
reproduction, he argued, replicates the original and negates its uniqueness in time and 
space. He eloquently described the phenomenon as “the decay of the aura.” This decay 
reflects the emergent human desire to bring things “closer,” both “spatially and 
humanly,” including the one-time sacred art object. This view echoes with my proposal 
to bring computers “closer” to humans, but the art object is moved from the spiritual end 
while the computer from the mechanical end. Initially the computer was a tool, 
instrument, and machine. Interactive multimedia technologies make it more “human” by 
creating an expanded illusion of life in terms of new animation phenomena.  
 To Benjamin, film was a new celebrated form of art in that era, because the 
cinema allows the mass audience to be “unconscious” critics of art by subsuming the cult 
value of the art object in public exhibition. Perception of film is a middle ground between 
the concentrated appreciation of painting and the distracted use of architecture. I would 
add that interactive generative animation is its counterpart in the computer age, and it 
shifts the original instrumental value of the computer to an imaginative value by 
immersing human users in enduring and everyday environments, presenting all-round 
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liveliness in order for their concentrated and diluted attentions, triggering evocative 
material-based imagination in their minds, and turning them into performers or 
animators.  
Animation as a Simulacrum of Life 
 While Benjamin asserted that copies problematize the original, Jean Baudrillard 
further claimed that simulacra displace or dismiss the original (Baudrillard, 1988). By 
simulacra, he meant the signs in contemporary media context that have no original 
referents. These media objects seem to imitate something but actually bear no relation to 
any reality. In fact, a simulacrum is by itself a part of the real, not the imaginary. As 
Baudrillard’s well-known example of Disneyland reveals, the image of the amusement 
park is not an imaginary world for kids, but instead a simulacrum of the “real” adult 
world, because the same childishness is everywhere in the societies outside. A cultural 
critic might say that the ideology of the park is an integral part of the hegemony of 
American culture. In short, simulacra blur the distinction between the real and the 
imaginary, and even become part of the real. 
 In this regard, the new animation paradigm is not just an illusion of life, but also a 
simulacrum of life. As I have argued, interactive generative animation provokes material-
based imagination and destabilizes the opposition between material images (the real) and 
mental images (the imaginary). People engaging with artifacts of the new animation 
paradigm see the animated images as “real” phenomena, because the associated motor-
sensory experiences are so embodied and evocative. Moreover, this expanded illusion of 
life is so pervasive in today’s digitally mediated contexts that it becomes an integral part 
of the modern life. The animated multimedia artifacts mentioned in this dissertation 
apparently imitate people’s everyday experiences through all-round liveliness and 
enduringly changing environments, yet they actually engender unprecedented behaviors 
and habits, such as web users sending virtual snowflakes with greetings instead of 
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mailing traditional cards during Christmas, commuters gazing at virtual koi fish 
anywhere with their hand-held ponds, or people meeting in an art gallery reading motion 
poems. These new human activities embody the simulation of life supported by 
interactive generative animation in digital media and bring it back to everyday life. 
Hence, animation is embodied and realized as a simulacrum. 
Animation as a Spiritual-Functional Phenomenon 
 Animation transcends the instrumental value of the computer, giving way to an 
imaginative value. Through provoking material-based imagination, animated artifacts 
give rise to new human behaviors and habits embodying a simulacrum of life. At the 
heart of this embodiment lies the motor-sensory feedback loop mobilized by generative 
and interactive systems. Hence, there exists a nuanced interplay between animation and 
the computer. On the one hand, animation instills the computer with soul and spirit by 
creating a holistic illusion of life and enduringly changing environments. On the other 
hand, interactive computational generation enables the sensorimotor functions of 
animated artifacts. As I argued elsewhere (Chow, 2009), this interplay short-circuits the 
notions of spirituality and functionality. The two seemingly contrasting terms “spirit” and 
“function” actually have a subtle and unnoticed link both etymologically and 
phenomenologically. The Latin origin of “spirit” literally means “breath,” which is a 
physiological process of taking in air and expelling it, and the ability to breathe is a 
phenomenal function of living things. Hence, spirituality and functionality jointly 
describe a phenomenon of life. Obviously the computer and animated artifacts cannot 
“breathe” literally, yet as this dissertation has demonstrated, they do perform other 
physiological functions in motor-sensory loops, such as moving in reaction to stimuli. 
Since interactive generative animation is a simulacrum, the new animation phenomena 
are “real” and they revitalize the original connection between the spiritual and the 
functional. 
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 This new spiritual-functional connection “animates” the computer and brings it 
closer to humans. I call this technological phenomenon spiritual-functional animation. It 
conceals the complexity and abstraction of the computer, and wraps it with a “skin,” very 
much like the costumes for marionettes, the shells of automata, the cement of fountains, 
or the silk screen in shadow puppet theaters. These systems engage the human pursuit to 
“stage,” but “veil,” technology in order to create spectacles, suspense, and surprise for 
audiences. In this sense, spiritual-functional animation helps popularize and proliferate 
computing technology in cultural and economical context. As I argued, the new 
animation paradigm invites its audiences and users to be animators, puppeteers, or even 
wizards in computer-mediated co-performance. Through its accessibility, spiritual-
functional animation can potentially help adapt every technology-challenged novice into 
a tinkering hacker. Hence, the phenomenon is not only technological but also cultural, 
economical, and personal. 
 Today, animation is omnipresent. The phenomenon of spiritual-functional 
animation continues absorbing, assimilating, and molding our perception and psychology. 
It confronts a new uncanny valley, in which we negotiate familiarity and strangeness 
based on how we situate ourselves relative to those ubiquitous human-familiar digital 
media artifacts. One day we might see and “believe” animated simulacra in digital media 
as natural as phenomena in physical reality. Our capacity to hunt or flee in physical 
space, which is believed to be a major training for human action and perception 
development in some primordial past (Arnheim, 1974, p. 372), would likely be shifted to 
techniques to enable us to “crawl” or “surf” in cyberspace. 
 239 
The text of this chapter, in part, contains material that is a reprint of, or has been 
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